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Abstract 
 
As the title points out, the main purpose of this dissertation is to address “The 
EU enhanced cooperation model: possible application to the entry into force impasse of 
CTBT”.   
The delay of the entry into force of CTBT raises attention mostly because of the 
rigid provisions of the Treaty.  The CTBT and EU enhanced cooperation, the origin, the 
legal precedents and the legal structure of CTBT constitute the main object of this 
research and study. An attempt to evaluate the possibility of applying the EU enhanced 
cooperation model to the provisional application of the CTBT is suggested.  
The compatibility between rigid and flexible rules and legal provisions is taken 
into the analysis developed, while at the same time the substantive object of CTBT – all 
nuclear-explosions-ban – is framed in a more vast scholarship of other disarmament, 
non-proliferation, and arms control treaties. The flexibility of the uses of concepts will 
be measured against the purpose of each interpretation. 
International law examples will be added whenever of value to illustrate 
situations or assessments.  
  
  
Keywords: arms control, CTBT, disarmament, flexibility, enhanced 
cooperation, entry into force, erga omnes, flexibility, jus cogens, non-proliferation, 
provisional application, ratification  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Wie schon der Titel hinweist, ist die Absicht dieser Dissertation: Die verstärkte 
Zusammenarbeit der EU als mögliches Vorbild für einen Durchbruch zur Inkraftsetzung 
des Vertrages über ein umfassendes Verbot von Nuklearversuchen (CTBT). 
Die Verspätung für die Inkraftsetzung des CTBT hängt mit den strengen 
Vorschriften des Vertrages zusammen. Der Vertrag über ein umfassendes Verbot von 
Nuklearversuchen und die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit der EU, Herkunft, die 
rechtmäßigen Voraussetzungen und die rechtliche Struktur des CTBT sind die Inhalte 
dieser Forschungsarbeit. Diese Arbeit ist ein Versuch die Möglichkeit auszuwerten, ob 
der Mechanismus der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit in der EU als Vorbild für die 
vorläufige Anwendung des CTBT sein könnte. 
Die Vereinbarkeit zwischen strengen und flexiblen Normen und rechtlichen 
Voraussetzungen wird im Laufe dieser Arbeit weiter entwickelt und ausgewertet. Zur 
gleichen Zeit wird der Inhalt des CTBT, ein umfassendes Verbot von allen 
Nuklearversuchen in Verbindung mit breiteren Studien über Abrüstungs-, 
Nichtverbreitungs- und Rüstungskontrollverträgen gebracht. Die Flexibilität in der 
Anwendung der Begriffe wird gemessen an die jeweilige Absicht der jeweiligen 
Auslegung. 
Völkerrechtliche Beispiele werden dann dazugenommen, wenn sie zur 
Verdeutlichung von Situationen oder zu ihrer Auswertung Beitragen. 
 
 
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: Rüstungskontrolle, CTBT, Abrüstung, Flexibilität, verstärkte 
Zusammenarbeit, Inkraftsetzung, erga omnes, jus cogens, Nichtverbreitung, vorläufige 
Anwendung, Ratifizierung 
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Introduction 
 
 It is deceiving that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that has been 
concluded as a Treaty aiming at contributing to Peace between States is still not in force 
after 16 years. It is not a single case in international law, but what makes this case 
appalling is that it is not because of its content is controversial that it is not in force, but 
only because of factors that go beyond the Treaty itself. For some parties the negotiation 
format was the incorrect one, for other parties the Treaty could include extra elements 
(not that those that have been included are wrong or unacceptable). Some others argue 
that the requirements for its implementation must be revisited. In reality, it is a political 
argumentation and it is any sort of legality or normativity that impedes its entry into 
force. 
A party that has signed or ratified the Treaty can hardly oppose to its entry into 
force. However, disagreement exists regarding CTBT and therefore a solution may need 
to be found to make the Treaty fully effective. The problem has been identified long 
ago, but so far no satisfying solution has been put forward, despite a few examples in 
that sense. When dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament themes, discussions 
are normally slow and tough, but it is expectable that the CTBT should at least have as 
many ratifying States as NPT does. Nevertheless, the entry into force has never been 
taken as an easy step, in fact the CTBT includes a provision intended to favour a 
reanalysis of the possibilities of entry into force. 
  
1. Main question 
 
As the title points out, the main purpose of this dissertation is to address “The 
EU enhanced cooperation model: possible application to the entry into force impasse of 
CTBT”.  It is a proposal based in EU and international law. 
Western law has been at the basis of international law and has served as an 
inspiration for several domestic legal orders in the World as well. EU law is one of the 
major contributions of EU to the world for the last 60 years, not only regarding 
regulatory principles, but the rule of law as a whole. The legal contribution of EU must 
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be kept or else the international law system may fall apart if deprived of one of its major 
roots. Moreover, the EU contribution as far as law is concerned may be one of the major 
elements of EU external action. 
Due to the fact that EU law constitutes a solid corpus juris and there is nothing 
to impede that it sets as an example in different contexts than EU, it is admissible that 
some of the principles, mechanisms and concepts that the EU has generated could be 
adopted at different instances and by different organisations. The EU model can serve as 
a model or, depending on the subject, be directly applicable to international law.  
The entry into force of CTBT has been delayed for too long due to the strict 
disposition of article XIV. However, diverse solutions may be found to advance with 
the process. The enhanced cooperation mechanism as inspired by the EU treaties may 
be a good alternative. 
Nevertheless it must be stated that any proposal that may be advanced in order to 
suggest a possible way forward for the CTBT cannot put legitimacy at stake just to 
privilege effectiveness, otherwise the rule of law could eventually be put into question. 
It would be a serious mistake to opt for any kind of legal illegitimate alternative, even if 
politically more comfortable. 
 
2. State of the art 
 
The question of entry into force and provisional applications has been dealt with 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and in the different works that 
preceded it. The fact that the dispositions on entry into force and provisional application 
may help in moving forward to find a solution for the CTBT, although not all States that 
have signed or ratified the CTBT, or that may do so, have ratified the Convention.  
On the other hand, the International Court of Justice judgment, Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2002, para. 258 and in particular para. 
264.) which declared article 24 of Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties a 
customary rule of international law, making the entry into force of Treaties a binding 
procedure for the States that decide to go along with Treaties among themselves, shows 
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that the engagement of a State regarding ratification and entry into force of Treaties is 
part of the rule of law principles. 
Moreover, the CTBT foresees the possibility to the parties to take a different 
decision regarding its entry into force than the text of the Treaty approved, and that is in 
line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This fundamental text will be 
taken into consideration in the analysis that is intended here. 
According to scholarship, there are not so many analyses on non-ratified treaties, 
although the problem has been raised by few studies on this specific matter. As for 
CTBT, most of the publications issued so far basically deal with the negotiations period 
of the Treaty and its technical elements. Only in rare occasions is the problem created 
by the difficulties regarding the non-entry into force of CTBT treated from a legal 
perspective. In most of the cases where the matter is tackled it is done mainly as a 
political question. It is undoubtedly a political question, but it surely involves a legal 
solution, which implementation can be of some help for the political question of non-
ratification. 
It must be said that entry into force of treaties and agreements depends on 
domestic legal order as well. To illustrate this aspect, we will just quote an example 
close to us, the Portuguese case. The Portuguese Constitution defines the procedures for 
the ratification act and the delays for the procedures, and both elements may have by 
themselves in some cases consequences on international law by, for instance, retarding 
the entry into force of a particular Treaty or agreement.  
The Portuguese legal norm distinguishes two different procedures according to 
the kinds of treaties at stake, to which it gives the name of Treaty or Agreement. The 
ratification procedures are essentially different, both in terms of the actors involved and 
the competences attributed to each of them, and also the power to block or not the 
ratification process, and therefore its entry into force. 
In the case of Treaties, the Government has to present a decree to the President 
who ratifies it. In the case the Treaty deals with Parliament competences, this organ has 
also to approve the text beforehand by a resolution, which is then ratified by the 
President. The Constitution is very accurate on defining the competences of each organ, 
besides, in case of doubt, the Government can always ask the Parliament for its 
22 
 
approval, thus giving it a political strength that may make an opposition by the 
President more difficult.  
On the other hand, the President can ask the Constitutional Court for its opinion 
on procedural matters, as well as between the compatibility of the signed Treaty and the 
Constitution. A negative opinion allows the President to refuse signing the ratification, 
which is then sent back to the Parliament that can ratify it by a 2/3 majority. 
In the case of agreements, they are approved by the Government by decree 
which is presented to the President for signature. The President cannot refuse its 
signature to the decrees. 
The Constitution is silent on the delays regarding the ratification of a Treaty or 
Agreement as a whole, but when the process has started, the time frames for each of the 
steps is defined and the different actors must comply with them. 
This is just one of many examples of domestic law regarding ratification 
procedures. The question arising from the diverse procedures of ratification and entry 
into force in domestic legal orders shall not be addressed in this study, but it must be 
noted that ratification processes are of different nature from State to State and depend 
on each constitutional order. 
The problem that is at stake in this investigation is to find ways to change the 
approach to CTBT so that it does not stay, as it is now, hostage of an individualized 
group of states. 
 
3. Purpose 
 
A proposal will be attempted to provide an answer to the question that guided us 
all along our research and which we have pursue in this dissertation.  This proposal will 
include a combination of European law and International law as a suggestion for a 
solution for the implementation of CTBT and to its entry into force. The goal is to 
develop some of the legal possibilities created by EU enhanced cooperation and suggest 
its implementation as far as CTBT is concerned. By doing so, a challenge on flexibility 
will be tried. 
23 
 
Taking into account the precise rules of EU enhanced cooperation; we will try to 
verify if this mechanism can be used for the entry into force of the CTBT. It will be a 
theoretical approach with a clear background notion that, in this particular case, any 
move towards entry into force basically requires the political will from States 
Signatories and Ratifiers.  
Nevertheless, if we were to consider possible ways out from the standstill in 
which we are at the moment, and even if there is a political will to do so, a legal 
solution will have to be found. The EU enhanced cooperation mechanism can be a 
model to overcome the lethargy of the ratification process of the Treaty and thus 
allowing its entry into force or at least its provisional application.  
Despite the truly innovative character of EU enhanced cooperation, it must be 
also said that the general approach can be found in international law, and especially 
within the legal framework of other international organisations. This reality makes it 
easier to try to apply an EU concept outside the EU structures, even if it has to be 
adapted.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
We have opted to limit the number of quotations and instead refer to the original 
works and by doing so we have identified the references that somehow are connected 
with our text in footnotes, in order for the reader to follow our reasoning without 
disturbances.  
The choice made to indicate full bibliographic references in the footnotes intends 
to facilitate the reading of the text. In the end, the bibliography is divided in two major 
groups (primary sources and general bibliography), to distinguish official texts from 
critical literature. The jurisprudence references regarding the cases of the European 
Court are not all quoted the same way because full information was not available at the 
ECJ site, namely the page numbers, one of the reasons for that might be the fact they are 
also not presented in pdf format despite the chorus of bloggers appealing to the ECJ to 
take measures to solve this problem. 
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All the mistakes and inexactnesses that may have been engendered in this text 
are our own sole responsibility. 
As far heuristic is concerned, the focus was mainly on more recent literature due 
to the almost daily changes in EU law and also in CTBT evolution. Although most of 
the bibliography is in English, it must be noticed that are many authors of distinct 
proveniences. Portuguese, French and Spanish literature was also included. There is not 
much case law on the subject dealt with in this study, i.e., enhanced cooperation and 
entry into force of treaties. 
Regarding hermeneutics, we privileged a contextual reading in time and space, 
but always trying to establish connections between the different positions expressed 
both to find similarities and to recognise differences. Conclusions were then taken. To 
avoid losing track of the main purpose of this study and the fact that there is abundant 
literature on philosophy of international law and law systems, we shall not deal with any 
of these concepts here, although they are necessarily at the basis of any legal research, 
independently of the theme. 
As far as reference to numbers that may change over time (like CTBT signatory 
or ratifier States or number os States participating in an enhanced cooperation), we have 
set the date of 1 December 2012 as the limit to our updates. It would be impossible to 
ensure a full update until the date of presentation of this study, due to the fact that 
numbers may change at anytime. 
 
5. Structure of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation is divided in three distinct parts. The first concerns the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, its origin and nature; the second regards 
European Union enhanced cooperation mechanism and similarities in international law; 
and the third is constituted by an attempt to present different possible applications of 
enhanced cooperation in EU, first, and the potential use of such mechanism as far as the 
application or entry into force of CTBT are concerned. Concepts are approached all 
along the dissertation and attention to the definitions and uses is given according to its 
presence in the text. 
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Chapter I refers to the genesis and to the background of CTBT. There is an 
attempt to characterize some concepts that will be used all along the dissertation and, at 
the same time, to establish an historical perspective of CTBT, as well as its relations 
with treaties within the same domain. This chapter also includes some theoretical 
aspects of international law, namely the recognition of erga omnes obligations and 
effects and also the applicability of jus cogens within the context under consideration. 
In terms of concepts regarding non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, there is 
an effort to complement the definitions with examples of treaties that somehow deal 
with an approximate object of CTBT. 
Chapter II analyses the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-
Treaty and tries to establish some comparisons with similar provisions in other 
international treaties. When analysing the Preparatory Commission, some focus will be 
directed to whether it should be considered, or not, a provisional or interim application 
of the Treaty.  There is no specific jurisprudence regarding CTBT even because it is not 
in force, but there are some court decisions, mainly from the International Court of 
Justice that can and should be referred as they deal with matters that are connected with 
the subject of the Treaty and to procedural dispositions that in some cases are also 
applicable to the CTBT. 
Chapter III focus on the problems regarding the entry into force of CTBT and 
presents the difficulties arising from the provisions of the Treaty. The discussion of this 
topic intends to be more of legal than of political nature. This chapter also includes the 
presentation of proposals that so far have been forward for an early entry into force of 
CTBT. Another aspect also raised here is the relation with customary international law, 
namely by referring to previous treaties on a similar domain. 
Before moving to the proposal intended to be suggested in the present 
dissertation, the general question on enhanced cooperation will be taken into account. 
The main goal of this study is to present a legal proposal to solve a problem of 
ratification and entry into force of a multilateral Treaty but avoiding the change of the 
Treaty’s text. 
Chapter IV intends to explain the changes occurred in enhanced cooperation as 
far as EU law is concerned, the different nomenclature it has received and the 
consequences of its adoption, as well the purpose of such an initiative. The historical-
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thematic perspective is followed in this chapter with detail. An analysis on flexibility in 
EU is also offered.  
Chapter V scrutinizes the concept of enhanced cooperation on its legal validity, 
its uses and procedures of implementation. It finalises by presenting the effective 
examples of enhanced cooperation adopted as foreseen in the treaties and some of the 
problems arising from its adoption. There is already some jurisprudence dealing with 
enhanced cooperation and it shall be given adequate attention as far as the theme of this 
work is concerned. The jurisprudence deals mostly with the application of enhanced 
cooperation and not so much with its use and implementation mode. 
Chapter VI makes an evaluation of the use of enhanced cooperation in 
international law to conclude that it is not at all an unknown concept, but it is not as 
developed as in EU law, despite some cases of comparable forms of understanding of 
the concept, namely by APEC and ASEAN. The differences in the uses of the concept 
are mainly on its scope of and implementation forms. This discrepancy is also 
discernible in some cases of domestic laws, where the concept of enhanced cooperation 
is occasionally used, but never with the same comprehensive character as defined by EU 
law. 
After these two elements of the present work have been presented, the CTBT 
and EU enhanced cooperation, and without arguing in any syllogistic sense, a 
combination between the two constituents is then tested. Not that there is any idea of 
two premises originating a consequence, but a separate explanation of both of those 
elements was considered necessary by us before starting with the presentation of a 
concrete proposal. 
Chapter VII will review EU enhanced cooperation and will try to identify other 
areas where the concept could be applied taking into account the evolution of events and 
EU law. It is a hypothetical approach, even if backed on scholarship. This hypothesis is 
put forward as a legal possibility and not with any political intent, an intent that would 
go beyond the purpose of this dissertation. The goal is to reveal some examples of 
possible enhanced cooperation within EU law. A specific mention will be made to the 
present problem of the sovereign debt and the discussions in the Council of the 
European Union on the need of a specific Treaty to handle some of the issues. A 
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position we do not share, as the recourse to enhanced cooperation could be a better 
option. 
Chapter VIII assesses the application of the EU enhanced cooperation 
mechanism to the CTBT, both considering provisional application of the Treaty and its 
entry into force. The aim of the chapter is to identify which elements foreseen in the 
TFUE/TUE regarding enhanced cooperation can be applied to the CTBT and in which 
cases there may be a need for changes. A concrete legal proposal is formulated here. 
The conclusion of this dissertation will eventually sum up the main questions 
addressed in this exercise underlining the added-value of EU law for international law.  
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Chapter I - CTBT- Its genesis and influences 
 
1. Brief remarks on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: 
similarities to other multinational Treaties   
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) text was adopted in 1996 
by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution
1
, after two years and a half of intense 
negotiations
2
 at the United Nations Disarmament Commission (which had been created 
in 1952) in Geneva.  The resolution received 158 votes in favour, 3 against (India
3
, 
Libya and Bhutan) and 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania, 
19 States (including North Korea) were absent or prevented from voting for having 
arrears. The adoption of the Treaty opened it for signature
4
. However, after 16 years the 
Treaty is still not in force due to the fact that its entry into force depends upon a unique 
criterion: the ratification of CTBT requires that 44 specific States, listed in Annex 2 to 
the Treaty, conclude this procedure before the CTBT enters into force. Between 1945 
                                                                
1
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996. The Treaty was opened for 
signature on 24 September 1996. Voting record 
YES No Abstention No Vote - 19 
158 3 5 Voting right 
suspended -  14 
Out of the room  - 
5 
All the others 
States that are 
not in any of the 
other lists 
Buthan, India, 
Lybia 
Cuba, Lebanon, 
Mauritius, Syria, 
Tanzania 
Burundi, Central 
African Republic, 
Chad, Dominican 
Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Gambia, Iraq, 
Niger, Mali, Sao 
Tome and 
Principe, Somalia, 
Republic 
Democratic of 
Congo, Zambia, 
Comoros 
Democratic 
People’s Republic 
of Korea, Eritrea, 
Lesotho, Rwanda, 
Seychelles  
 
2
 Jonas, David S., “The comprehensive nuclear test ban Treaty: current legal status in the United States 
and the implications of a nuclear explosion”, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, vol. 39, n. 4, 2007: p.1014. 
3
 India keeps sustaining that the Treaty does not clearly set as the aim the total disarmament and until it 
happens, India will not sign the Treaty. If it were to keep this position indefinitely, the Treaty will never 
enter into force. One of India’s arguments is that laboratory testing and explosions are not banned by the 
Treaty, but those are only possible for the States that have recollected sufficient information from 
previous experiences. For New Delhi this means that the discrimination that it argued on 1968 regarding 
the NPT remains and it is unacceptable. 
4
 On 23 September 1996. 
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and 1998, there have been, at least, 2050 nuclear explosions worldwide
5
. In 1998 France 
acceded to the Treaty thus putting an end to its nuclear essays. It had been the only one 
of the five nuclear States that had not done it in 1996, while two others (China and 
USA) haven’t still ratified the Treaty. 
The Treaty was the end of a process initiated in 1993 by a UNGA resolution 
imposing the beginning of negotiations of a CTBT
6
. At this stage 183 States have 
signed the Treaty, 157 have ratified, 36 of annexe 2
7
 
In 1994, during the first phase of negotiations, France and UK hardly 
participated. If the number of papers presented by delegations reveal their engagement, 
the difference between those two and the other States, specially taking into account that 
those were two Nuclear States and Permanent Members of the Security Council, is 
noticeable: USA – 22 papers; Australia – 14; China – 13; Canada – 10; Russia and India 
– 7 each; Sweden – 6; France – 4, UK – None. The rolling text that was then used for 
the negotiations Treaty was a mixed of an Australian and a Swedish non paper. 
The question of the entry into force will occupy us thoroughly later on. At this 
stage the intention is only to raise the subject, for its particular importance. Taking into 
account the provisions of VCLT, in particular its article 24
8
, there are some elements 
that should be taken into account in all analysis of entry into force clauses, as only with 
the same criteria is it possible to infer conclusions on similarities and differences. It is 
of particular importance the ICJ judgment which declared article 24 VCLT as a 
customary rule of international law
9
, making the entry into force of Treaties a binding 
condition for the States that decide to go along with Treaties among themselves. We 
                                                                
5“Des explosions nucléaires expérimentales ont été réalisées dans tout type d’environnements, produisant 
des rayonnements en quantités dangereuses au-dessus du sol, sous-terre et sous l’eau. Des essais 
nucléaires ont été menés sur barge, sur tour, sous ballon, à la surface de la terre, sous l’eau à des 
profondeurs de 600 mètres, ou sous terre à plus de 2 400 mètres de profondeur et dans des tunnels 
horizontaux. Des bombes d’essai ont été larguées par des avions et tirées par des fusées dans 
l’atmosphère, à plus de 320 kilomètres. Partout où des essais d’armes nucléaires ont été réalisés, des 
problèmes écologiques et sanitaires sont apparus”, Peden, William, Hill, Felicity, “Le Traité 
d’interdiction des essais nucléaires mis à l’épreuve”, Fórum du Désarmament, n. 2, p. 17. 
6
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/70 of 16 December 1993. 
7
 http://www.ctbto.org/ 
8
Villiger, Mark E., Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Leiden-
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009: p. 339-348. 
9
 International Court of Justice, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, I. C. J. Reports 1998, 
para. 31and 32. 
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shall argue that the VCLT can be assumed as customary rule of international law
10
 
vested in one Treaty, thus making those States that have not acceded to be bound by its 
content, exception made to specific procedural aspects. 
The rules defined in the Treaties may vary, depending on the substance of the 
Treaty, the Parties, the impact intended for the Treaty, among other reasons. The 
following examples: i.e. the UN Charter, the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), the Statute of the International Criminal Court (SICC), and the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) are a clear sign of this diversity. Two aspects seem of particular 
importance: the number of Parties needed to make a Treaty enter into force
11
 and the 
time frame for it to happen. We assume that the deposit of the ratification instrument is 
a clear manifestation of the will of the Party to be bound by the Treaty, although we 
would recall article 18 of VCLT as it considers that, even if a party to a Treaty is not 
bound before the accomplishment of ratifying or any other concluding procedure 
contained in the Treaty, it is still under the obligation not to defeat the object and 
purpose
12
 of the Treaty in question. This might be one of the reasons supporting the 
moratoria from states that have signed the CTBT but which ratification is still pending.  
Differently from what it might seem normal, not all States have necessarily the 
same status regarding the entry into force of a Treaty. In some cases, there is an 
identification of a few mandatory ratifications by some States, like in the case of the UN 
Charter
13
, but those are not enough. The UNCLOS speaks only about a number (60)
14
, 
but does not name any State. The same number and without any specific reference to a 
State is predicted in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (SICC), article 126. 
The Kyoto Protocol, because it is a very technical Protocol and because it is attached to 
a previous instrument, the UNFCCC, could define a different set of rules, by including 
in the number of Parties required for its entry into force some other characteristics
15
. 
                                                                
10
 In the sense of Article 38, n. 1.b of ICJ Statute. 
11
 Lantis, Jeffrey S., The Life and Death of International Treaties. Double-edged diplomacy and the 
politics of ratification in comparative perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 2 
12
 Klabbers, Jan,“How to defeat a Treaty's object and purpose pending entry into force: toward manifest 
intent”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2007, vol, 34, n.2, p. 293. 
13
 UN Charter, article 110. 
14
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 308. 
15
 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, article 25. 
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One other aspect of the entry into force is the date set for the effect. The UN 
Charter, for instance, does not impose a date, but only a fact: the ratification of a certain 
group and a certain number of States. Ulterior ratifications make the UN Charter in 
force for those Sates on the date of the deposition of the ratifying instrument, which 
means that in reality there will always be some delay between the ratification act and its 
entry into force and the States are not compelled to hand over the instrument in any 
particular time frame, it depends exclusively on the will of the State. 
 The UNCLOS foresees a time frame for the entry into force after all the 
ratifications needed for the effect have been deposited. It also includes specific rules on 
this subject for future amendments. 
  Although with a different time frame, the SICC follows the same logic by 
defining a date for the entry into force after the fulfilment of procedural conditions, 
namely ratifications by States and deposit of ratifications. In spite of establishing the 
possibility of amendments, it does not say anything about their entry force, so it can be 
assumed that they will enter into force upon their approval. 
 The CTBT includes a provision on entry into force establishing a number and a 
nominal list of States which ratification is mandatory before entry into force. 
The CTBT is the first Treaty to abolish all sort of nuclear explosion tests, not 
allowing any exception on magnitude, environment or purposes of the explosion. The 
fact that it was adopted by a UNGA resolution makes it of normative value.  
The pressure for concluding a CTBT was indeed growing in 1995, not only the 
decision of extending the NPT indefinitely underlined that nuclear explosions had to 
stop (as it is said in its preamble), but the statement of principles and objectives for 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament included a provision stating the signature of 
a CTBT should be concluded by the end of 1996
16
. Moreover, the ICJ in 1996 
corroborated this idea in its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons
17
. 
                                                                
16
 The same idea will be repeated in the NPT review conference when it was included in the 13 steps 
document resulting from the Review Conference of 2000. 
17
 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinions, 
I.C.J. Reports, 1996: para.105(2). It is relevant to note that the ICJ refers in this paragraph to two different 
elements: to pursue and to conclude negations regarding nuclear disarmament. By doing so, the ICJ seems 
to intend not to exclude any step of the process, making it even stronger and legally valid. 
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Recognizing that UNGA resolutions may have normative value, the ICJ does not 
fully endorses the interpretation that the repetition of UNGA resolutions signifies the 
existence of a rule of international customary law
18
, nor does it refuses it, it just simply 
mentions it. We consider that the ICJ could be more assertive
19
, but as the ICJ has 
always refused to consider in its evaluation the conditions of the adoption and the 
content of a UNGA resolution
20
, it cannot recognize UNGA the opinio juris
21
 
requirement in international law
22
. Interesting enough, the ICJ does not comment on the 
validity of its own advisory opinions when they are not endorsed by all the judges. 
 
2. Getting some clarity on concepts 
 
2.1. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
 
 There is often some confusion in literature regarding the concepts of arms 
control and disarmament. It must be said that they are not necessarily synonyms, 
especially when the term is translated into other languages but English. The meaning of 
these concepts is involved in differentiated historical contexts that must be taken into 
account when these issues are addressed.  The concept of arms control seems to be less 
developed than the concept of disarmament
23
. Although CTBT is a disarmament 
                                                                
18
 Burroughs, John, “The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”, Conference on Nuclear Policy and Security on the eve of the 21st century, 
St. Petersburg, 1999:    p. 1 
19
 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in armed 
conflict, Advisory Opinions, I.C.J. Reports, 1996: p. 254. 
20
 The ICJ “does not find it necessary to expound the extent to which the proceedings of the General 
Assembly, antecedent to the adoption of a resolution, should be taken in interpreting that resolution”, 
International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1962: p. 156. 
21
 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinions, 
I.C.J. Reports, 1996: p.254-255 and Cassese, Antonio, International Law, 2nd ed., New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005: p.119; Ian Brownlie,  Principles of Public International Law, 7
th
 ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008: p.8-10; Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008: p.84 
22
 Baird, Darren Mitchell, “The changing posture of the international community regarding the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, n. 22, 1999, p. 557-548. 
23
 Baas, Richard, Negotiating nuclear weapons. A study on the merit of article VI of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Disarmament, Twente: University of Twente – Münster: Westfälische 
Wilhelms-Universität, 2008: p.16. 
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Treaty
24
, namely because it impedes that nuclear tests take place, and without nuclear 
explosions it is not possible to be sure that the nuclear weapon can be effective
25
, it is 
difficult to consider it as an arms control Treaty as there is no reference to specific 
weapons in the Treaty
26
, only in a subsidiary way could it be considered a specific arms 
control Treaty
27
, like the lists of the multilateral export control regimes like the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, the NSG, the Zangger Committee
28
, or the MTCR indeed 
are
29
. However, we must recall that those lists include weapons, but also technology and 
dual use equipment that could be used for explosions
30
. On the other hand, and despite 
the fact that some of those lists are prepared by only a few number of States, the fact is 
that they have an erga omnes effect, which will be missing in some treaties, as we shall 
see, namely because of their bilateral character. 
 Another concept that is often used in this study is non-proliferation
31
, which is 
also confused with disarmament
32
, although being very different. The difference is such 
                                                                
24
 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, preamble, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10. 
25
 This was clearly stated by Richard L. Garwin during the CTBT: Science and Technology 2011 that 
took place in Vienna between 8 and 10 June 2011. Although from the theoretical point of view computer 
explosions can be enough, reality is a different game. This need to test was particularly obvious from UK 
and France side with their proposal for nuclear tests under exceptional circumstances and the last tests by 
France and China to acquire sufficient information for computer testing (that later would be used by India 
as an argument for its not ratification of the Treaty, as it does not possess those data), Ramaker, Jaap, 
Mackby, Jenifer, Marshall, Peter D., Geil, Robert, The Final Test. A History of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations, Vienna: Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 2003: p.25. There are, 
however dissident views to this approach, Fetter, Steve, Toward a comprehensive test ban, Cambridge: 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988: p. 34, 72 and 100. 
26
 “Unlike arms control treaties that limit the deployment of particular types of weapon systems, 
restrictions on nuclear testing are an attempt to thwart research and development on new nuclear weapon 
systems of all kinds”, Fetter, Steve, Toward a comprehensive test ban, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1988: p. 185. 
27
 Dekker, Guido den, “The effectiveness of international supervision in arms control law”, Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, vol. 9, n. 3 2004; p. 315-330 
28
 Schmidt, Fritz W., “The Zangger Committee: its history and future role”, The Nonproliferation Review, 
vol.2, n.1, 1994: p. 38-44. 
29
 Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-Binding norms in the International Legal System, 
edited by Dinah Shelton, 2nd. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: p. 472-474. 
30
 A synthetic but complete explanation on the different regimes of arms trade restrictions can be found in 
Prenat, Raphaël, “Les régimes multilatéraux de maîtrise des exportations de technologies sensibles à 
l’utilisation militaire”, Annuaire Français de Droit International, vol. 44, 1998, p. 293-311. 
31
 To avoid different usages of concepts, and once we are dealing with a Treaty that has been approved by 
the UNGA, we usually follow the definitions presented in Tulliu, Steve, Schmalberger, Thomas, Coming 
to terms with security: a lexicon for arms control, disarmament and confidence-building, Geneva: 
UNIDIR - United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2003: 240p.  and Coming to terms with 
security: a handbook on verification and compliance, Geneva-London: UNIDIR - United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research – VERTIC – The Verification Research, Training and Information 
Centre, 2003: 146p. The definitions presented in the NATO site, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/arms_disarm_nonprol/index.html#Definitions, are particularly clear as well. 
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that the international Community has preferred to keep the discussions on these issues 
in two different places
33
. Despite the differences, there is a large grey area that 
eventually is discussed both at disarmament and non-proliferation level
34
. 
 
2.2. Erga omnes obligations and erga omnes effects 
 
The concept of erga omnes obligation was first recognised by the ICJ in 
Barcelona Traction case
35
. It refers to obligations that are valid for all, meaning the 
whole international community; all States have some interest upon specific rights. 
These obligations designate the scope of the application of the law at stake, as well as 
the procedural consequences from this. All States - irrespective of their particular 
interest in the matter - are entitled to invoke State responsibility in case of breach of an 
erga omnes obligation
36
. 
 Erga omnes obligations are not restraint to any territorial scope. Unlike 
contracts’ or Treaties’ obligations, erga omnes obligations grant enforceable powers to 
all States, which mean that all States can institute contentious proceedings before the 
court, and thus making the State violator responsible. This “spill-over” effect from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
32
 Guillard, Olivier, Désarmement, coopération régionale et sécurité en Asie du Sud, Paris : L’Harmattan, 
1999 : p. 31 and Baas, Richard, Negotiating nuclear weapons. A study on the merit of article VI of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Disarmament, Twente: University of Twente – Münster: 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, 2008: p.3, 15. 
33
 It is common to consider Vienna – Austria as the home to non-proliferation, specially because it hosts 
the siege of IAEA and CTBTO, and Geneva-Switzerland as the home of disarmament, as the Conference 
on Disarmament has its siege there. 
34
 Although we consider it is a rather radical opinion, it is worth mentioning, Arundhati Ghose when he 
sustains that the CTBT, as it is today, is no longer a disarmament treaty but just a non-proliferation 
instrument, “Maintining the moratorium – a de facto CTBT”, Disarmament Forum, n.2, 2006: p. 24.  
35
 “33. (…)In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of al1 States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, al1 States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes. 
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.”, Case concerning the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3-53 
36
 This understanding has been a process. We would recall here the advisory opinion by the ICJ, where it 
was held ““only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its 
breach” Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C. J. 
Reports 1949, p. 181-182 and again the Barcelona Traction Case. Moreover, it is also significant to look 
into to the position by the International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International law: 
difficulties arising from diversification and expansion of International Law”, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 
2006.  
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ICJ ruling on erga omnes, gave rise to a thorough discussion and application of the law 
of State responsibility
37
. These kinds of processes are usually settled by the ICJ, as 
National courts do not have the jurisdiction to enforce those obligations. This does not 
mean, at all, that just for the fact that those norms are erga omnes obligations they are 
automatically implemented. 
The balance between an erga omnes obligation and the respect for the principle 
of pacta tertiis has been highlighted by the publicists and also by the ICJ 
jurisprudence
38
. This is a question that the CTBT has to deal with as well, once, for 
instance, a non Signatory State is not obliged to build an IMS Station even if it may 
negatively impact States Signatories. On the other hand, the erga omnes effects of 
CTBT obligations impede that State Signatories affect non Signatory States. An 
important remark is that erga omnes effects should not be confused with erga omnes 
obligations, as in the case of the CTBT its provisions regarding the basic obligations 
considering the main goal of Peace have erga omnes effects, not because of CTBT but 
due to international law; the specific obligations, on the other hand, are erga omnes for 
all the Parties. If the nuclear test-ban is a desired erga omnes effect of the Treaty, it is an 
erga omnes obligation for all States Signatories, and eventually all States, not to make 
any explosion. By adhering to the Treaty, States assume the duty of certain obligations 
towards the other Stares Signatories or Ratifying States and also to all the States, 
without any differentiation regarding their status vis-à-vis of the Treaty. 
The two characteristic features of obligations erga omnes identified in the 
Barcelona Traction case by the ICJ, that is, universality, binding on all States without 
exception, and solidarity, all States have a legal interest in their protection
39
, are both 
applicable to CTBT reasoning. 
Some of the areas where erga omnes are perhaps easier to be identified are the 
environmental
40
 norms, genocide, piracy, Human Rights
41
. However, it should be 
                                                                
37
 Tams, Christian J., Tzanakopoulos,  Antonios, “Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal 
Development”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 23, 2010: p. 781-800. 
38
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 
p. 16-54. 
39
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 17. 
40
 Viñuales, Jorge E., “The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of 
International Environmental Law: A Contemporary Assessment”, Fordham International Law Journal, 
vol. 32, n. 232, 20p. 
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underlined that erga omnes obligations are not a priori excluded from any domain. The 
Barcelona Traction case also contributed for the definition of fundamental values that 
concern the whole international community, as they are at the base of the erga omnes 
obligations. These obligations “are grounded not in an exchange of rights and duties but 
in an adherence to a normative system”42. 
Taking into account the content of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (CPPG), we 
consider that these two Treaties include provisions that are erga omnes application and 
any legal person of the whole international community, namely the States, can take 
contentious proceedings in case of violations of the universal principles of those 
Treaties. We would recall here the case of counter claims by Yugoslavia in 1997, which 
enlightens on the effects of the erga omnes obligations, by making them compelling
43
.  
Nevertheless, it must be stated that law suffers a constant evolution and the 
concepts as well, that is why it is possible to recognize that, for instance, 1951 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide contains erga omnes 
obligations, which were only named as such in 1970. The resolution on obligations and 
rights erga omnes in international law
44
 is another enlightening document of the 
definition of erga omnes, though not as binding as the ILC or the ICJ. 
It is relevant to notice that unilateral declarations or decisions may also have 
erga omnes effects
45
. That was the case with the French government declarations 
regarding nuclear tests in South Pacific
46
. These cases involving Australia, New 
Zealand and France, and unlike it might be suggested by its title, should be considered 
within the environment scope
47
, and not in the disarmament or non-proliferation ones.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
41
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 135. 
42
 R. Provost, “Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, British Yearbook of International 
Law, n. 65, 1994: p. 386. 
43
 Pegna, Olivia Lopes, “Counter-claims and Obligations Erga Omnes before the International Court of 
Justice”, European Journal of International law, n. 9, 1998 p. 724-736 
44
 Fifth commission of  Justitia et Pace – Institut de droit international, 2005. 
45
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 175.  
46
 International Court of Justice, Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports, 
1974: p. 455-478; International Court of Justice, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgement, I.C.J. 
Reports, 1974: p. 253-274. 
47
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 187. 
42 
 
2.3. Jus Cogens 
 
Taking into account the ICJ position on jus cogens norms
48
, as some nuclear 
States did not sign or ratify the Treaty, it could be difficult to consider CTBT norm, at 
this stage, a jus cogens norm with erga omnes effects
49
. Curiously, both concepts were 
consecrated at the same time. One, jus cogens, by the International Law Commission in 
the VCLT, and the other, erga omnes, by the International Court of Justice. Unlike erga 
omnes that refer to obligations and effects, jus cogens is applicable to norms. There is a 
substantive and conceptual difference between the two concepts, which are often used 
and correctly used in parallel but they cannot be interchanged
50
.  
However, the CTBT is inclusive and it is the result of several decades of 
negotiations and legal opinions on the matter, therefore, unlike PTBT
51
, the CTBT will 
endorse a practice resulting in customary rule
52
, and therefore with erga omnes effects 
but not being jus cogens
53
. It must be recalled, however, that besides the state practice, 
and in order to be defined as a rule of customary international law it also requires an 
opinion juris
54
 which may be inferred from UNGA and UNSC resolutions. 
 
3. The origins of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
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 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 73. 
49
 Some authors argue that international law is not only treaties but primarily custom and general 
principles of law, Farrel, Theo, Lambert, Hélène, “Courting controversy: international law, national 
norms and American nuclear use”, Review of International Studies, n. 27, 2001: p. 320. 
50
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 193-210. 
51
 Kurosawa, Mitsuru, “The legality of atmospheric nuclear weapon tests. Nuclear tests cases”, 
http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp:8080/dspace/bitstream/10191/14659/1/11(1)_87-108. pdf, 24p. 
52
 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 74. 
53
 Ragazzi, Maurizio, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002:  p. 53 and Orakhelashvili, Alexander, Peremptory norms in International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006: p. 117-120. 
54
 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 7
th
 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 
p. 8-10; Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, 7
th
 ed., London-New 
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Although the exact period of discussion of the text
55
 was not too long (1994-
1996), especially taking into account the subject and the usual lengthy discussions on 
multilateral treaties, it should be taken into account that in reality it was the result of a 
process that included several political and legal actions and instruments all along several 
decades. The subject of the Treaty is of extreme sensitivity and the role of the different 
actors since the first initiatives has changed, sometimes blocking the discussions. This is 
a Treaty that addresses particular national interests which have been extensively argued 
that needed to be preserved. 
Before the Treaty concluding years, two periods of negotiations may be 
identified: from 1958 to 1962 and from 1977 to 1982. The question of verification
56
 has 
always been the most difficult problem. During these periods negotiations were held 
between USA, USSR and UK, while the two other nuclear States, France and China, 
proceeded with their tests. It must be said that the UK had decided to make its tests in 
American soil, and therefore it would be affected by all USA decisions on the matter. 
Regarding the verification discussion, the means used for the effect, whether national or 
international, assume the character of one of the most relevant discrepancies.  
If we were to define a starting point, we would consider that two events
57
 had a 
special meaning in this historical path. First US, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 
speech Atoms for Peace to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953
58
 and the 
appeal by India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, on 2 April 1954 for a standstill 
agreement on stopping nuclear testing. The CTBT must also be understood in its 
particular historical context
59
. Even if the need for a CTBT had been expressed decades 
before the negotiations started, the fact is that the end of the Cold War and the end of 
the détente period that launched the need for a legally binding instrument that would 
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replace the arms control regime existing so far
60
, facilitated the beginning of 
negotiations of a comprehensive Treaty on test ban on all
61
 nuclear tests
62
. The role of 
civil society in these matters was also very relevant from the beginning by putting 
pressure on governments and organisations, either condemning
63
 or supporting nuclear 
explosions and proliferation
64
. The contribution of the civil society has proved to be 
both very useful in terms of theoretical discussion regarding concepts and in defining 
policies. 
From the legal point of view, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater of 1963
65
 should be taken as the first 
example of an attempt to create a legal instrument that would impede at least some sorts 
of nuclear explosions. This Treaty was the possible result of the negotiations between 
USSR and USA. Nevertheless, the adoption of such a Treaty was a clear sign towards 
Peace
66
. Like the CTBT, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Underwater mentions nuclear weapon tests, and any other nuclear 
explosions
67
, but in its article I, al. a) it restraints the scope of the prohibition to a few 
environments, which the CTBT does not. 
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Another important legal instrument at the basis of the CTBT is the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968. The NPT 
provisions define some concepts and establish a norm on how to understand non-
proliferation and disarmament
68
, principles that will also be reiterated in the CTBT.  If 
the 1963 Treaty is a specific legal instrument that the CTBT will use for its 
technicalities, in reality it will be the NPT that creates the legal grounds for a CTBT. 
Other Treaties were equally important to set the basis for the CTBT, like the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974) or the Treaty on 
Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976)
 69
, but these two are just 
bilateral treaties. 
In 1989, according to article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, the depositary governments received 
the necessary number of requests to initiate a conference intended to extend the 
prohibitions of the Treaty to all environments. The conference was mostly the result of 
civil society, by Parliamentarians for Global Action, who were supported by some non-
nuclear states (Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia). If the 
proposal had passed the PTBT would have been transformed into the CTBT. That was 
not the case
70
. 
The conference however took place in 1991
71
, but the United States and the 
United Kingdom refused to move forward. In this same year the Soviet Union 
announced a moratorium on nuclear tests
72
. The moratorium, while from the Peace 
point of view is very laudable, has a perverse effect by delaying the negotiations of legal 
binding instruments, on the alleged basis that they are not needed. Once moratoria are 
instruments that only depend on the States will that decide to impose one and do not 
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result from a legally binding instrument
73
 and do not have any punitive or coercive 
measures for its violation, they are a very fragile measure regarding non-proliferation 
and disarmament
74
. Moratoria have been used over and over to ensure that the aim of 
the negotiations be kept alive. 
Along with the moratoria, the no-first-use principle has been suggested by 
China, as a guarantee to non-proliferation and disarmament processes, but again, it is a 
principle solely based on the will of a State that can unilaterally decide to review it. It 
was India that officially included it in its nuclear strategy
75
, which coming from a 
nuclear State that is not part to the CTBT gives some assurances. The USA have 
adopted this policy and instead of referring to the first use of the nuclear weapon, they 
sustain they will not be the first to make an explosion (not testing, as they do it in a 
subcritical way)
76
. 
The changes in the World Order that took place in the beginning of the Nineties, 
namely the end of the Cold War and the end of the existing deterrence
77
 – si vis pacem, 
para bellum
78
 - , forced the international community to find ways to ensure that Peace
79
 
would not be put at stake
80
. While negotiations for a CTBT had started, in 1995
81
, the 
NPT was extended indefinitely
82
. This was a remarkable sign of the international 
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community that it was looking for means to replace the former antagonistic balance of 
the Cold War, often named détente
83
, by a confidence system based on principles of 
international law vested into Treaties signed and ratified by the Parties. The CTBT itself 
in its Preamble refers to the new World outlook
84
 and considering it an opportunity. 
The 1995 Revision Conference of NPT fulfilled its tasks, and its outcomes 
changed the NPT and the assurances of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. 
The CTBT also has a “revision” mechanism, its article VIII, but so far it has not been 
possible to be used. As for article XIV, it has not been used to its limit, being used only 
for events where good intentions and principles are reiterated, but without any concrete 
measures to overcome the deadlock imposed by the restrictive Annex 2 to the Treaty. It 
is admissible to consider that the “revision” mechanism of article XIV was inspired in 
article X, like article VIII was, of NPT
85
, although, and unlike the NPT, without 
defining the exact purpose for the conference foreseen in article XIV. 
The though negotiation period
86
 of the CTBT uncovered that in 1995 there were 
still many confidence problems that needed to be exorcized if a Treaty was to be 
reached. Some of those problems still remain for some States after 16 years. The 
negotiations all along 1994-96 revealed that there was a common will within the 
international community, but different opinions on how to reach it, its meaning and the 
possible scope of a Treaty. The question of detection and verifiability
87
 was, and still is, 
one of the major arguments for the disagreements and constitutes one of the obstacles 
for its ratification. For the USA, for instance, this has been an utmost important point 
impeding its ratification.  
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It is also of major importance that the ICJ in 1996 also recovered article VI of 
NPT, thus also creating an undisputed legal basis for the CTBT
88
. 
A small detail but revealing how far the CTBT was intended to go is the option 
for its name CTBT (Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty) and not CNTBT (Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty), while in reality it only deals with nuclear explosions. In 
1995, the question of testing was of more importance than that of nuclear, even if the 
Treaty only refers to nuclear explosions. However, undoubtedly, the most important 
modifier of the Treaty was comprehensive. For the first time, as we have seen, a Treaty 
did not put any limits on the prohibition of nuclear explosions, thus including all 
environments, all purposes, all quantity and all quality of explosions. 
 
4. Preceding Treaties – legal and substantive background 
 
4.1. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Underwater 
 
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 
and Underwater is normally known as PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty) or LTBT 
(Limited Test Ban Treaty). In order to negotiate the PTBT, USSR and USA agreed on a 
test suspension that would allow the negotiating Parties (including the UK) to proceed 
without any pressure. From the very beginning two questions were at stake: to detect 
and to identify the explosion
89
. Regarding the detection there were no major difficulties, 
the same cannot be said on the identification, which, for the USA could only be 
properly done by a verification system that included inspections on site. This raised 
another question which only later would be answered positively
90
. It must be recalled 
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that we were in 1963 and the tension between USA and USSR had considerably 
diminished after 1962 Cuban missiles crisis, but the negotiations had begun 8 years 
before. The Treaty between USA, URSS and UK entry into force in 1963, the same year 
it was signed and was opened for signature by the States willing to so
91
.  
The PTBT was also intended to answer some fears of the international 
community regarding the effect of the explosions due to the radiation. The case of the 
Japanese vessel Fukuryu Maru in 1954 (the crew of the ship was contaminated while 
fishing in the Pacific Ocean because of US nuclear activities in the South Pacific) has 
most probably contributed for the adding of al. b of n. 1 of article I of PTBT
92
. The 
same arguments were later used by Australia
93
, and New Zealand, against France for its 
nuclear tests in the pacific. From the beginning the idea of a CTBT was present as an 
ultimate goal, and although it was not established, due provisions were adopted to 
impede any blockade to possible negotiations in that sense. 
The PTBT uses an enumerative terminology which is not intended to be 
limitative but only illustrative, that is, it was not supposed to deduct from what is not 
enumerated in the Treaty that all the rest was allowed or forbidden
94
. In reality, the 
formulation used also allowed the States to keep the right to use nuclear weapons in 
case the situation demanded them
95
. The ICJ will endorse this position in its advisory 
opinion
96
. It is a very simple Treaty just prohibiting some kinds of explosions, but not 
establishing any mechanism of verification and control.  
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The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 
and Underwater proved that the superpowers were able to find an agreement regarding 
nuclear weapons; showed respect for the rest of the world where the test did not take 
place; launch the challenge that will be accomplished in 1968 with the NPT
97
. 
Once there already was a Treaty on nuclear explosions, the first possibility 
would have been to review the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater and make it a comprehensive one
98
 or 
terminate that Treaty and replace it for a new one. None of these options were taken, 
although efforts were made in both those senses.  
 Despite the fact that not all States that are parties to CTBT are parties to VCLT, 
the truth is that the Convention should always be taken into account for those who are 
parties to that instrument and even those that are not
99
, and the reality is that its content, 
even if not legally binding for all, constitutes at this stage international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law and reflect general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations
100
. Therefore even if not literally, the principles of 
VCLT can be assumed as the most generalized legal understanding of specific questions 
in law. 
 It is true that the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) 
provides for the automatic termination of treaties, but this is not the case here. VCLT 
admits this automatism for the cases where the treaties themselves set a date for their 
termination or if the aim of the Treaty has been undoubtedly accomplished. Neither of 
the situations is applicable to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. Moreover, the conditions envisaged by 
article 59, 1, a), of VCLT cannot be applied to the present case. First, the Treaty must 
relate to the same subject-matter, and that is not the case
101
. If it is true that CTBT 
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covers part of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Underwater attributions, it does not address them all, and therefore we cannot 
consider that it replaces it. Even if some of the clauses might be incompatible, it does 
not necessarily lead to the any Treaty’s abrogation102, nor was there any decision by the 
Parties in that sense. 
  The recourse to the principles envisaged in article 31, 3, a) of VCLT 
presupposes four conditions:  
i) The act must be included in the extension of the expression agreement; ii) the 
agreement must be between the parties; 
ii) The agreement must be subsequent;  
iii) It must regard the interpretation or application of the Treaty103.  
 The only condition that can be admissible is that the CTBT was indeed posterior to 
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Underwater. 
Neither France, nor China, two nuclear States, had ever become parties to the 
1963 Treaty, while India and Iran, for instance, were parties to PTBT but did not sign 
(India) or ratify (Iran) the CTBT. The fact that France was not part to the PTBT allowed 
it to pursue atmospheric tests, resulting in the ICJ processes moved by Australia and 
New Zealand that argued the fall out of radiation in their territories, while France 
discarded this argument by saying the amounts were of no relevance and that France 
was not bound by any international law impeding nuclear tests, but was bound by its 
own declarations and statements
104
, a position the ICJ endorsed but underlined that 
those were not the only binding instruments. 
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However, the UNGA adopted resolutions urging states to review that Treaty
105
 
and to start negations within the Conference on Disarmament towards a new and 
comprehensive Treaty regarding nuclear tests. The CTBT text would eventually include 
the modifier “comprehensive”, a reference to nuclear weapons tests, as well as other 
nuclear tests and will also specifically refer to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater
106
, thus bringing back a legal 
instrument that was only valid for some States. By doing so, in practical terms, it also 
allowed that all documents, studies, etc. produced for the negotiation of that Treaty 
could legitimally be used for the CTBT negotiations, thus avoiding lengthy discussions 
on some conceptual and technical definitions. Since the resolution on the text of CTBT 
and since it received the first signatures, the UNGA has passed several resolutions 
exhorting States to ratify the Treaty and to duly fulfil its purposes. 
 
4.2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is commonly known 
by its short form, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation or NPT. It was opened for signature 
on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. The Republic of North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT in 2003. 189 States are parties to the Treaty. Four non-party 
States are known or presumed to have nuclear weapons: Israel, India, Pakistan and 
North Korea (some States, like the EU Member States and Japan, argue that North 
Korea did not withdraw from NPT, only suspended its membership). 
The NPT
107
 includes three basic chapters: non-proliferation, disarmament and 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is generally considered that the non-proliferation 
articles are the main aspects of the Treaty
108
. However, if politically that may be the 
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case, the fact is that reality has proven that the other two chapters go hand in hand with 
non-proliferation, even if for negotiations between the parties. If we want to proceed  
negotiations in any of the fields of the Treaty, it is absolutely necessary to take the three 
chapters together all along any negotiation, as it is commonly seen at the annual General 
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
We could understand the CTBT as a complementary Treaty to NPT, not only 
because of its multilateral nature, but also because it stems from the NPT (and the 
PTBT for that matter)
109
.  On the other hand, the NPT includes in the Preamble the 
systems of delivery, thus confirming its disarmament character, which are not referred 
to in CTBT’s text, nor it was expected, but it should be underlined that the change in 
delivery systems does not necessarily imply a change in the nuclear warhead, but may 
contribute to its efficiency
110
. 
The literature regarding NPT is extensive, detailed and covers most of the facts 
of the Treaty, which overall are the same at stake in CTBT, but the approach is a 
radically different one. While the NPT is an extremely generalist and large Treaty, the 
CTBT is extremely specific on its purposes. It must be said that during the NPT 
negotiations, the question of nuclear explosions was also object of discussions
111
, but 
the mild result on this particular aspect was only the wording of article VI of NPT, 
where it is stated that “Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. In 1975 and 1985 the revision 
conference of NPT refers in its concluding document the need to move forward towards 
a CTBT. In 1980 and in 1990 it was not possible to reach agreement regarding the final 
document also because of the inclusion of CTBT, or not. 
 Always accused of double standards, the CTBT will be a proof that nuclear 
weapon States clearly sustain their obligations according to article VI of NPT
112
, which 
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were basically to ensure a disarmament policy
113
. Moreover, the fact that the purpose
114
 
of CTBT is already mentioned in the Preamble of the Treaty is by itself already a 
convincing proof that a CTBT is a major element in the non-proliferation and 
disarmament policies. 
 The CTBT, following on the steps
115
 of NPT will be an important contribution 
for the change from the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) policy to MAS (Mutual 
Assured Safety)
116
. The NPT did not define the approach on whether to adopt a direct or 
incremental approach towards a CTBT. Both options have been taken into account, but 
the CTBT as such could only be possible in the framework of negotiations, even if 
several bilateral and multilateral instruments have contributed by launching initiatives, 
that would be used for the discussions regarding the CTBT and the non-proliferation 
and disarmament efforts
117
. Some argue that the NPT was not really the result from 
multilateral negotiations
118
. 
 Unlike the CTBT, the NPT establishes two different legal regimes for nuclear 
and non nuclear States, and from those regimes a whole set of rights and obligations 
derive causing serious divergences between the States Parties. This differentiation 
between nuclear and non nuclear States has become such a serious issue that although 
CTBT does not reproduce this distinction
119
, the fact is that for many States (like India), 
that principle is still at the basis of CTBT
120
. 
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 With the exception of article V, the NPT includes a safeguards strategy, based 
upon IAEA, which was set as a means to assure all State Parties that the criteria for the 
implementation of the principles of the Treaty would be generalized to all
121
. 
 
4.3. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests 
 
This is a strict bilateral Treaty between USA and USSR signed in 1974 and 
which entered into force in 1990
122
. This Treaty intended to be a complement to the 
PTBT once that Treaty did not include underground explosions. The Treaty is also 
known as Threshold Test Ban Treaty and became known as TTBT. It has been 
considered as another mean of the “law of détente” 123 that ruled the balance of power 
during the Cold War. 
The TTBT establishes a threshold, by prohibiting nuclear tests of devices having 
a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150 000 tons of TNT). This threshold 
calculated in terms of exploding power and not in terms of effect by recurring for 
instance to seismic magnitude indicators like the Richter scale impeded the parties to try 
to make larger tests in grounds that might have less significant seismic magnitude 
indicators, but using a larger explosive
124
. The threshold is militarily significant once it 
annulled the possibility of testing new or already existing nuclear warheads beyond the 
fractional megaton range, thus reducing the explosive force of new nuclear warheads 
and bombs that otherwise could be tested for weapon systems. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that the limitation set by this Treaty is considerably less than 
what was allowed under PTBT
125
. 
The TTBT included a Protocol on procedures for the exchange of technical data 
and limiting weapons testing to specified test sites to assist in verification. Data 
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exchanges include geographical boundaries and geological information of the test areas, 
as well as geographic coordinates of test locations to assist in yield determination. The 
verification was foreseen by national means only. If either the United States or URSS 
were to resume nuclear explosive testing beyond the threshold, this Treaty would 
authorize resumption of the on-site monitoring and inspection of such tests by the other 
side. For the first time USA and USSR agreed to exchange data on explosions. 
The reason for mentioning this bilateral Treaty – once there are many more in 
the realm of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control – is that it also deals with 
nuclear explosions and it includes in its structure elements that will later be used in the 
CTBT, namely a reference to a verification system. Unlike the PTBT, it was not opened 
for signature, ratification or accession by any other State. As we have seen with the 
PTBT, it was not the fact that it was not discussed in a multilateral forum that impeded 
it to be open to the other States.  
This was the first Treaty to clearly deal with underground tests. Tests in other 
environment have been dealt with in PTBT and the Outer Space Treaty, although in this 
latter case only in a subsidiary way.  
The logic of this Treaty, unlike the PTBT, was dramatically different, even if at 
first glance it could seem another break in the wall. With the TTBT, it was no longer 
intended to prohibit explosions, but, instead to clearly define the allowed ones. We 
consider this Treaty as a breach in the disarmament and non-proliferation logic initiated 
by the PTBT and then reinforced by the NPT. It opened the door to some sort of 
explosions. Although they were not forbidden, the fact of defining a limit for the 
allowed explosions reveals that the disarmament and non-proliferation efforts were not 
as strong as they had been few years before. 
 
4.4.  Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for 
Peaceful Purposes 
 
Again this is a bilateral instrument only. The Treaty was signed in 1976 between 
USA and USSR and only entered into force in 1990. Like the 1974 Treaty, this Treaty 
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also defined a threshold of 150 kilotons and 1500kt for group explosions (a kind of 
explosions that are required, for instance, to open canals). It was not open to other 
States, including the nuclear ones (besides USA and URSS, the other P5, UK, France 
and China). Soon it was perceived that the TTBT was missing something and therefore 
the two opposing States decided to agree on a Treaty that would allow explosions for 
peaceful purposes
126
. One of the obstacles for the implementation of this Treaty was the 
verification system
127
. The question of the difficulties of verification
128
 will also be 
argued by the American Senate to impede the ratification of the CTBT
129
. 
Unlike the TTBT that defined environments for explosions, the PNET was valid 
for the environments, being the limitation imposed by its purposes. The nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes would remain a possibility
130
 as long as the TTBT 
would be in force.  
The PNET also included a Protocol similar to the one of the TTBT, but the area 
of intervention was no longer restricted to testing fields known and identified by both 
parties. According to article VII, the PNET finds its legal basis in article V of the NPT, 
moreover the IAEA, that has been given the responsibility and technical competence to 
make studies on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, is equally mentioned in 
article VII. However, article III of TTBT stated that it did not deal with explosions for 
peaceful purposes, which be subject to a further agreement
131
. 
We would also consider that both the TTBT and the PNET were mostly 
established in order to create a verification regime that article V of NPT did not include, 
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especially because the UNGA by then only spoke about prohibiting military use of 
nuclear weapons, nothing saying about peaceful nuclear explosions
132
.  
The question of peaceful explosions, which are not allowed by the CTBT, was 
argued by China
133
 not to ratify the Treaty
134
, especially because it is allowed under 
NPT. The fact that the PNET was not opened to other States did not help to give 
confidence to Beijing on this matter. It is worthy to recall that for India the main 
potential nuclear threat has always been China
135
 and not Pakistan
136
 that was given 
nuclear technology by China and then smuggled it worldwide by the Khan network. 
 
4.5. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 
 
One different type of treaties also connected with disarmament and non-
proliferation efforts regards the creation of weapon free zones
137
. The creation of these 
zones also constitutes an element of non-proliferation and disarmament policies inspired 
by the revision conferences of NPT. However, and although the Peace nature of those 
treaties is unquestionable, these treaties escape to the object of our study. It is relevant 
to mention them, as well as other treaties that refer to areas instead of States: on the one 
hand, Antarctic (in force since 23.06.1961), Outer Space (in force since 10.10.1967), 
Seabed (in force since 18.05.1972), and, on the other hand, and specifically on nuclear 
weapon free zones, Tlatelolco (Latin America and Caribbean) (in force since 
25.04.1969), Rarotonga (South Pacific) (in force since 11.12.1986), Bangkok (ASEAN 
States) (in force since 28.03.1997), Mongolia (in force since 28.02.2000), Semei or 
Semipalatinsk (Central Asia) (in force since 21.03.2009), Pelindaba (Africa) (in force 
since 15.07.2009). The most complicated situation has always been the Middle East 
where a nuclear weapon free zone has intensely and unsuccessfully been promoted for 
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years. A conference on this subject with the participation of all States of the Region has 
been postponed to 2013 due to the lack of agreement between those States. 
These treaties are the closer treaties to a prohibition of nuclear weapons, but they 
only concern parts of the Globe
138
. Unlike biological and chemical weapons, which are 
forbidden by international treaties, nuclear weapons are not and even the ICJ recognizes 
its use in its advisory opinions under specific circumstances, being one of them self-
defence. The ICJ did not, however, define self-defence. 
Within this context we shall evoke here two General Assembly resolutions that 
for their content go together with the upper mentioned treaties: UNGA resolutions 
30/3472 A and B on a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon free 
zones in all its aspects and 30/3471 on the Implementation of the Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of Africa. 
Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean) - In 1963, after the 
Cuban missile crisis, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru made a first statement 
calling for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone, which was to be established in 
1967. However, Brazil only ratified it 27 years later and Cuba was the last State of the 
region to join the Treaty in 2002. The Treaty entered into force in 1992, when France, 
the last of the P5 to do so, ratified the Treaty. The Treaty is flexible allowing bilateral 
cooperation frameworks and even the participation of States not belonging to the 
geographic area. Moreover, its recognition by the UNGA was important, especially for 
your complete universalisation. The Treaty does not allow reservations, although Brazil, 
to join, demanded that in order to come into force, the Treaty and its two protocols were 
signed and ratified by all Member States of the region. 
Treaty of Rarotonga (Pacific and Oceania) - the Treaty entered into force in 
1986, it was signed by 13 States
139
 and its complete ratification is done. The reasons 
that led to the creation of this NWFZ were the frequent holding of nuclear tests in the 
region (the USA, the United Kingdom and France often tested on the atolls of the 
Pacific). The creation of this NWFZ had much more to do with environmental issues 
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and safety arising from testing and related transportation of nuclear materials and 
consequent pollution than with the issues of non-proliferation. 
Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia) - The scope of the Treaty falls within 
ASEAN. The Protocol on the negative guarantees has not been ratified by the P5, which 
were not involved in the negotiations. This is a Treaty that does not accept reservations, 
but admits withdrawals. On the other hand, the main concern is the non-proliferation in 
the context of the NPT.  
Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa) - at this moment, only 34 African states have 
ratified the Nuclear Treaty and only 4 of the P5 have also done so. The Treaty prohibits 
the possession and development of nuclear programs, testing and dumping. Its area of 
operation extends to the islands and hence the existing litigation with Spain in the 
Canary Islands. The Treaty is an enforcement mechanism that is the African 
Commission on Nuclear Energy, which verifies the denuclearization of the region. 
Semipalatinsk (Central Asia) – Its members are the five Central Asian States 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Work began in 
1993, finishing only in 2006 (the IAEA and UNODA were involved and played a 
central role in the formation of this NWFZ). In 2009 the Treaty entered into force but 
the last national ratification (Uzbekistan) took place in 2011. The P5 have not signed the 
protocol on negative assurances. This is a very sensitive NWFZ once it is the first in the 
northern hemisphere and there are nuclear weapons in its immediate neighbourhood. 
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Chapter II - Analysis of the main aspects of the text of the Treaty 
 
1. Structure of the Treaty 
 
Negotiations started very well and in a speedy way
140
, based on existing work 
done for other treaties and by the Conference on Disarmament. It was possible to have a 
rolling text soon, even if with numerous brackets. The discussions regarding the text 
within the brackets involved all the States, but some of the States had a more active 
role, even of not all from the beginning, as we have seen: USA, Russia, France, UK, 
Iran, India, China, and Australia. It seemed clear from the beginning that the States 
would not allow any wording that created any sort of discrimination between parties 
(like the NPT)
141
, nor would they allow that the Treaty could result from discussions 
among just a few
142
. Several ad-hoc groups were set to deal with specific chapters of the 
Treaty. The chairpersons of the ad-hoc groups circulated extensive questionnaires 
among the negotiation parties and then compiled the answers in rolling texts presented 
for the negotiations. It was a very effective way of work, once it was possible to have a 
very approximate idea of the red lines of each negotiating party. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
143
 Treaty is composed by 17 articles, 2 
annexes, 1 Protocol and 2 annexes to the Protocol, all annexes and the Protocol being 
integrative parts of the Treaty (article X). Not taking into account all of these elements, 
the Treaty cannot be considered complete and effective for the accomplishment of its 
purposes. The two annexes to the Treaty include, the first, the geographical distribution 
of the States, including them in regional groups for the definition of the number of 
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representatives in the Executive Council, and, the second, the list of States which 
ratification is mandatory for the entry into force of the Treaty. These were the States 
members of the Conference on Disarmament in 1996 and that by then had a nuclear 
reactor. Both conditions were mandatory to be in the list. Some of the critical studies 
tend to refer just one or the other conditions, but there is no doubt that a cumulative rule 
was at stake
144
. The 17 articles are divided in numbers and alineas and articles II and IV 
stand out for the impressive number of paragraphs there contained: 57 and 68, 
respectively. 
The discussion on the type of legal instrument which is CTBT seems 
superfluous, as it calls itself a Treaty, and there has been no contestation to this. As for 
the concept of Treaty itself, we shall follow the definition of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, (article 2, 1 a)) combined with the 1986 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations, (article 2, 1 a)). We shall not try to engage in 
definition of a Treaty from the legal point of view, once we consider it can only be 
classified according to its purpose and object and according to its parties
145
, these ones 
making it a clear multilateral Treaty and not a bilateral to which other parties can 
become members. 
The Treaty bans all nuclear explosions in respect of four parameters identify in 
the Treaty: number, yield, location and time. All of these parameters are equally treated, 
and in all circumstances explosions are banned
146
. However, scholarship has argued that 
there may be some types of explosion that the Treaty does not ban (some States – like 
India - argue in the same sense)
147
, as it fails to provide a clear differentiation between 
prohibited nuclear explosions and non-prohibited activites, especially because nuclear 
explosion is not defined in the Treaty
148
. 
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The Protocol is essentially of technical nature and it is divided in three distinct 
parts, each one dedicated to elements of the Verification Regime, as contained in article 
IV, 1 a), c) and d). The consultation and clarification procedures foreseen in article IV, 
1 b) of the Treaty are only developed in the Treaty, article IV, 29 to 33, and not in the 
Protocol, even if these activities may require or generate technical inputs and may even 
determine the sequence of events leading to an on-site inspection. The Annexes to the 
Protocol refer, the first, to the details of the monitoring assets (stations and laboratories) 
associated to the International Monitoring System (IMS), the second to the 
characterization parameters for the International Data Centre (IDC) standard event 
screening. This annex is of particular importance once it regards one of the controversial 
means of the Treaty, especially regarding its usage and availability of data and 
establishing parameters for the identification of a nuclear explosion. 
Apart from the details included in the Treaty regarding the Verification Regime 
and the set up of the organisation to handle the Treaty, the fact is that the substantive 
part of CTBT is quite limited, if not incomplete. Without challenging David S. Jonas 
general position on his perception of long treaties
149
, we would consider that the CTBT 
should not be hostage of its own text and it should be seen an exception, once most of it 
is more of procedural or administrative nature than political and therefore it should be 
considered a mistake to evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty just because of its size 
without considering the text in detail. 
The major difficulties of CTBT result from the fact that it lacks some conceptual 
definitions (nuclear explosion or test, to start)
150
. Moreover, some of the technical 
nature elements change with time, as does the accuracy of data that lead to some of the 
concepts and procedures included in the Treaty and in its Protocol. Some of the missing 
aspects of the Treaty would eventually be given an answer in the Resolution 
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establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization
151
. 
The structure of the Treaty does not follow the rules of the IAEA for a 
comprehensive nuclear law
152
 in domestic terms: apart from the Preamble, which some 
may argue that its legal effects are not translated into direct effects due to its theoretical 
approach, it leaves out the concrete definition of the objective and scope of the Treaty 
and the definition of key terms. This is why we consider that an extra assessment must 
be given to the preamble and to try to find in its wording some of the answers the Treaty 
fails to provide autonomously. 
In terms of general concepts
153
 and definitions regarding the purposes of the 
Treaty, the preamble and article I are the parts that deserve more attention, while article 
IV clearly defines de Verification Regime, which clarifies the executive means for the 
implementation of the Treaty. Taking into account the aim of the Treaty, article IV on 
the Verification Regime constitutes, though, a key part of the Treaty
154
. The other 
articles are basically the normal articles regarding the procedures relating to the Treaty 
itself, even if they contain some special features as we shall see further. Article II is also 
very specific, once it deals with the organisation to be established for the execution of 
the Treaty. The article on the organization, independently of its specificities, is just the 
necessary legal instrument for the organization being set in motion. Most of the article 
would somehow be reproduced in the Resolution establishing the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 
It must also be noted that article V refers to sanctions (even if not using this 
expression), a term which must be clearly defined within the context of such a delicate 
domain, along with the concrete situations in which they can be applied. Finally, a note 
must be made about article XIV on entry into force, for its novelty and special features. 
The Treaty will only enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of the 
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44
th
 ratification of the States individually identified in the list of Annex 2 to the Treaty 
(and never before two years). 
The Treaty bans all nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear 
explosion. It is clear that it is not only the test that is the concern, but the explosion. The 
notion of test is circumscribed to weapons only. The notion of nuclear explosion
155
, 
although it will be constructed all along the Treaty by the means of identification (we 
know how and what exploded by the means of verification), is missing in the Treaty as 
there is no absolutely clear definition of nuclear explosion (or test)
156
, for some authors 
this is another reason that does not sustain CTBT
157
. In particular, the question of 
laboratory tests or very low-yield tests
158
, that can pass undetected by the verification 
regime, is a matter of debate between States, once only States that have done real tests 
can be able to technically use the information just with a much smaller test. The aim of 
the explosion/test has been also object of controversy. China, for instance, pledged all 
along the negotiations that explosions for peaceful purposes
159
 should be left out of the 
Treaty
160
; this was not accepted by negotiating parties. China only accepted the Treaty if 
there were an agreement to review the issue at least at a later stage, so the Treaty would 
eventually include a provision (article VIII, n.1) suggesting an ulterior revision of the 
matter. On the other hand, the Stockpile Stewardship Program developed in the USA 
could be a reliable substitute for nuclear explosions
161
, as far as USA are concerned 
The Treaty does not say anything on the use of nuclear weapons
162
 in case of 
war, which had been considered by the ICJ as legal
163
, nor was it supposed to
164
. The 
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Treaty does not refer to any military exception, but “other nuclear explosions” should 
not be understood as refering to the use of nuclear weapons in case of war. Here we 
would distinguish two different cases
165
.  
As far as jus ad bellum is concern, in fact there is nothing to impede the use or 
threat of nuclear weapons, especially in cases of self-defence
166
. The same cannot be 
said regarding jus in bello
167
, once this concerns the war scenery itself and other norms 
of international law
168
, namely humanitarian law, as Judge Weeramantry demonstrated, 
are then applied, making the use of nuclear weapons – because of its effects – illegal. 
Although the argument raised by Judge Weeramantry deserves to be accommodated, it 
nevertheless goes beyond the question at stake. The question put to the ICJ was on the 
right to use nuclear weapons and not on the effects of such weapons. In reality States 
are not forbidden to use nuclear weapons
169
, but, and according to Judge Weeramantry, 
as sustained in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, any weapons that can have those 
destructive and poisonous effects are illegal. The Advisory Opinion, in a very subtle 
way, somehow incorporated this idea
170
, after all it was recognised that jus ad bellum  
and jus in bello had to be taken together in the evaluation done by the ICJ. 
This has been an important factor to bring the States to ratify the Treaty. This 
was the case when President Clinton transmitted the Treaty to the Senate
171
. Just to 
clarify some recurrent misunderstandings, the American Senate does not ratify treaties 
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(according to USA Constitution, art. II, para. 2, cl.2), but provides advice and consent to 
the President to do so. 
One important remark is that the CTBT reflected a growing need since the 1950s 
to consolidate in a legal instrument obligations, that otherwise would not be upheld by 
the States. This is a change in international law and the fact that a Treaty was required, a 
“hard law” instrument, it also reflects the need to make it clearly legally binding172 with 
universal value. 
Like all other Treaties there have been expressions of support and of opposition 
to the CTBT, whether for military or technical reasons, the same arguments, or almost, 
have been used by both sides, but in fact the question is merely political
173
.  
Like in the NPT, withdrawal is a possibility given to the States Parties. This 
withdrawal must be reasonably justified on reasons of national interest that may be 
compromised by being party to the Treaty. Unlike the NPT, the CTBT is of unlimited 
duration since the very beginning. The arguments that have been used both to support 
and to depreciate CTBT are mostly the same, depending only on the arguments used to 
sustain them. In some cases, it has been considered that the Treaty is irrelevant
174
 
because it is redundant with other treaties or that it fails to generate the necessary 
means, namely verification ones, that would make it an added-value to arms control
175
. 
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For Against 
Constrains modernization of nuclear 
weapons (modernization is bad) 
Constrains modernization of nuclear weapons 
(modernization is vital) 
Ends development of new nuclear weapons 
(new weapons are bad) 
Ends development of new nuclear weapons (new 
weapons may be necessary) 
Helps prevent proliferation Has little or no impact on proliferation 
Moves us towards nuclear disarmament 
(disarmament is good) 
Moves us towards nuclear disarmament 
(disarmament is presently foolhardy) 
A ban is verifiable (it freezes other nations’ 
nuclear capabilities) 
A ban is not verifiable (if other nations cheat, it 
does not freeze their nuclear capabilities) 
 
and also Paine, Christopher, “Facing Reality. A Test Ban Will Benefit U.S. and International Security: A 
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2. The Preamble 
 
The Preamble, along with article I, defines the object and purpose of the Treaty. 
One of the first questions addressed in Treaty’s law is the difference between purpose 
and object of the Treaty. It is a united notion in the German, Austrian, English and 
American traditions, but not in the French legal doctrine
176
. This is more of a taxonomic 
squabble than a real legal problem and although the definition of concepts is of utmost 
importance, in this particular case we consider that in reality that is more a question of 
language usage than of numenic or phenomenal definitions of concepts
177
.   
Even admitting a consensus
178
 over the definition of object and purpose of the 
Treaty, it is not certain that there will be an agreement on the acts that may defeat either 
the object or the purpose
179
 of the Treaty. Still regarding the option for object or 
purpose, it should be underlined that the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
(articles 18, 19 (c), 20 (2), 31, 33, 41, 58 (1), 60), as the CTBT also does, always 
mention both concepts together
180
. 
In a simplistic way, we could say that the object of the Treaty is defined in its 
title, a comprehensive test ban, and the purpose is the nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation as contained in the Preamble. But in reality, a comprehensive test ban is an 
element of disarmament and non-proliferation, so indeed it is the enumeration of 
somehow the same in both cases, even if a “technical” distinction can be made. It could 
be envisaged that the Verification Regime in article IV could be considered the main 
object of the Treaty, once it defines the means to achieve the aim of the Treaty
181
. 
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However, article II is of equal importance once it defines the actor for the Treaty’s 
implementation. The organization created by the Treaty becomes itself part or a distinct 
object of the Treaty, but equally important, as it is meant to execute the Treaty. 
According to the Preamble of the CTBT, it supports disarmament, but it does not 
define any target or benchmark, unlike the NPT, INF or SALT do, nor does the rest of 
the Treaty. It refers only to one element that may have implications in the development 
and sustainment of nuclear weaponry
182
. 
In reality, although clearly a non-proliferation and disarmament legal 
instrument, the Treaty does not prohibit the use or the development of nuclear weapons, 
but recognizes that it will have an effect of constraining such kind of activities. Nothing 
in the Treaty impedes States of exercising the right to self defense as foreseen in article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The negotiation of the Treaty started with the Preamble which was eventually 
put on hold until the substantive part of the Treaty was agreed (that is, articles II and 
IV). This was the only possibility to make sure that there would not be any 
inconsistencies regarding the definition of concepts. The fact is that the rest of the 
Treaty was agreed based on definitions that should have been inserted in the beginning 
of the Treaty – like nuclear explosion – but they weren’t. Some States argued they 
wanted to finish the Preamble before moving ahead, but the majority opted otherwise. 
Deciding the Preamble right at the beginning would have probably meant to fail in the 
negotiations, as the result would probably be too limited.  
The use of some modifiers in the text might suggest that there is universal 
understanding of its usage, but it is not true, once the interpretation and scope of a 
modifier is always very questionable, not to mention that differences may arise with 
translation
183. One particular example is the reference to “positive measures” in 
paragraph 2 of the Preamble. The use of “positive” suggests different assessments: it 
may refer to measures that have been decided to be executed, opposing to the option of 
not doing anything. Nevertheless, we consider it refers to measures that may commonly 
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be considered as actions that tend to reinforce the purpose of the Treaty
184
.  The 
reference to positive measures contrasts with the options taken so far as disarmament 
and non-proliferation are concerned, namely the NPT
185
. 
All along the Preamble the reference to measures is recurrent, but there is no 
indication of which measures it refers to (specially in case of paragraph three), if only 
those agreed in multilateral treaties, or if those adopted only bilaterally, within the same 
spectrum, should also be taken into account, we tend to assume that, although not clear, 
the undefined vocabulary used allows a much more comprehensive approach than any 
restrained listing. The fact is that these measures follow the reference to international 
agreements. We assume that it mostly refers to other political and legal acts that may 
not have a binding effect but which concern the same matter. One of this is acts is the 
ICJ advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 
The second paragraph clearly defines that the Treaty is to be seen as a 
disarmament and non-proliferation instrument, although limiting it to the nuclear field. 
This is an important aspect, once it must be retained that CTBT does not include any 
reference or purpose regarding conventional weaponry.  
The Preamble in its fourth paragraph includes a declaration of the States Parties 
engaging themselves to non-proliferation and disarmament; this is a clear statement of 
the purpose of the Treaty. Moreover, the act of producing a declaration gives rise to 
legal obligations
186
, and the Preamble is in itself as legally binding as the rest of the 
Treaty once it is an integrative part of the Treaty
187
. Paragraph five reinforces that 
declaration by adding some major modifiers: globally, complete, general but also stating 
an obligation for all Parties to control it. This paragraph refers the reduction of nuclear 
weapons with a view to global disarmament; it does not impose immediate disarmament 
or any time frame for it. 
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It is important to note that the Treaty is not, according to its own wording, solely 
a disarmament or non-proliferation instrument, but both, even if it does not directly 
impede the development of nuclear weapons or its usage
188
. 
Nevertheless, in the Preamble, in its sixth paragraph, the Treaty establishes a 
linkage between nuclear explosions and the development and qualitative improvement 
of nuclear weapons, and its consequences for the disarmament and non-proliferation 
efforts. This is one of the disagreed aspects that have always originated controversy.  
The end of nuclear explosions is presented as one step to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. It is not the only one, the most important or essential, but just one, though 
meaningful, according to paragraph seven. The use of the expression systematic process 
in this paragraph, as it already did in paragraph five, underlines the fact that 
disarmament is a process, but a systematic one. 
The CTBT sets right from the Preamble of Treaty, in its eigth paragraph, a pre-
condition for the efficiency of the Treaty by considering that a comprehensive nuclear-
test-ban must be based on a universal and internationally effective verifiable Treaty
189
. 
If during the Cold War the two enemies controlled each other, the fact is that since then 
Treaties need independent verification structures
190
. Moreover, a Treaty seemed to be 
clearly necessary after the Cold War
191
 to replace the former dual control and as means 
to justify countermeasures
192
, as is the case of CTBT. An OSI, although intrusive, 
should not be seen as one of those countermeasures
193
which should be understood only 
as the measures contained in article V of the Treaty. 
In the Preamble there is a concrete reference to another Treaty regarding non-
proliferation and disarmament (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater,) while there is no specific reference to 
NPT, but there is a mention to the principles stated in that Treaty (in particular in  
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article VI of NPT). None of those two instruments includes a definition on nuclear 
explosion as such.  
In the NPT preamble, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater is also quoted and in a more incise way 
than it is in CTBT. The NPT refers to the continuation of negotiations towards a 
comprehensive test ban Treaty, while CTBT naturally does not, but the fact is that the 
peaceful nuclear explosions may be revisited in the future, which means the 
comprehensive character of CTBT may be compromised.  
Divergences regarding mentioning the NPT in the Treaty were eventually taken 
into account and no direct reference to the NPT can be found in the Treaty. Some 
concerns included in the NPT have been included in the Treaty namely the special 
preoccupation on the inclusion of the references to non-proliferation (one), disarmament 
(seven) and nuclear weapons (nine) in the preamble of the CTBT; and also to nuclear 
weapons (four, three in the basic obligations and one in the OSI) in the corpus juris of 
the Treaty
194. To illustrate the differences between the treaties, let’s note here the text of 
all of those treaties regarding their purposes, and the influence of one Treaty upon the 
following one is pretty obvious.  
 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water - Preamble 
NPT – Article VI CTBT - Preamble 
Proclaiming as their principal aim the 
speediest possible achievement of an 
agreement on general and complete 
disarmament under strict international 
control in accordance with the objectives 
of the United Nations which would put an 
end to the armaments race and eliminate 
Each of the Parties 
to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good 
faith on effective 
measures relating to 
cessation of the 
Convinced that the 
present 
international 
situation provides 
an opportunity to 
take further 
effective measures 
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the incentive to the production and 
testing of all kinds of weapons, including 
nuclear weapons. 
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of 
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for 
all time, determined to continue 
negotiations to this end, and desiring to 
put an end to the contamination of mans 
environment by radioactive substances 
nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to 
nuclear 
disarmament, and on 
a Treaty on general 
and complete 
disarmament under 
strict and effective 
international control. 
towards nuclear 
disarmament and 
against the 
proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in 
all its aspects, and 
declaring their 
intention to take 
such measures. 
 
The reference to previous treaties might suggest in some cases that the new 
Treaty would replace the former ones, which is not necessarily the case, especially if 
they deal with jus cogens norms
195
. VCLT provides for the automatic termination of 
treaties, but this is not the case here. VCLT admits this automatism for the cases where 
the treaties themselves set a date for their termination or if the aim of the Treaty has 
been undoubtedly accomplished. If the automatic procedure is not used, in order to 
terminate a Treaty, the termination has to be invoked, which was not done in this case. 
As for the legal reasons on the fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic 
stantibus)
196
, according to article 62 of VCTL, it cannot be used as a legal basis for the 
termination. The change of circumstances must be as such as to impede the application 
of the Treaty or replacing it.  
Regardless of the fact that the Preamble, in its sixth paragraph, refers to nuclear 
weapon tests and to all other nuclear explosions, the doubt remains, can the CTBTO 
intervene in the case of natural disasters or human errors resulting in nuclear accidents 
that may provoke explosions?
197
 Apparently yes. By isolating the world test for 
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weapons and by including all other nuclear explosions, it is admissible that CTBT can 
be used for accidental explosions and for non-military purposes
198
.  
The Preamble ends by articulating the purpose of the Treaty, once again, and 
extending it by adding other values, namely peace and security. It might seem obvious 
that a Treaty dealing with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
199
 would 
necessarily be connected to peace and security issues, but in international law it is 
always better to mention if some action is required. Moreover, these references to peace 
and security clearly make the CTBT in accordance with the UN Charter principles. 
It could be argued here that law, moral and ethics cannot be opposed, and the 
Human interest as whole should prevail
200
. 
 
3. Article I – Basic obligations 
 
The heading of the article – basic obligations – is self-explaining, but it is even 
more if we take into account the declaration in the preamble. There is a clear intention 
to create specific and legally binding obligations for the States Parties
201
 from the 
beginning of the Treaty, one of the reasons being, probably, the fact that the Treaty 
lacks some major definitions. It may be (wrongly) assumed that the repetition of an 
expression might solidify its definition. 
The notions of nuclear weapon test explosion and nuclear explosion had been 
previously referred to in the Preamble but no definition was presented. As it has been 
demonstrated since its signature and ratification of the Treaty, the understanding of the 
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scope of these notions is diverse. For some States, laboratory tests or explosions may be 
excluded from the Treaty
202
, while for some others
203
 they should have been included. 
Without a definition in the Treaty, both interpretations may be valid, but this means that 
the scope of the Treaty itself is therefore very different. China argued that according to 
article V of NPT, peaceful explosions should not be included. 
Unlike the PTBT of 1963, the CTBT includes all environments, even if, at least 
for some States, not all kinds of tests and explosions are. The wording is, however, 
similar to 1963 Treaty (article I). “Any other nuclear explosion” is too vague and the 
fact that the CTBT verification regime is only prepared for 1 Kt explosions 
demonstrates that some smaller explosions may pass unidentified. The same is valid for 
laboratory tests. Moreover, the use of decoupling
204
 techniques may put the IMS/IDC 
data at stake. 
Paragraph two extends the prohibition expressed in the first paragraph by 
imposing a ban on any encouragement or participation in nuclear explosions. This idea 
was already part of article I of PTBT and of article I of NPT. However, it must be said 
that there may be room for a question on compatibility regarding article IV of NPT and 
the access to nuclear technology. This is the kind of provision that States like India 
reclaim. With this paragraph States are not only forbidden to make explosions but to 
help others to conduct an explosion. 
 On the other hand, CTBT lacks a provision similar to article II of NPT by which 
States are also forbidden to receive or to allow the transfer of elements allowing a 
nuclear explosion. Having said this, it must be retained that the way the Treaty is 
drafted puts the onus on one side only, the suppliers, ignoring the intermediaries and the 
receptors.  
If it is true that the aim of CTBT is to ban explosions and not to deal with other 
aspects regarding nuclear technology and weaponry, nevertheless, we must not forget 
that explosions are only done with materials and technology, and its reference might 
have been an added value for the Treaty. This loophole in the Treaty does not allow the 
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Treaty to provide the assurances some States want. Despite the fact there are several 
arms control regimes in place, not all members of CTBT are part to those regimes, nor 
there is one including both nuclear materials and delivery technologies. 
Although the Treaty does not discriminate, and opts for the vague word “all”, we 
admit that the modifier “comprehensive”205 – which is only used in the title, in the 
Preamble and in article 1 – refers either to fusion206 and fission207 explosions. 
 
4. Article II – The Organization 
 
Article II refers to the organization created by the Treaty to implement it
208
. It is 
a common procedure in this kind of treaties
209
. This article intends to create the 
organization, to define its basic competences, and its organs in order to establish a 
permanent structure that can assure the performance of the necessary duties to enforce 
the principles of the Treaty
210
. The case of the CTBT also creates obligations for the 
States, not only by banning explosions, but also by promoting sharing and cooperation 
to identify acts of non compliance, not to mention the national authorities, major actors 
in the context of IMS/IDC. 
This was one of the most disputed articles in the negotiations in Geneva, not 
only because it defines the organs of the organization, but also because it defines the 
access conditions to some of them by the States Parties, namely the Executive Council 
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(paragraphs 27-40), and by doing it defines competences and attributes power to the 
States. The organization will be chaired by a Director-General. The structure of the 
organization is similar to the one one created by the Chemical Weapons Convention
211
 
for its own organization (the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, 
and the Technical Secretariat).  
The Technical Secretariat (paragraphs 42-53) was also subject of large 
discussions among negotiating parties. One of the problems was the competences that 
were attributed to the Technical Secretariat, once some States did not want to give the 
full control to an international organization, nor was the case in the end. In reality, the 
more States and national authorities collaborate with the Technical Secretariat, the 
easier and more rewarding are the efforts of the organization. Moreover, the problem of 
intrusiveness was questioned by some States, in particular by China that argued that an 
inspection should not serve any intelligence purposes. This was not new, during the 
1963 PTBT negotiations, even without an organization behind the concerns over a 
possible loss of sovereignty were immediately raised.   
Giving some assurances to States Signatories, paragraph 6 refers that the 
verification activities will be handled in the least intrusive manner. However, as we 
shall see, the possibility of on-site inspections will have, at least to some extent, to be 
quite intrusive. Even though, daily routine activities will be dealt with in a very non-
intrusive way. 
The issue of confidentiality is addressed in paragraph 7 and this will constitute 
one of the arguments for those who want to block the advance of the implementation of 
the Treaty, not because the way it is drafted in the Treaty, but because it is a theme that 
keeps popping up during different negotiations, namely the manuals (as contained in 
paragraph 44). The fact is that the IMS network is so wide and it is up to national 
authorities or the diplomatic missions accredited to the CTBTO to require access to 
data, which cannot be denied by the Technical Secretariat. The data made available does 
not concern only the State requiring those data. 
The possibility of establishing special arrangements with other International 
Organizations (article II, n.8) has become very pertinent with the Fukushima accident in 
Japan on 11 March 2011. This enabled the Provisional Technical Secretariat to set up 
                                                                
211
 http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/, in particular article VIII. 
80 
 
special mechanisms of cooperation with other International Organizations (like WMO – 
World Meteorological Organisation or WHO – World Health Organisation). Regarding 
the cost efficiencies benefices, it is relevant to note that a special relation is being 
developed with WFP - World Food Program for the setting up of an Enterprise 
Resource Planning. The cooperation with WMO, for instance, has produced tangible 
results regarding atmospheric transport modelling
212
. 
Paragraph 11 deals with the relation between voting rights and payment of 
assessed contributions, giving a two year margin period for those who are in arrears. A 
State that does not fulfil its financial obligations for more than two years loses its voting 
rights in the General Conference (like it happens in other International Organizations 
like IAEA or UNIDO, jus to mention a few that also have their siege in Vienna). Until 
the State has paid back it is also impeded to receive the unutilized balances, which will 
only be returned after the accounts have been cleared. 
Two major organs are defined: the Conference of States Parties and the 
Executive Council. This article also institutes a Technical Secretariat which will be 
responsible for running the daily operations, namely the monitoring system and the data 
centre. 
The Conference of States Parties is supposed to meet annually in regular 
sessions, but it may have special sessions upon a decision by the Conference, by a 
request from the Executive Council or by a request from a State party with the support 
of the majority of the other States Parties. It is up to the conference to decide on the 
budget, the scale of assessments of States Parties, to appoint the Director-General of the 
Technical Secretariat, to elect the members of the Executive Council and to approve the 
rules of this organ. The scale of assessments will repeat the decision taken by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on this subject, even if the CTBTO is not an 
organ, program or institution of the United Nations, but an autonomous agency within 
the UN system. 
The Executive Council shall be formed by 51 States Parties, following a set of 
criteria: number of monitoring facilities of IMS, experience and expertise in monitoring 
technology (although nothing is said on the method of evaluation for this) and the 
contribution for the budget of the organization. The States will be, as usual in UN, 
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nominated by each regional group, which are defined in the Treaty. It must be recalled 
that in the case of CTBT, to change from one regional group to another one it requires 
the agreement of both groups and it must be a consensual decision from both. 
The rules of decision in the Conference of States Parties are the majority of 
States Signatories present and voting, in case of procedural matters, and consensus for 
matters of substance. If no consensus is reached the President of the Conference will 
impose a 24h delay and then a decision is taken by a 2/3 majority if not by consensus. 
All matters on which there may be doubts whether they are substance or procedural will 
be taken as substance. The same rules apply to the Executive Council, except the 24h 
delay which is not envisaged. These are the same procedures envisaged for the 
Conference of States Parties of OPCW. 
Besides the executive role, one of the major tasks of the Executive Council is to 
receive and take action regarding on-site inspections requests, being able to replace the 
Conference of States Parties in case of urgency. It is also responsible for the facilitation 
and consultation procedures as contained in article IV. 
 
5. Article III  - National implementation measures 
 
Article III on national implement measures is a recurrent provision in 
multilateral treaties once it establishes the relation between the States Parties and the 
organization, besides imposing an obligation to the parties not to jeopardize the aim of 
the Treaty and to implement the Treaty. Until the entry into force, the Executive 
Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat reports to the Preparatory 
Commission on the national measures adopted by the States. 
This article somehow consolidates what the VCLT already contained in its 
article 18 - obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty prior to its entry 
into force
213
 - , especially for those parties that have neither ratified the VCLT nor the 
CTBT. This understanding is even more valid if we consider that article 18 is of 
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declaratory nature of customary law
214
, which means that article III only does the same 
on this matter. The moratoria adopt by some of the Signatory States also intends to fulfil 
the obligation of article 18 VCLT, even if the States are not parties to VCLT. 
This national obligation is probably also the result of the larger effort to prevent, 
pre-empt or persecute terrorist activities
215
. In fact, the CTBT can be useful to detect the 
use of nuclear weapons by terrorists, including in territories of States that are not parties 
to the Treaty, because of its extended IMS
216
. 
It also refers to the obligation of the States Parties to nominate a National 
Authority and to put it in contact with the Technical Secretariat. Besides to make sure 
that confidentiality is not violated, one of the purposes of this article is that there is a 
national institution responsible for the coordination of the monitoring system at national 
level. The national authority shall be the national focal point for liaison with the 
Secretariat, the other organs and the other States, as far as technical questions are 
concerned, for the rest it is the competence of the diplomatic missions accredited to the 
organization. This national authority is the entity responsible for transmitting to the 
Organization any information regarding explosions, thus being a fundamental element 
for one the 4 measures for the Verification Regime of article IV, namely regarding the 
confidence-building measures and the consultation and clarification elements there 
stated. 
The national authority is also responsible for providing the data obtained by 
national technical means of verification, which although not being fully described in 
article IV, are clearly mentioned as being able to be used the same way as the IMS data. 
The other State Parties cannot interfere with other Parties national technical means of 
verification. China expressed some doubts on this reasoning, but eventually the 
provision was adopted. 
A special note should be made about the first paragraph of the article, which 
imposes the obligation of execution of the Treaty. Although a general principle of 
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International Law, it has been always included in treaties
217
 of this kind. Article III 
reiterates the obligations of States regarding control measures. Apart from IMS and 
OSI, in fact the primary control is naturally left to the States. It is also up to the States to 
decide upon criminal law in case of violation of the obligations of the Treaty. The 
Treaty iself does not include any measure on this, but article III, in paragraph 2, refers 
to the need of States to work together regarding the enforcement of their own domestic 
prohibitions that reflect the Treaty obligations.  
As far as criminal law is concerned, the US has made a clear point on assuming 
that the Treaty requires State Parties to extend the prohibitions to their nationals even if 
outside their borders, but the same does not apply to corporations, to which extra-
territorially is not applicable. 
 
6. Article IV - Verification 
 
Apart from the purpose of the Treaty, this is probably the most important article 
of CTBT, not because of its 68 paragraphs, once most of them are the necessary 
definitions of the Verification Regime different components (as contained in paragraph 
1: an International Monitoring System (IMS); Consultation and clarification; On-site 
inspections; confidence-building measures), but because it creates the needed 
mechanism to fulfil the purpose of the Treaty, without which the verification – like it 
happened with previous treaties as the PNBT or PNET – would remain only with 
national means and, especially in case of a multilateral Treaty, that would not be enough 
to ensure the independence and reliability of data. The independence of the Verification 
Regime is a fundamental issue to confirm any possible intervention (namely an on-site 
inspection) based on commonly agreed data. With the Verification Regime in force, a 
blockade to an OSI based on alleged data cannot be accepted. This is a means to make 
the transgressor State be obliged to bare the onus of the counterproof, but not the 
proof
218
, which is presented by the claimant.  
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Verification involves two distinct moments which require different operations: 
detection and identification
219
. Article IV includes the systems for both cases, the IMS 
mainly for detection and on-site inspection for identification. The detection element is 
the one that thwarts States from cheating
220
. Taking into account the Treaty refers to all 
nuclear explosions and is intended to be comprehensive, it must be sustained that even 
non-detectable explosions, either because of very low yield, or because using a low 
yield method, like hydronuclear experiments, are also considered to be a breach to the 
Treaty, even if some States (like Russia) do not fully agree with this assessment
221
. 
The article will be supplemented in extenso by the Protocol to the Treaty. The 
verification regime is the essential element to detect non-compliance
222
. The four 
elements of the Verification Regime are equally important to determine the non-
compliance by a State and, and from the legal point of view, article IV defines the right 
of reply of the defendant. Even if the Treaty does not deal with criminal law, in terms of 
procedure, a great transparency and adequate balance of the roles of both parties (the 
defendant and the plaintiff) is assured by the Treaty.  
This article is of particular interest for the way intrusiveness is addressed and the 
limits imposed to it. The only aspect of the International Verification Regime that can 
be intrusive is an OSI
223
, not any other of the elements contained in article IV. 
Moreover, an on-site inspection can only take place if it follows the strict procedures of 
the Treaty and its protocol. 
Article IV can only be fully read and understood together with the attached 
Protocol to the Treaty. Verification cannot be defined by itself; it can only be judge 
according to the decisions made by the States regarding what they want
224
. In the 
context of CTBT, verification is a process very well defined beforehand and not 
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adjusted to circumstances. The question of compliance was absent from NPT
225
, but the 
CTBT refers to compliance
226
 on several occasions, both regarding procedures for its 
implementation, and enunciating some legal measures to address the violation of 
compliance. Non compliance with the Treaty goes further than violation of the Treaty, 
as this may refer to material breaches not indeed affecting the object and purpose of the 
Treaty. The judgement of non-compliance
227
 will be grounded on effective data and 
declared by the Executive Council (article II, paragraph 8, al. a). This has also been one 
of the arguments used by USA not to ratify the Treaty, as it does not want to hand over 
to an international organization the responsibility to decide upon compliance or non 
compliance
228
. 
One aspect of international supervision that is not addressed by CTBT is the 
publicity given to the non-compliance judgements, thus not forcing States to make those 
judgments public. This is not a single case, most of arms control treaties avoid including 
publicity for these acts in their texts. This option may be understood taking into account 
the extreme sensitivity of the matter and of the concerned data (that may include 
technological, topographic, geographic, geological and other elements that States often 
consider being of special national interest). 
 There are several techniques that can be used in the verification process, but they 
are conditioned by their cost, availability and ownership. However, the list of 
techniques is a living instrument susceptible to the necessary updating. The CTBT 
created an International Monitoring System, which is a fundamental part of the 
verification regime and it reflects the growing perception among the international 
community that verification should be based on independent systems, unlike the PTBT, 
even if national technical means can also be taken into account, at least to launch a 
suspicion somehow justified.  
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One important element is that national technical means may include elements 
that are not part of the Treaty – like satellite collection systems - , but the data can be 
used by the members that have access to those data, if the State decide to share it, 
especially in the cases where national means are used. It must be clarified that the IMS 
uses satellites
229
 (namely Vsats
230
) for transmission of data, but not to recollect data, 
once this technique was excluded from the very beginning due to its cost, despite China 
and Pakistan insistence, that argued that only the use of satellite and electromagnetic 
monitoring could make the system valid for all environments, namely the outer-
space
231
. 
The possibility of decoupling
232
 is a very challenging one for the IMS and from 
the beginning it has been considered by the Secretariat and the experts involved in the 
negotiations, even if not all consider it is a real effective method that could allow 
undetected explosions
233
.  Paragraphs 92 to 96 of article IV foresee an excluded area 
from an OSI, in reality the explosion spot itself could be excluded, but paragraph 96 
rests the rights of the inspection team, even if in a restricted way. This restriction is 
also intend to preserve the integrity of installations of the inspected State that may be 
located sufficiently near the explosion site, but may not have any relation
234
. 
Although the negotiations
235
 regarding IMS were not easy, those concerning 
IDC were much more difficult. Only when these were over, was it possible to agree on 
the IMS.  The IMS is composed by 50 primary seismic stations and 120 auxiliary 
seismic stations; 80 radionuclide stations, of which 40 are to be equipped with 
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technology to monitor noble gases
236
; 11 hydroacoustic stations; and 60 infrasound 
stations. Moreover, 16 radionuclides laboratories are also foreseen in the Treaty. No 
indication of the kind of technology used is mentioned in the Treaty, but the location 
of all stations and laboratories is undoubtedly identified (although it can be changed 
by consensus). The Treaty and the protocol missed the opportunity to clarify how the 
counter-check of data, especially in the case of an on-site inspection, should be 
done
237
. This is a matter that the discussions for the on-site inspections manual have 
been dragging on for some time. 
 A nuclear explosion produces different signals from an earthquake
238
 as well as 
from a nuclear reactor signal. In the latter case because of the distinct kind of isotopes 
that are released in the two cases
239
. The CTBTO has a running project to be able to 
ensure the quality and rigour of data
240
, the International Noble Gas Experiment
241
. But 
still, the system has to be improved in order to clearly establishes possible 
contaminations. 
This article also establishes the relation between national authorities, as referred 
to in article III, and the Organization and defines the competences of each one of them. 
Moreover, the role of States Parties is also mentioned within this context. 
 In paragraph 13, the compatibility with article IV of NPT, even if without a 
direct reference to that Treaty, is the basic principle for the development of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes. 
 If the IMS is basically the responsibility of the States that host stations, although 
under the authority of the Technical Secretariat, the fact is that the IDC is the Secretariat 
responsibility and strict competence. It is interesting to note that the CTBTO has two 
different definitions of assets. On the one hand, and from the legal point of view, these 
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assets, i.e. the stations, are the property of the States; on the other hand, and from the 
contabilistic point of view they are CTBTO assets, once they are run by the CTBTO 
(through contractors). The IMS by itself is useless without a data centre. States Parties 
can provide data from other stations than those of IMS. The treatment of data by IDC is 
also a way to make data of universal value once the means for its evaluation have been 
agreed by all State Signatories of the Treaty. This means that all data collected by the 
IDC are given exactly the same kind of analysis. 
 Consultation and clarification are not to be considered as part of an on-site 
inspection, not even as a first stage
242
. It is a voluntary mechanism, unlike the on-site 
inspection, which is clearly intrusive. Although voluntary, it has a time limit (48h) and 
the State asking for an on-site inspection must include the results of the consultation and 
clarification procedures in its request. The consultation and clarification may well avoid 
an on-site inspection, but they also may lead directly to the steps in article V (as 
contained in paragraph 33) if there is clear confirmation of non compliance. 
The on-site inspections follow the same scheme of the challenge inspection of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the role attributed to the Executive 
Council and the Director-General. The CTBT does not include any other type of 
inspections (routine, short-notice or random) but only inspections intended to certify a 
violation of the Treaty and for that reason they are the most intrusive kind. The on-site 
inspection main goal is to provide the Executive Council enough elements allowing it to 
take a decision, maybe involving sanctions as contained in article V. It should be taken 
as a last recourse. 
Usually two approaches regarding on-site inspections are considered by CTBT 
analysts: on the one hand, the red light approach, meaning an on-site inspection moves 
forward unless the Executive Council decides otherwise; on the other hand, the green 
light approach which requires a prior approval by the Executive Council. The Treaty 
also considers two different kinds of on-site inspections: on the one hand, the cases of 
inspections to characterize the explosion; on the other hand, to identify the perpetrator, 
in cases where the explosions takes place in a common territory, like the high seas
243
. 
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This is a controversial reading, although supported by many defenders of the Treaty (a 
combination of part II, paragraphs 105-108 of the Protocol, and article IV, paragraph 35 
of the Treaty). 
The time frame for an on-site inspection
244
 is very well defined along this article 
and it is complemented by the Protocol provisions referring to on-site inspections. The 
question of which data to use (from national means or just from the IMS), as well as 
who would be given the authority to launch an on-site inspection were some of the 
issues on which a compromise was difficult to reach
245
. 
 The fall out aspects of a nuclear explosion is not part of the inspections task, but 
of IMS. Nevertheless, it is still the verification regime ascertain in the Treaty that 
contribute to evaluate the disproportionate magnitude of the health effects of nuclear 
weapons, that is, the date recollected by the verification system contribute to the 
definition of the event thus allowing public health authorities to intervene in due time in 
an effective manner
246
. The level of radiation detected is equally relevant to make 
prospective analysis of its effects
247
. 
 The question of verification has been argued by some States as being the only 
added value of CTBT, if it were to be effective. The American Senate has used this 
argument for several years to impede the ratification of the Treaty by the USA
248
, which 
will have a major impact on the future of the Treaty
249
. 
 It is of common perception that the verification systems and regimes are one of 
the most controversial areas of non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. One of the 
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most complicated aspect is the validation of data, while some States argue that only data 
provided within the boundaries of the Treaty may be used by the organisation, others 
(like USA) tend to insist on evoking inter alia wording to justify the use of different 
sources of information. This is not a single question of CTBT or CTBTO but it has been 
seen elsewhere, for instance, in the IAEA. 
 The last element of the International Verification Regime – confidence building 
measures (paragraph 68) – is complemented by the Protocol and it regards the duty of 
the States Parties to inform the CTBTO of chemical explosions that may originate 
signals that can be detected by IMS and by doing so avoiding noise in the IMS. Ideally, 
the information should be conveyed before the explosion takes place. Nothing is said in 
the Treaty on confidence building measures the CTBTO may engage to reaffirm the 
certainty of IMS and its independence. It seems there is some unbalance in the Treaty 
regarding the duties of the States Parties and the organization. 
 
7. Articles V - Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance 
including sanctions and VI - Settlement of disputes 
 
The Conference of States Parties or, in case of urgency, the Executive Council 
can take a violation of the Treaty to the attention of the United Nations. It is not 
identified to which organ it should be brought to the attention, but it is assumed that it is 
the Security Council. This is an extreme measure that can only be envisaged if it is not 
possible to redress and remedy the situation by other means, like consultation and 
clarification as contained in article IV, paragraph 1 b. This possibility of sanctions is 
what, somehow, justifies the existence of a Treaty, as without it the measures there 
contained would be illegal
250
. The States Parties can also adopt measures according to 
international law within the Conference to punish an offender State. Moreover, the 
Treaty refers to a very specific measure that deals with the Treaty itself (article V, n.2), 
that is, the restriction or suspension of the State Party to exercise its rights and 
privileges.   
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Article V reinforces the legal and political constraints that States must consider 
when they form their judgements about national defence policies
251
, as with CTBT the 
nuclear option is much more difficult, once the States Parties cannot ensure that 
hypothetical nuclear weaponry could be test to assure its functionality. 
The disputes that may arise are supposed to be handled in a peaceful way, as 
article 33 of the Charter of United Nations establishes. According to article VI disputes 
regarding the interpretation or the application of the Treaty can be taken to the 
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Contentious processes are also 
possible, if both parties (whether two States Parties or a State Party and the 
organization) agree to do so
252
. It remains to be analysed the applicability of article 34 
of the International Court of Justice in these situations, only States can be parties to 
proceedings in Court. Besides the ICJ, both the Executive Council and the Conference 
of States Parties
253
 have been empowered to settle disputes. It is important to note that 
article VI sustains that this is without prejudice to articles IV and V. These disputes 
relate only to the application or interpretation of the Treaty, and not to the compliance 
with the Treaty (for that, the procedures are included in articles IV and V)
254
.  
Article VI refers extensively to the role of the Executive Council and the 
Conference of Parties regarding the settlement of disputes, but it does not confer any 
power or competence to those organs to impose a resolution of a dispute. Bearing in 
mind that international organisations cannot be parties to a dispute before the ICJ, the 
CTBTO can, however, according to paragraph 1 of article 65 of ICJ Statute, ask for an 
advisory opinion. 
 
8. Articles VII Amendments and VIII - Review of the Treaty 
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The Treaty can be amended at any time after the entry into force, but in principle 
not before that (including the strict rule of article XIV
255
), according to procedures and 
delays contained in article II. Moreover, there must be no negative vote cast by any 
State Party. There is a lighter or simplified procedure for amendments regarding matters 
of administrative or technical nature. There is not any provision allowing any 
amendment before its entry into force, but there is no exclusion of such as well. 
The possibility of revision of the Treaty is set for ten years after the entry into 
force, if not decided otherwise by the Conference of States Parties, and every ten years 
from then on. This will be an opportunity to update the Treaty on the basis of new 
scientific and technological developments. The possibility of underground tests for 
peaceful purposes may be revisited
256
. This may be a set-back in the disarmament and 
non-proliferation, although there is not only a mention to peaceful purpose explosions, 
but also that any amendment will also preclude any military benefits from those 
explosions.  
States can veto the amendments in two different occasions: in the moment of the 
approval of the amendement or by failing its ratification, thus impeding its entry into 
force. There is a clear norm to impede there is dual track on the Treaty’s legal effect, 
meaning that amendments are only valid if ratified by all Parties to the Treaty. 
 Due to technical character of the Treaty, the possibility to revisit the text seems 
to be very reasonable, once not only the technical means change, but also the procedural 
rules may be adapted to overcoming new situations. 
 
9. Articles IX - Duration and withdrawal, X - Status of the Protocol and the 
Annexes, XI - Signature , XII - Ratification, XIII – Accession 
 
                                                                
255
 Anastassov, Anguel. “Can the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Be Implemented before Entry 
into Force?”, Netherlands International Law Review,  2008: p. 84. 
 
256
 After all, the notion of test is only associated to weapons, not necessarily to explosions, which mean 
that, at least theoretically, tests without explosions are not covered by the treaty. 
93 
 
As usual, the Treaty ends with the standard clauses
257
 of duration, the status of 
the different parts of the Treaty, that is, its text, its annexes and its Protocol and 
annexes, and the procedures regarding signature, ratification, accession, reservation, 
deposit and the definition of the authentic texts.  
Article IX deals with two important aspects: the duration of the Treaty, which is 
unlimited, (the NPT, for instance, was not), and the possibility of withdrawal. The 
Treaty admits the figure of withdrawal (article IX), in the same terms the NPT does, 
with a mandatory notice to the Security Council, the other States Parties and the 
Executive Council six months in advance. It leaves to the party the responsibility to 
indicate the facts that justify its decision
258
, like the NPT does. The inclusion of 
withdrawal can be seen as a persuasive element for States to accede to Treaty once the 
compromise established with the accession does not become mandatory forever, but 
only until the State wants it
259
. On the other hand, it makes the Treaty too flexible 
regarding its accomplishment, as North Korea withdrawal from NPT has proven. The 
withdrawal clause in reality ensures that the States are given the last option
260
, a 
situation that has been contested by the more diligent opponents to nuclear explosions 
and tests. If we were to consider the Treaty an example of hard law, once it codifies 
principles and defines behaviours and is legally binding
261
, the fact is that article IX
262
 is 
more an example of soft law
263
, as it is an example of a fragile or weak certainty for the 
fulfilment of the Treaty. This approach towards soft law seems to gain importance in 
international legal scholarship
264
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Article X makes the Protocol and its annexes an integral part of the Treaty, 
although, as we shall see, in the case of reservations, for instance, not all the rules apply 
evenly. 
Article XI makes the Treaty an open Treaty for all the States without exception, 
after all the text had been adopted by a UNGA resolution and it would be strange that 
this would not be the case. Moreover, the text was negotiated in a multilateral forum by 
all the States that wanted to do so. 
Article XII imposes the ratification obligation to the States Parties, while article 
XIII provides for the accession after the entry into force by any State. The fact that 
ratification is clearly inserted in the Treaty as a mandatory step for the entry into force 
of the Treaty contributes for a more clear interpretation of article 24 of VCLT and also 
makes sure that not only the Signatory entity endorses the Treaty, but the State 
reconfirms it
265
, thus avoiding questions like the ones raised in the case opposing 
Cameroon to Nigeria regarding their land and maritime border
266
.  The ratification thus 
ensures the fulfilment of the domestic procedures
267
 Ratification may be more difficult 
depending on the intrusiveness of the Treaty, as the CTBT includes on-site inspections; 
its level of intrusiveness may be, upon certain circumstances, considered difficult to be 
accepted
268
.  
 
10. Article XIV - Entry into force 
 
Article XIV concerns the entry into force of the Treaty. Because of its unique 
character and being one of the reasons for this dissertation, we shall deal with it in a 
separate chapter, bearing in mind that the period between the signature and entry into 
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force of arms control treaties requires special attention
269
.  The article imposes the 
ratification by 44 States identified in Annex 2 to the Treaty and corresponding to the 
States that were members of the Conference on Disarmament by then and which had a 
nuclear reactor according to IAEA list. India opposed to such a strict list
270
. This 
opposition is not of legal but of political nature and must be understood within the 
history of international relations and in particular the context of multilateral 
negotiations. In the following chapter an analysis of this article along with the questions 
of ratification and enter into force will be further developed. 
Article XIV defines the possibility of a Conference of ratifying States every two 
years on the anniversary of the Treaty in order to find ways to move forward with the 
entry into force of the Treaty. This kind of conference has taken place every two years 
since 1999 and it has been supported by Ministerial meetings in alternate years. The 
reference date is 24 September (anniversary date of CTBT). Although the Conference 
and the Ministerial meetings are supposed to be only for ratifying States, the fact is that 
all Signatory States are invited, and even some observers to the PrepCom (like Pakistan) 
if they show interested on participating. 
 
11. Articles XV - Reservations, XVI - Depositary and XVII - Authentic texts 
 
The possibility of reservations
271
 (article XV) is excluded regarding the Treaty 
and its annexes, but it is established concerning to the Protocol and its annexes, as long 
as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty
272
. The 
reservation clause only mentions the impossibility for a kind of reservation but it is 
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silent regarding procedures
273
 for the allowed reservations (with the exception above 
mentioned). 
Nothing is said on the obligation of the other parties to accept the reservations
274
 
and what would be the relations among the Parties and the validity of the Treaty
275
. On 
this matter it must clarified the existence of two views, a classical one inspired in the 
ICJ Advisory Opinion
276
, that argues that the acceptance by all the other States Parties is 
mandatory, and another one, based on the VCLT (Articles 19-23) which admits a 
certain flexibility on this matter
277
. However, in the case of CTBT, it seems that once 
there is a clause impeding all reservations, if a reservation were to be accepted, it would 
in fact require an amendment to the Treaty, thus changing the legal nature of the act
278
 
from a reservation from one party to an amendement of all parties. 
The problem of the persistent objector
279
 is avoided once the Treaty clearly 
impedes reservations. The advantage of this clause is that it contributes for the clarity 
regarding the law
280
, which is always of extreme importance and in particular in 
international law where different legal regimes participate. However, in case of a non-
signatory or non-ratifying State – like India – a problem arises on whether to accept the 
persistent objector rule if the ban on nuclear explosions could be considered as a 
customary law. It must be recalled that from the very beginning India objected to the 
Treaty, even if not because of its main purpose
281
. 
One question that has not been fully addressed or answered both by the ICJ and 
in literature is the acceptance of a reservation definition and its consequences
282
, despite 
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article 20 of VCLT. If this is a problem that does not concern the Treaty and its 
annexes, it should be taken into account for the Protocol and its annexes. 
Concerning reservations, it is important to mention that they are not possible 
regarding customary international law
283
 and in the case of nuclear explosions, although 
they are not an object of customary international law, we would consider that its 
prohibition might be considered as such. Again the inclusion of this clause on the Treaty 
underlines the universal obligation without any questioning.  
The fact that test is not defined in the Treaty it might allowed interpretative 
declarations, which might be assimilated to reservations. This is a means that some 
States have used this trick sometimes with success and sometimes not
284
. 
The fact the UN Secretary-General is the depositary of the Treaty confirms its 
multilateral character
285
, for instance the PTBT was deposited with the governments 
that had started the Treaty
286
, a fact that per si raised suspicions on some States on the 
equality of all the Parties. The fact that the UN Secretary General is its depositary
287
 is 
also an assurance there is no secrecy regarding the Treaty (although it would be 
impossible in practical terms in this case due to the way negotiations were handled). 
However, it must be clarified that this secrecy avoidance is guaranteed by the act of 
registration with the UN (according to article 80 of VCLT), therefore the two acts 
should not be confused, although in the case of CTBT one act implies the other as the 
depositary and the instance of registration is the same. 
Regarding the authentic texts, the usual formula applied in UN was incorporated 
in the Treaty text, which means that the text is equally authentic in all of the six UN 
official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish). 
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12. Annexes to the Treaty (Annex 1 to the Treaty – List of States pursuant 
to Article II, paragraph 28;  Annex 2 to the Treaty – List of States 
pursuant to Article XIV), Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty, and its annexes (Annex 1 to the Protocol, Annex 2 to the 
Protocol - List of Characterisation Parameters for International Data 
Centre Standard Event Screening) 
 
The annexes to the Treaty, the Protocol
288
 and its annexes are used to better 
define some contents expressed in the Treaty, as well to provide details in terms of 
procedures, for instance regarding on-site inspections. From the strict legal point of 
view, they do not make any inflexion or deflexion from what the Treaty defines. 
Annex 1 to the Treaty distributes the States among regional groups, as referred 
in article II, para. 28. This distribution is different from the usual one and puts Israel in 
the Middle East and South Asia Group. If geographically it is a correct option, 
politically it would reveal to be a faux pas once it has impeded that group from taking 
decisions
289
 from the very beginning. The six groups created are different from the 
UNGA division, but similar to IAEA division. 
Annex 2 defines the list of the States which ratification is mandatory for the 
entry into force of the Treaty and the criteria for the establishment of the list. The first 
was to be a member of the Conference on Disarmament on the date of the approval of 
the Treaty and the other criteria was to have a nuclear power reactor on that date as 
well. 
The Protocol is particularly important in defining the rules for inspections, 
taking into account that they are one of the compliance measures of verification, as it 
happens with other arms control treaties
290
. Moreover it also elaborates on the basic 
rights and obligations of the States regarding IMS and IDC and complements with 
details on those two systems. The technical questions raised in article IV are more 
developed in the Protocol, which provides the procedural, technical and scientific 
guidance for the use of data and products of IDC and the use of IMS. It is relevant to 
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note the disctinction between data and products, as confidentiality and technical matters 
are not necessarily identical. 
 
13. The preparatory organs291 
 
Once the Treaty requires several measures to be taken into force it was decided, 
as it has been, for instance, the case with OPCW, to create a Preparatory Commission 
and a Provisional Technical Secretariat that could develop the different tasks required 
before the entry into force of the Treaty (paragraph 14). The Preparatory Commission 
was given the statute of international organization
292
, thus being able to negotiate and 
enter into agreements, not to mention the capacity to exercise the intended functions 
before the entry into force of the Treaty.  
The fact of having legal personality
293
 also imposes an increased responsibility 
to accomplish the tasks, as there are not any arguments – apart from decisions by the 
Preparatory Commission – to impede any action. Some of the activities can only take 
place after the entry into force, namely the on-site inspections, but there is a large 
technical work that is needed to be done before it happens. These tasks include the 
preparation of manuals
294
, the definition of technologies, the calibration of equipments, 
testing equipment and procedures, among others. 
The creation of the Preparatory Commission is based on the UN General 
Assembly Resolution, but most of the aspects defining its status, rules and competences 
are to be found in the annex to that resolution. This resolution and its annex are of 
utmost importance on the question of the entry into force and application of the Treaty, 
once the creation of the Preparatory Commission had as its fundamental aim to fulfil 
some of the Treaty tasks that have been referred before and which are often taken for an 
example of provisional application of the Treaty. The resolution is the necessary 
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agreement for the creation of a Preparatory Commission that will further the 
accomplishment of the Treaty until its entry into force
295
, namely setting up the IMS 
and the IDC. 
The Preparatory Commission works as the Organization will work
296
, with 
similar organs and similar procedures, though with some specificities owe to the fact 
that it is based on a constitute text which is a resolution taken among States without any 
support from any organization. Many of the voting States were not parties to the Treaty 
by then. One important difference from the provisions of the Treaty has to do with the 
lost voting rights of States Parties, as the Treaty refers to two years of arrears, but the 
resolution only to one year.  
The rules of decision by the Commission are similar to the rules regarding the 
Conference of States Parties, including the suspension of the session if no consensus 
can be reached. Clearly the option for consensus generally prevails, as choosing a 
voting procedure may put the initiative in danger, as States may accept to be part of a 
consensus decision, but if called to a vote they may fail to approve
297
 it. 
One of the major advantages of the consensus rule – known as the Vienna rule - 
is that it ensures more legitimacy to the decision
298
. It is true that it involves further 
negotiation and diplomacy than any voting system. Moreover, and specially for treaties 
that are not in force, it is a very useful means to secure a widest support for the 
decisions, thus contributing for the development of International Law. 
The policy making organs, besides the Preparatory Commission are the Working 
Group A, which deals with political, financial and administrative issues, and Working 
B, that handles the technical discussions. There is also an Advisory Group that deals 
with financial and administrative issues and gives counselling to the Executive 
Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.  
In terms of procedures Working Groups A and B make recommendations to the 
Preparatory Commission while the Advisory Group makes recommendations to 
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Working Group A and to the Executive Secretary. The Preparatory Commissions is the 
only organ that can take decisions. It is the Preparatory Commission that has the 
competence granted by the resolution to handle the development in fulfilling the 
requirements of the Treaty
299
, but this is in reality a task that is mostly developed by the 
PTS on a daily routine basis. 
The Commission has been given the tasks of preparing the grounds for the entry 
into force, as far as technical means are concerned, and, at the same time, to handle the 
Provisional Technical Secretariat, namely by approving and financing its budget
300
.  
Being an international organisation, the Preparatory Commission, its policy 
organs and the Provisional Technical Secretary are accountable according to the same 
rules, with the necessary adaptations resulting from the fact that they are only 
provisional entities
301
.  
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Chapter III - Article XIV – Questions on entry into force 
 
1. Article XIV – Entry into force 
 
The article is longer than usual compared to articles concerning the same 
subject-matter
302
. It is composed by five distinct numbers
303
 and its wording already 
indicated that entry into force would not be an easy process
304
. This difficulty results 
from the sensitiveness of the object and purpose of the Treaty but is also due to the 
extremely strict conditions there imposed
305
. 
The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the 44
th
 State of Annex 2 to the 
Treaty, that is all States mentioned in that annex of the Treaty, has ratified and 
deposited its instrument with the UN Secretary General, but never before two years after 
its opening for signature. This period was overdue on 10 September 1998. This 
minimum time frame for the entry into force would allow the realization of many 
activities in particular those referred to in article IV of the Treaty, especially taking into 
account the imprecision of the article
306
. It would be impossible, or at least very 
ineffective, to have the Treaty enter into force before those tasks had been fulfilled
307
. 
Moreover, the extra 180 days foreseen for after the deposit of the last 44
th
 ratification of 
Annex 2 to the Treaty list of States shall be used for settling down the aspects that might 
still be under consideration. To mention just a few: the approval of the manuals
308
 and 
the transformation of the PTS into a full-fledged organization. 
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The Treaty is still not in force once there are still eight States mentioned in 
Annex 2 to the Treaty missing their ratification and deposit of the respective instrument: 
China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and 
USA. Of this list, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan have not 
even signed the Treaty yet. The obligation of deposit of the instrument of ratification 
creates an extra step that can be used to delay the entry into force. It is possible to 
envisage the possibility that a State may ratify the Treaty and then delay its deposit and 
until that procedure takes place, the entry into force cannot be concluded
309
. 
Moreover, the deposit instrument must also be taken into consideration, not only 
to ascertain that the formalities have been followed, but also to ensure if any reservation 
or interpretation that has been presented may not be acceptable by the some other States 
Parties. Although the Treaty is clear regarding of making reservations to the Treaty 
itself, the fact it allowed reservations to the Protocol and its annexes may imply extra 
time. On the other hand, nothing is said about interpretation by States and its validity. 
Until entry into force takes place, a special conference of the ratifying States that 
have deposited its ratification instrument with the UN Secretary General can be 
convened three years after the signature
310
. This conference will take place every year 
until the entry into force upon request by the majority of the ratifying States to the 
Depositary. The Conference will be convened to analyse the possible measures to be 
taken to facilitate the ratification process and by doing so the entry into force of the 
Treaty and it has only one requirement, is that those measures have to be consistent with 
international law. 
It has been agreed by States Signatories that the Conference should take place 
every two years. So far there have been conferences in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2009 and 2011, despite of the fact that the Treaty offered the possibility for such a 
conference on the anniversary of the Treaty every year. In between, and following an 
initiative by the Netherlands, Australia and Japan, it was also decided that a Ministerial 
Meeting should take place in alternative years. The legal character of those two events 
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is substantially different once the Conference is foreseen in the Treaty and the 
Ministerial Meeting is not. 
Moreover, all States Signatories shall be invited as observers. Practice has 
shown that even the States that are not Signatories have participated in the conference as 
observers, the same applies to other International Organizations. 
For those States that will ratify or accede to it after its entry into force, the 
Treaty will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
or accession with the UN Secretary General. 
The CTBT includes several other conditions for its entry into force
311
: apart 
from the signature (article X), it also sets articles on mandatory ratification (article 
XII)
312
, accession (article XIII) and deposit (article XVI), only then the conditions 
established in article XIV can be taken into account, being themselves extra 
requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty
313
.  Article XIV does not refer to the 
need to accomplish an act, like ratification, once those are obligations of the parties 
regarding the Treaty, according to other provisions, as we have seen above, but it sets 
specific conditions in which the entry into force can take place. 
We agree with G.G. Fitzmaurice when he argues that ratification is not the 
moment when the State consents to be bound by the Treaty (that is when it signs the 
Treaty), but the moment that makes the State effectively bound to the Treaty
314
. Two 
different steps are at stake: the consent to be bound and to be bound.  
The entry into force, unlike ratification, in our view, is a different matter, as it 
goes beyond the State’s own competence even if, in the case of CTBT, it requires the 
ratification of 44 namely identified States, it does not depend upon on the will of a 
single State the entry into force (unless it is the last 44
th
 State of the list of Annex 2 to 
the Treaty, in which case it is a pernicious effect of the Treaty provisions). Besides the 
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procedure that makes a State to be bound by a Treaty, it must be taken into account that 
only when the Treaty is in force should it be considered that a State is bound to a 
Treaty, thus being able to withdraw from the Treaty until that moment
315
, without 
having to follow the withdrawal clause included in the Treaty. 
So far there have been 12 UNGA resolutions appealing to the entry into force in 
the shortest delay and exhorting States to proceed with the ratifications process as soon 
as possible. The Treaty was opened for signature after being approved by a UNGA 
resolution. The States that have shown difficulties with those resolutions are: Cuba, 
Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, Tanzania, Bhutan, India, Libya, Colombia, USA, Palau, and 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The fact is that not all of the resolutions have 
received exactly the same voting. But it should be kept in mind that the results do not 
necessarily mirror the will of all the States, as in some occasions States have missed the 
UNGA voting moment, and therefore it is from the years’ trend that we may infer which 
State have indeed had difficulties with the Treaty. It is of particular significance that the 
United States has repeatedly voted against the resolution on entry into force
316
. 
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21 
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13 
A/RES/59/109 177 2 – Palau, USA 4 – Colombia, India, 
Mauritius, Syria 
8 
A/RES/60/95 172 1 – USA 4 – Colombia, India, 
Mauritius, Syria 
14 
A/RES/61/104 172 2 – USA, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea 
4 – Colombia, India, 
Mauritius, Syria 
14 
A/RES/62/59 176 1 – USA 4 – Colombia, India, 
Mauritius, Syria 
11 
A/RES/63/87 175 1-USA 3 – India, Mauritius, Syria 13 
A/RES/64/69 175 1 - Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 
3 – India, Mauritius, Syria 13 
A/RES/65/91 179 1 - Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 
3 – India, Mauritius, Syria 9 
109 
 
Moreover these resolutions reiterate the practice on prohibiting nuclear explosions. By 
doing so, they contribute to the development of international law, as foreseen in article 
13 of the Charter of the United Nations. It remains to be seen how this customary 
international law could be taken for “hard law”317, instead, as usual, for “soft law”. To 
translate this customary international law – which is not a general assessement by all 
States – into an instrument of hard law is in reality what the CTBT is all about. 
For the States that have ratified the Treaty, its entry into force is of particular 
need to make its content valid
318
. Its validity – a fundamental characteristic of law – will 
imply several other features that will reinforce the purpose of the Treaty just, for 
instance, by making it binding. The question of the validity of the norm is of major 
importance when dealing with treaties that have been approved by a UNGA resolution, 
once it is politically questionable to argue against the Treaty afterwards, even if from 
the legal point of view, nothing is definite until ratification/entry into force is 
concluded. This procedure of adoption of the Treaty can be considered as a 
corroborative element of the normative character of those treaties that, like CTBT
319
, 
had their texts adopted by a UNGA resolution. 
Regarding the normative character of CTBT, or any other Treaty for that matter, 
it should be distinguish two different aspects that should apply independently. On the 
one hand, the legal obligation of the State as a party to the Treaty and, on the other 
hand, the legal effectiveness of the Treaty by itself, that is, by imposing a norm that may 
even affect third parties. These effects are not formally included in the Treaty, but they 
are the collateral result of the implementation of its provisions. 
 
2. The negotiations of article XIV 
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The negotiations
320
 of the article were long, especially if compared to the time 
spent for the whole Treaty negotiations, and unsurprisingly controversial, but that kind 
of negotiations normally are. The idea of having a relevant number of States ratifying 
the Treaty before its entry into force was not new and was suggested during the 
negotiations.  It would eventually be endorsed, but in a very unique wording, as it 
names 44 States, thus not leaving any room for flexibility on the entry into force criteria 
and makes the entry into force dependant on the specific will of those 44 States.  
States, like Austria, argued that the ratification by all members of the 
Conference on Disarmament, the forum where the Treaty was being discussed, should 
be mandatory before its entry force. The solution that was finally consecrated in the 
Treaty would prove to be an answer to all the questions raised, but it would soon reveal 
to be very difficult to achieve. As previously stated, the choice of these 44 States 
followed two requirements, clearly formulated in Annex 2 to the Treaty: the State had to 
be member of the Conference on Disarmament on 18 June 1996 (like Austria wanted) 
and it also had to be in the IAEA list of States possessing a nuclear reactor. This was a 
very diplomatic way of including all the P5 and other States which, from the security 
point of view, have been considered threats to other States. Nevertheless, the 
negotiations were open to all States willing to do so, as membership also will be. 
It must be recognised that the Nuclear States in 1996 were no longer just the 
ones identified in the NPT, but no new list of such States was set, due to the refusal by 
the P5, but also from other States like Japan or South Korea. This was also one of the 
reasins that India argued not to proceed with the signature and ratification of the Treaty, 
as it feared that the discrimination of NPT could be applied again, even if there was no 
specific disposition of the same sort, namely regarding the P5. The fact that NPT fixed 
the Nuclear States has always been object of strong criticism by many States, in 
particular India, that argues that by that procedure those 5 States are granted different 
and more powers and competences than the other States, the same goes for North Korea. 
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Being nuclear energy for peaceful purposes an undisputed right according to 
NPT (article IV), it is not excluded that the number of States having a nuclear reactor, as 
well as the number of States members to the UN Conference on Disarmament may be 
larger, which, if the Treaty does not enter into force, may lead to question the logic 
behind the requirement of article XIV because it is limited to a particular moment in 
time and does not include a substantive reason (unless it would be updated). 
The entry into force has often been politically used, even if “dressed up” as a 
legal question, and not necessarily because of the Treaty text itself. This has been an 
assessment made both by scholars and by the ICJ jurisprudence
321
.  The non-ratification 
by some States has implied the non-entry into force of the Treaty and it has raised a 
concern regarding the normativity of its content, but the non-ratification does not mean 
that the concerned State, if a signatory one, is no longer attached to the Treaty
322
, as 
article 18 of VCLT provides
323
. 
 
3. The political difficulties for the entry into force 
 
The fact that eight States of Annex 2 of the Treaty haven’t still ratified and 
notified the UN Secretary General of the ratification is not explainable by one simple, 
single or legal reason
324
, but the compromise to end nuclear explosions has been 
assumed with the large approval of the CTBT text by the UNGA resolution
325
 (with the 
exception of India, Libya and Bhutan and the abstention of Cuba, Syria, Mauritius, 
Tanzania and Lebanon) that approved the CTBT.  
In reality, the reasons behind the delay in ratification are much more of political 
nature than of legal reasoning, but the effect is the same, that is, the Treaty cannot enter 
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into force. The option for not ratifying the Treaty sometimes did not have anything to 
do with the Treaty, but it was, and it is, an issue for domestic consumption
326
.  
The USA
327
 have delayed the ratification arguing that the Treaty has no 
substantive benefits for the State but ratifying it
328
 would not be a problem, while others 
arguing differently
329
, consider that the ratification might put the State in danger
330
, 
once some other States could develop new weaponry because of not being limited 
concerning nuclear experiences, while the USA would be
331
. This is a much contested 
difficulty once, not only did the USA make numerous explosions in the past, but also 
the data collected can still be used. Moreover, there are other means – subcritical 
explosions – that may still take place, thus assuring the quality and efficiency of the 
nuclear arsenal. The ratification of the USA will most probably pave the way for further 
ratifications, but it should not be taken for granted that it solve the reticence by all 
States. 
The argument of the subcritical explosions must be carefully addressed as it 
always raises concerns. Moreover, the USA have started the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program which is intended to promote research simulation and other activities that may 
contribute to ensure a continued reliable, safe and credible US nuclear deterrent without 
nuclear testing (the doubt remaining as whether subcritical explosions should be 
considered as any other nuclear explosion). The Republicans in the Senate
332
 have 
shown that for them the IMS could be too intrusive and not so much a control 
mechanism, like the on-site inspections would be. 
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The question regarding the ratification of Iran, Israel and Egypt may have a 
more regional cause. It does not seem probable that any of them will ratify before the 
others do so. Moreover, there are other specific reasons for each of them to delay the 
process. For Israel, not being a member of NPT, to participate in the CTBT is a card it 
can play in the international arena to reflect its commitment towards nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation, on the other hand being in the crib of Middle East 
States, and like the USA, it fears that it might be overcome by a neighbour regarding 
nuclear weapons. Iran will not ratify the Treaty before Israel does, basically for the 
same fears, even if its fuel cycle is in a less developed stage, and, on the other hand, the 
CTBT ratification is a card it can always play during negotiations on the nuclear field. 
Finally, Egypt shall not ratify it before Israel becomes a member of NPT. It is because 
of its security, but also because Egypt has always argued for non-proliferation and 
disarmament, after all it was one Non-Aligned Movement State from the very beginning 
supporting international disarmament. 
For North Korea, the CTBT at this stage seems a very limiting Treaty. Although 
it has a full nuclear cycle and it is able to build long-range missiles, it is still not capable 
to master nuclear warheads in those missiles, so it is expected that it will conduct some 
more explosions. The possibility of its signature and ratification in the near future are 
highly improbable. North Korea could, nevertless, use the signature and ratification of 
CTBT to gain some leverage in the Six-party talks
333
.  
Unlike it has happened with other States, the pressure on North Korea has been 
lighter just for the fact that neither Japan nor South Korea, two States very engaged with 
CTBT, want to officially recognise North Korea as a nuclear military State, which they 
refuse to do, as they fear that too much pressure on Pyongyang may eventually force 
that recognition which would lead to a dramatic change in the approach of the Korea 
peninsula. 
Pakistan will follow India’s footsteps, for security reasons, but it has been more 
engaged with the CTBT, even participating as an observer in several events and 
meetings and even voting in favour on the UNGA resolutions on CTBT entry into force. 
India has kept a strong opposition to the CTBT arguing that, unlike it is mentioned in 
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the preamble of the Treaty, its text is not a disarmament Treaty, but a non-proliferation 
only and for that there is already the NPT. Moreover, the Treaty is not as 
comprehensive as India wanted
334
 once it does not include subcritical tests and may be 
revised regarding peaceful nuclear explosions (an aim which has always been strongly 
supported by China, its main competitor in Asia, including regarding nuclear). 
However, Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding, the Lahore 
declaration, imposing a moratorium
335
 on nuclear
336
explosions.  
This is sometimes considered a “small bilateral CTBT” and has provided some 
assurances to the international community, but, like any other moratorium, it can be 
unilaterally be put to an end at any time. Because this is a bilateral moratorium, it offers 
more certainty. It must be retained that although a moratorium may be in many cases the 
best alternative to the CTBT, it is still a fragile legal instrument as it only depends on 
the political will of the State concerned. Other States of Annex 2 to the Treaty also have 
moratoria in force, like China and the USA, while others argue that they follow the 
principle of not defeating the object and purpose of the Treaty they signed. 
The ratification process in China started more than 10 years ago, but it has been 
left in a limbo. The fact the USA has also not ratified the Treaty may serve as an 
explanation, on the other hand there are still some aspects of the Treaty that China 
would like to know beforehand, namely regarding on-site inspections and the use of the 
data provided to the PTS
337. Considered China’s geostrategy, it could be understandable 
it may be difficult for Beijing to follow the ratification procedure while neither India, 
nor USA, nor North Korea follows the same path. However, CTBT does not deal with 
the use of nuclear weapons
338
, which in any case could be use in a self-defence scenario, 
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according to ICJ, but with nuclear explosions or tests, which in reality serve to upgrade 
the nuclear weapons.  Nevertheless, from the official point of view the only reason 
presented, so far, is just the administrative burden of the People’s Congress and it has 
always reiterated the official position on the need of an early entry into force
339
 of the 
Treaty, following the Declaration of the Chinese Government of 5 October 1993. 
By ratifying the Treaty, States may need to enact legislation so that the Treaty 
produces legal effects
340
, as it might not be directly applicable. States can, on the other 
hand, consider that their jurisdiction is, at the same time, ruled by national and 
international law and a Treaty in force precedes any national law. It may require 
national legislation to be transposed into the national public legal order
341
, namely 
regarding different kinds of procedures that the Treaty may imply. States are free to 
choose not only the internal way by which they are binded by the Treaty, but also the 
necessary instrument to make the integration in the national public legal order
342
. 
A question may arise regarding the compatibility of the international and the 
domestic norm, but an answer has been provided in a quite clear way, conferring 
international law the primauté
343
 or if not the primauté, than at least international law 
should be all-inclusive
344
 and therefore there is no hierarchy but just a complementary 
system.  
If this is a general accepted rule regarding “hard law”, the situation differs as far 
as customary law is concerned, as some States refuse to accept the precedence of 
customary international law
345
 over domestic “hard law”. This is one the reasons 
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justifying the need to vest the customary law into codified “hard law” by means of a 
Treaty. 
 
4. The efforts made to enhance the entry into force of CTBT 
 
There have been 12 UNGA resolutions regarding the entry into force of the 
Treaty, and 5 UNSC resolutions calling upon States to sign and ratify the Treaty
346
. 
These initiatives obviously do not result from the Treaty, but from the States. 
Nevertheless they constitute international documents which may be considered as an 
element for making the purpose of CTBT at least a customary legal norm. Those 
resolutions are basically a reiteration of the object and purpose of the Treaty and an 
appeal to non-ratifying States to proceed with the ratification processes and to non-
signatory States to proceed with signature and ratification. 
The Treaty, as we have seen, in its article XIV includes a provision that allows 
States to gather in a conference in order to evaluate the possible proceedings regarding 
the entry into force of the Treaty and adopt the necessary measures to take it forward. 
There have been conferences every two years (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), 
complemented by Ministerial meetings in alternate years, since 1999, date of the first 
UNGA resolution on the entry into force of CTBT. While the ministerial conference, 
mostly because it is not set in the Treaty, does not produce any tangible document, it 
produces some tangible results, mainly keeping the flame of the entry into force burning 
and issueing a ministerial declaration. On the other hand, the conferences end with a 
report, a final declaration and a list of measures to press on ratification and eventually 
on entry into force of CTBT. That list of measures is sometimes presented separately 
from the declaration. Both the declaration and the list of measures are approved by 
consensus. The approval procedure of the declaration is relevant, once it reflects a trend 
in the approach to the CTBT arguments. It is usually approved by consensus by the 
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Preparatory Commission parties (though not in a Preparatory Commission session) 
before the conference. 
Analysing the declarations and the list of measures adopted, some words have 
been picked up in order to verify the consistency of the international action. As the 
graphic below presents, three groups of expressions have been singled out: one 
regarding law and its procedures (entry into force, defeat the object and purpose of the 
Treaty, international law, consensus); another regarding the object of the CTBT 
(nuclear, disarmament, non-proliferation, explosion, test/testing) and another one that 
refers to concepts that have been included in the declaration due to its relevance for the 
subject that we are dealing with (moratorium, civil benefits/applications). The column 
on the left indicates the number of times each word/expression is used
347
. 
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 The decrease of the usage of all of those words in 2011 is due to the fact that the 
declaration was considerable shortened, but kept the same structure and references 
(even if in a shorter number). It is important to note that in 2003 the civil benefits were 
added to the declaration. They constitute more and more an important argument to 
persuade States to ratify the Treaty
348
. It is also relevant to note that the word nuclear 
has gained place compared to test and explosion. As for disarmament and non-
proliferation, although they are both referred to in the Treaty, in reality the word 
disarmament takes the lead (which contradicts India’s traditional position on CTBT). 
 The legal arguments that have been included in the declaration (namely the 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty and the reference to 
international law) have only been reduced to a minimum in 2011, as we have witnessed 
during the negotiations of the text, but still the need to mention them was fully retained. 
It should also be noted that in the 1999 and 2001 declarations, apart from those legal 
aspects that have always been included, there was also a reference to article IV. The 
mentioning of the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty is 
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nothing more than a repetition of article 18 of VCLT. If doubts could be raised 
regarding the application of this clause, especially in States that are not party to VCLT, 
this recurrent procedure may contribute to make it customary international law
349
 (even 
if the ICJ has a different opinion)  
Once CTBT is not in force, article 26 of VCLT (Pacta sunt servanda) is not 
applicable
350
. Regarding the possibility of provisional application (article 25 of 
VCLT)
351
, it will depend on another legal instrument, which then will be executed 
according to the provision of article 26 for those States that might decide to be parties to 
that hypothetical instrument on provisional application. So far the Conferences foreseen 
by article XIV have not adopted or discussed any document of this kind. 
 It must be recalled here that not only Pacta sunt servanda is binding, jus cogens 
norms, according to article 38 of VCLT, as well as the obligation not to defeat the 
purpose and object of the Treaty, are equally binding. 
 The inclusion to the reference to international law confines the action of States 
to a legal basis that otherwise might allow States to dispute over the fundaments of the 
principles stated in the declaration. Although the declaration of the conference is a 
political document, it is very relevant that some international law questions and in 
particular some legal justifications are inserted in the text of the declarations. 
 The use of the consensus rule of decision
352
 is already foreseen in article XIV, n. 
2 regarding the measures to be adopted by the conference to promote the entry into 
force of the Treaty, and it is constantly reiterated. The first declarations also included 
the reference to the consensus rule of decision for the adoption of the declaration
353
.  
The option for consensus is very similar to the EU constructive abstention, if not 
from the strict legal point of view, at least in practical terms. The consensus option 
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allows that States that do not agree, but do not want to interfere with the outcome, may 
participate in the deliberative process. It is assumed here that consensus is just the 
absence of any formal objection
354
. However,  and unlike what happens in EU with 
constructive abstention, all States are equally affected and obliged to implement the 
declaration and the measures the same way, and not just those who have approved it. 
This abstention has been used by some Governments to go along the Treaty, even if 
against their own Parliaments. 
 The successive references to entry into force in the declarations can also 
arguably be used to sustain that the decision is commonly valid to all the States that 
subscribe it, thus making it an element of general law
355
, with erga omnes effects, as we 
have seen before. 
From a substantive point of view, it is of particular notice the fact that the word 
nuclear is being more and more used, including in 2011, when the declaration was 
significantly shortened, and it was the only word that was more used than in previous 
declarations.  
 
5. Some of the questions raised by article XIV 
 
The difficulties faced by CTBT to enter into force raise several questions to 
which publicists have provided, at least in some cases, some answers, even if not 
accepted by all. On the one hand, the conformity of CTBT with VCLT may respond to 
some of those issues, on the other hand some others remain without a universal answer. 
Of course it is not forgotten that VCLT is not a universal convention in the sense of 
including all States, but its content, namely its procedural aspects, is largely understood 
as customary international law
356
.  
However, taking into account the purpose and object of the Treaty
357
, a question 
was raised on how to make sure that all nuclear states would abide by the Treaty, once 
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non-Member States might have easier access to nuclear weaponry as they could 
continue their tests. This argument, used, among others, by USA, goes beyond the 
purpose of the Treaty – which is to interdict all nuclear explosions – by trying to include 
the consequences of the act (access to nuclear weaponry) within the framework of the 
Treaty. The creation of the CTBTO, on the other hand, may serve those purposes
358
 by 
accomplishing the required verification. 
The object of the CTBT could be argued as also being customary international 
law
359
, once the first Treaty regarding some of its aspects dates back to 1963 and others 
were produced since then regarding some of its major aspects. Again that is also 
controversial. Perhaps it is even more important the fact that the text of the Treaty was 
adopted by a UNGA resolution
360
 with an almost full approval by all States, which may 
lead to the conclusion that the needed opinio juris
361
 of the customary international is 
already evident. Moreover, unratified treaties may be applied accordingly
362
, either 
because the Parties want or because it includes provisions that do not need ratification, 
namely the ones reproducing jus cogens or customary international law, although 
regarding customary international law there may be some doubts. 
To increase the normativity
363
 of the CTBT it would have been possible to opt 
for easier and faster procedure on entry into force, or follow more complicated 
procedures and compromises. The latter was indeed the case. The normativity of the 
Treaty is also an element that may preclude national sovereignty and that may generate 
tensions among domestic partners and impede the ratification, not to mention the nature 
of verification/enforcement arrangements of the regime established by the CTBT.  
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The question of normativity brings up another question which is to know if we 
can consider the norm of CTBT a peremptory norm (jus cogens)
364
 or just a customary 
rule of international law, or none. Before it is necessary to decide if indeed the CTBT 
generates a norm or not, that is, if it is just a declaratory rule
365
.  
We admit there is a graduated normativity
366
 and that the Treaty cannot be taken 
as a whole, but instead the different provisions contained in the Treaty should be taken 
separately, but always considering that CTBT creates norms, with different accents, 
namely within the situation of not in force. 
 The basic norm of the Treaty – the interdiction of nuclear explosions as 
foreseen in the CTBT - should be considered jus cogens without the Treaty is in force 
due to its legal character and antecedents. Moreover, the Treaty (not the Protocol) does 
not admit any reservation, and therefore the conditions of article 53, n. 2 of VCLT are 
duly fulfilled.  
The norm created by the verification regimes affects both the Signatory and the 
Ratifying States and, on the other hand, third parties
367
, once the CTBT creates an 
objective regime which is internationally controllable – the reality is that the IMS can 
indeed control non Signatory/Ratifying States, and imposes duties on those States (for 
instance by “forcing moratoria”, or by restraining trade relations due to the absence of 
sanctionatory measures)
368
.  
The effects of nuclear explosions may affect third parties, therefore these parties 
have rights, as well as obligations, that result from a Treaty to which they are not a 
party. Articles 35 and 36 of VCLT define the conditions in which those rights and 
obligations occur. It is not question here to revise those articles, but mentioning them is 
necessary to better frame the discussion on entry into force. Moreover, third parties will 
be affected as far as jus cogens provisions may be found in CTBT. As we have seen in 
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Chapter 1, CTBT defines a norm with erga omnes character
369
, one of the reasons being 
the purpose of the Treaty, but also its regime, as to be efficient the verification regime 
needs to be universally applicable. 
The CTBT is one of those treaties that are not only intended to regulate inter-
State relations, but it also intends to develop a uniform practice that may include rights 
of third parties
370
. It must be retained, however, that States are free to enter into treaties 
or not
371
, but the agreements reached may generate desired or undesired consequences 
on third parties, which may have no alternative but to accept those consequences. This 
practice constitutes another fundamental element for the creation of customary 
international law. 
 
6. Customary international law  
 
The CTBT consecrated an existing practice which was then approved by a 
UNGA resolution
372
. The almost unanimous approval makes it almost custom, leaving 
aside the very small minority that did not vote in favour of the resolution approving the 
text of the Treaty. The practice has to be consistent and followed by a sense of legal 
obligation
373
, which the successive UNGA resolutions have sustained. 
The practice, it must be recognised, did not concern the explosions – which had 
continued – but the condemnation of that act. This is what was possible to consider in 
1996 as practice and as ground to make CTBT a legal binding instrument prohibiting 
the explosions and by doing so giving reason to censoring practice. It will never be 
excessive to remind that the element of practice, along with the opinio juris, constitute 
the fundamental elements for the definition of customary international law
374
. 
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This practice implies other criteria that must also be taken into account before 
considering a certain provision a normative one, those are, for instance, the duration of 
the practice
375
. 
Custom by itself is not a norm
376
, to become one it needs to be replenished with 
the above mentioned elements, and that is what is possible to be said about several 
aspects of CTBT. Although the CTBT is not customary law, it incorporates some 
provisions which can be considered to be customary at the international law level and 
regarding the comprehensive ban of nuclear explosions it intends to create a rule “in 
statu nascendi”377 (or almost). 
One way to make custom to become a normative binding rule one is by 
reinserting it in subsequent treaties
378
 . Those treaties may last in parallel; they do not 
have necessarily to replace each other. This has been the case with successive treaties 
on nuclear explosions, even if only dealing with some sorts of explosions. Moreover, 
the nuclear free zone treaties also corroborate this custom, by inserting provisions 
interdicting nuclear explosions and also by make it binding for the P5, these treaties can 
also be seen as examples for the CTBT.  
On the other hand, codifying in a Treaty some provisions may also be necessary 
to be able to adopt counter-measures
379
 (as the ones referred in article V and VI of 
CTBT), almost impossible if we take the moratorium cases, this is one of the major 
differences to the binding character of international norms duly approved in 
international treaties. The Treaty also defines other norms, namely procedural ones, that 
may be equally useful to execute the Treaty in an uniform way always respecting the 
object and purpose of the Treaty text. 
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7. Provisional entry into force or provisional application of the Treaty 
 
Nothing in the Treaty refers to provisional entry into force
380
 or to provisional 
application of the Treaty
381
, but, in reality, the IMS (including the IDC) could be taken 
as a sign of application of the Treaty before its entry into force
382
. The IMS is being set 
up in order to be ready by entry info force of the Treaty – as the article IV, n.1 requires 
– but it is already functioning. This it was well demonstrated in 2006 and 2009 
regarding the nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or in 2011 
after the nuclear accident in Japan at the nuclear power station of Fukushima Dai-ichi. 
Some questions still remain unsolved, suc as the right of access and storage of data or 
the confidentiality of its usage. 
Moreover, the CTBT, like any other Treaty, includes provisions that are 
supposed to be implemented before the entry into force. Those provisions are legally 
binding for the States that want to be a Party to the Treaty. As most scholars, and the 
VCLT, argue, those provisions refer to actions like signature, ratification or deposit
 383
. 
Those procedural steps are necessary for each and every party to a Treaty and only with 
its accomplishment is it possible to achieve entry into force.  
Despite the controversy on whether “possible provisional entry into force” or 
“provisional application” of a Treaty should be considered, according to VCLT, in its 
article 25, the consecrated concept was provisional application of the Treaty
384
. Some 
States have even constitutional problems to accept the figure of provisional entry into 
force, though may accept the provisional application. This is the case, for instance, of 
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Portugal.  The option for provisional application was made during the negotiations 
period, as the option for provisional entry into force raised more eyebrows and could 
engender extra legal problems that were not desired
385
.   
Article 25
386
 of VCLT admits that the provisional application may be an ulterior 
decision to the signature of the Treaty and not necessarily coinciding with the signing 
moment
387
. This article defines the moment for the decision to apply a Treaty before its 
entry into force by considering in its n.1, alinea (b) that the negotiating States have in 
some other manner agreed to do so. Moreover, the reference of negotiating States makes 
it possible for non-signatory or non-ratifying States to be parties to the provisional 
application instrument. To use article XIV conference to discuss provisional application 
could create a problem by excluding the possibility of participation in the discussions of 
former negotiating States, like India. As they can participate as observers, this is not a 
real formal problem, but a political excuse. 
It is not automatic that a negotiating party is a signatory or ratifying party: India 
was a negotiating party, but is not a signatory or ratifying; USA was a negotiating and a 
signatory party, but is not a ratifying one; Brazil was a negotiating and is a signatory 
and a ratifying one. These are just some examples of the different status States may 
have regarding CTBT. The question that may be raised is, if the provisional application 
is agreed after the signature of the Treaty, which States are supposed to intervene in the 
negotiations of the legal instruments regarding provisional application of the Treaty? 
The negotiating States of the Treaty or those which have sign it? Excluding ones or the 
others may preclude the provisional application. We would admit that the article 25 of 
VCLT refers to negotiating States of the Treaty, so that no such State is excluded from 
the possibility of provisional application and the negotiation of the respective 
instrument. 
The CTBT does not refer to any of those possibilities, but it does not exclude 
them as well
388
. According to the records of the negotiation period, article XIV should 
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not be changed before entry into force, neither should any of the conditions it contained 
be surrendered
389
. However, in the legal binding text – which is only the Treaty, its 
annexes, its protocol and its annexes, and not the preparatory work – there is no 
expression of the sort. The known proposals for entry into force
390
 only refer to an 
agreement that could be adopted by UNGA or a protocol but discard the possibility of 
revisiting the Conferences of article XIV. 
To consider CTBT lex lata or lege ferenda
391
 may seem to be an academic 
discussion, but in reality it translates a very different approach on the legal 
consequences of its text. Although it is not in force, and therefore the easiest option 
would be to classify it as lege ferenda, the fact is that, as previously seen, some of the 
provisions have an immediate application, while others a provisional one, and others 
none until enter into force of the Treaty. It is then possible to consider CTBT as a 
mixture of both lex lata and lege ferenda
392
. Unratified treaties, which are necessarily 
not in force, may still be generally accepted rules
393
. 
Provisional application has one major advantage compared to the normal entry 
into, that is, it may avoid the same domestic procedures regarding the entry into force of 
the Treaty, namely the ratification process
394
. 
One of the arguments used for the provisional application is the urgency of the 
matter
395
, which is not the case for the CTBT, opened for signature 16 years ago, and 
which has a prospective aim and not a conjunctural purpose. The delay of its 
ratification, and the low prospects of its possible entry into force in the near future, 
should, on the other hand, suggest a deeper reflection on how to make the Treaty move 
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forward. The CTBT did not opt for including any provision like the Council of Europe’s 
standing formula on provisional applications of a Treaty, which approximately reads “in 
order to avoid any delay in the implementation of the present Treaty, the signatory 
States agree to apply it provisionally”. 
 
8. Interpretation of the provisional application of the Treaty 
 
Article 31, n.3 of VCLT, like the rest of the article, refers to general rules of 
interpretation. It includes three different elements: a subsequent agreement, a 
subsequent practice and the relevant rules of international law. The first two of these 
elements refer to means of interpretation arising after the conclusion of a Treaty 
396
, the 
latter basically corresponds to the disposition of article 38 of the ICJ-Statute
397
, 
although VCLT added “applicable in the relations between parties”, meaning that it 
should be assumed that the parties do not intend to act inconsistently with other 
previous obligations and that they assume there are relations between them on a 
particular subject-matter. 
It is true that article 32 of VCLT refers to supplementary means of interpretation 
regarding the means evoked in article 31. Taking into account the provisional 
application of a Treaty, a special attention should be attributed to article 31, n. 3, alineas 
b and c. Those supplementary means of interpretation in the case of provisional 
application of a Treaty must also be understiood as means to keep the application itself 
in line with international obligations. 
The preparatory texts are only usable as explanatory elements of the text 
wording and not as a justification to determine the binding character of the norm or 
define the scope of the norm. This means there is room for different interpretations in 
the usage of the same means, which is the preparatory work, without forcing a unique 
result or interpretation.  
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Therefore, the extremely straight position argued by Rebecca Johnson could be 
questioned, even if the preparatory works of a Treaty are considered to be the most 
important supplementary means of interpretation
398
, they are not binding. Once to 
interpret a text does not necessarily mean to follow previous assumed positions, 
otherwise they would have been vested in the Treaty. That is even more the case of 
treaties that create institutions (as CTBT does, although not as a primary objective)
399
.  
If article 31 of VCLT deals with rule of interpretation, article 32 deals with 
means, therefore they should be read in a different way. While article 31 defines a way 
to act, article 32 refers to supplementary elements that can be used in that action, but 
does not attributes them any legal binding category, pre-conclusive character or 
particular status, they are just elements to help the necessary legal exegesis
400
 of the 
Treaty text.  
Unlike argued by Rebecca Johnson, the preparatory work for a Treaty should be 
used to enlighten on conceptual notions and not to be used to limit the scope of a legal 
provision. The present tendency to adequate the rule to the means, which is the opposite 
of what was decided for the VCLT, should be avoided
401
, once it inverts the legal 
interpretation of VCLT, by conferring a characteristic to means that were not supposed 
to have it. 
  
9. Provisional application of CTBT – some precedents and proposals 
 
There have been several cases of provisional application of treaties; the most 
famous one perhaps being GATT, but the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
Sea, for instance, though not provisionally applied included a Preparatory Commission 
that, like in the CTBT, was intended to prepare for entry into force. UNCLOS was used 
by States to adopt legislation according to its provisions and by doing so it generated 
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rules of customary international law
402
. It is important to note that there are linguistic, as 
well as, legal differences between treaties and agreement, the reason being that even 
from the procedural point of view, an agreement is easier to implement than a Treaty
403
 
and may surpass some of the more complicated procedures that treaties require
404
.  
The provisional application may be more engaging if it includes an opting out 
system
405
, as its effectiveness cannot be regarded as binding as the Treaty in force 
would be and States may change their perspective on the provisional application if, for 
intsnace, it may take too long as provisional.  
Provisional application, though included in the VCLT, is supposed to be decided 
by an agreement
406
, which is not a Treaty, and therefore some of the VCLT provisions, 
like ratification, can be waived. By opting for an agreement and not for a formal Treaty, 
States have the possibility to stimulate confidence-building (and by doing so improve 
the possibility of entry into force of the Treaty), the flexibility allowed by a provisional 
application agreement may easy negotiations regarding some procedural matters (in the 
case of CTBT, the manuals can be a good example). However, an agreement is a legal 
binding text between parties and it should be respected. 
The creation of CTBTO reflects a tendency found today in international law by 
which States opt by leaving some of the pursuit of their interests to international 
institutions
407
, without transfer of sovereinity. The CTBTO was created to implement at 
least some of the provisions of the Treaty. Without the CTBTO it would be impossible 
to ensure the regulatory character the CTBT
408
 intends to create. It is important to note 
that, unlike it happens with EU, we consider that there is no delegation of competences, 
the CTBTO is attributed with tasks that are controlled by the policy making organs 
which are constituted by States Parties. We mention this detail here because the 
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Provisional Technical Secretariat and the Preparatory Commission have been entrusted 
with similar tasks. 
The fact that the Preparatory Commission resulted from a UNGA resolution may 
be seen as a precedent for provisional application of CTBT, as the Commission, and the 
Provisional Technical Secretariat have been given almost the same tasks as the 
Executive Council and the Secretariat will have upon entry into force of the Treaty. 
However, regarding the competences of the organs created by the UNGA resolution, 
there is a bigger limit than that is imposed upon the organs created by the Treaty. They 
can only act in order to implement the necessary provisions that the CTBT has fixed as 
mandatory before entry into force. There is is one contradiction: on the one hand there 
are two created organs that somehow correspond to organs foreseen in the Treaty, but 
they have their competences limited and therefore they cannot apply the Treaty 
provisionally, but only execute the tasks foreseen by the Treaty for the period before its 
entry into force. 
The creation of a Preparatory Commission with legal personality
409
 – even if 
only by a resolution and not by a full Treaty – was absolutely needed to be able to move 
forward with the needs of CTBT. There had been experiences before that lacked a 
constitutive legally binding instrument, which have not been good examples of 
effectiveness (for instance the OSCE). The PTS, on behalf of the Preparatory 
Commission, has already celebrated agreements with States regarding the sharing of 
data for civilian purposes – namely tsunami warning – with the approval by the 
Preparatory Commission. 
The difficulties with article XIV are somehow the same faced by the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, once it stipulated impossible conditions for entry 
into force, as it required that States ratified a Protocol known to be unacceptable by 
some States. The option was to make a Protocol to the Treaty which in reality changed 
its content. This, nevertheless, has been a very unusual procedure
410
, and so far never 
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suggested for CTBT, as the proposals for provisional application do not refer to any 
change in the Treaty or Protocol. 
The conference of article XIV, and the Ministerial Conference within that 
context, have only insisted on the need of entry into force and appealed to States still 
lacking signature, ratification, or deposit to act on those matters as soon as possible. 
There have been only two concrete proposals for the adoption of a legal instrument 
regarding the provisional application of CTBT, but none has imposed itself. The down 
under table intends to present those proposals in comparison: 
 
1.
411
 To promote the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as 
opened for signature on September 24, 1996, 
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States 
Parties hereby agree to the provisional application 
of certain provisions of the Treaty. 
2. Without detriment to the provisions of Article 
XIV of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply 
provisionally all other Articles, Protocols and 
Provisions of the Treaty. 
3. The Treaty shall be applied provisionally [on 
DATE] by all States which have signed and 
ratified the Treaty, unless they notify the 
Depositary in writing that they do not consent to 
such provisional application. 
4. The Treaty shall be applied provisionally by 
any State which has signed the Treaty, which 
consents to its provisional application by so 
notifying the Depositary in writing. Such 
provisional application shall become effective 
from the date of receipt of the notification by the 
Depositary. 
5. Regardless of whether a signatory State has 
agreed to provisionally apply the Treaty, financial 
contributions for supporting Treaty 
implementation and verification shall remain as 
agreed in the Schedule [give details] unless a 
State notifies the Depositary in writing of its 
intention to alter its financial contribution. 
6. Provisional application shall terminate upon the 
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty. In conformity with Article IX of 
Preamble
412
 
The States Members of the Preparatory 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Member States”, 
Underlining the objective of the CTBT to 
contribute effectively to the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, 
to the process of nuclear disarmament and 
therefore to the enhancement of international peace 
and security, 
 
Concerned about the slow pace of ratification 
process and slim prospects of entering into force of 
the CTBT in a near future, 
 
Called for the early signature and ratification of the 
CTBT by all States that have not yet done so and 
for them to refrain from acts which would defeat 
its object and purpose in the meantime, by, inter 
alia, preserving the announced moratoria on 
nuclear testing, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I. Purpose of the Operational Protocol 
The purpose of this Operational Protocol is to put 
the CTBT into effect on a mutatis mutandis basis 
even though the Treaty as a whole has not yet 
entered into force. 
                                                                
411
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the Treaty, any State may also withdraw its 
consent from provisional application by notifying 
the Depositary in writing, and must include a 
statement of the extraordinary event or events 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty which 
the State regards as jeopardizing its supreme 
interests. 
Article II. The Organization and scope of 
activities 
1. The Preparatory Commission shall be the 
principal organ of the Organization. It shall 
consider any questions, matters or issues within the 
scope of the CTBT, including those relating 
powers and functions of the Executive Council and 
the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the 
CTBT and its provisional application. 
2. The Preparatory Commission shall not act 
as a substitute for the Executive Council on issues 
related to on-site inspections. The latter may be 
performed as a confidence-building measure at the 
initiative of and as an act of good will by the 
Member States concerned. 
3. The Provisional Technical Secretariat 
shall assist the Preparatory Commission in the 
performance of its functions, in accordance with 
the CTBT. 
Article III. Adoption of the Operational 
Protocol and accession  
This Operational Protocol shall be adopted by 
consensus by States participating at the Conference 
on Article XIV (2). Any Member State may accede 
to this Operational Protocol at any time by sending 
a formal letter to the Chairperson of the 
Commission thereafter. 
Article IV. Entry into force 
This Operational Protocol shall enter into force 
immediately after its adoption by the Conference 
on Article XIV (2).  
Article V. Duration 
1. This Operational Protocol shall be applied 
on a temporary basis for a period of 10 years, or 
until the CTBT enters into force earlier. 
2. After the expiration of 10 years States 
may decide by consensus to extend the duration of 
this Operational Protocol for another period, or 
periods. 
3. The provisional application of the CTBT 
in no way affects the existing requirements for 
ratification and entry into force of the Treaty as a 
whole. 
 
 
 These are two very different proposals. Rebecca Johnson opts for an agreement 
endorsed both by the Conference on Disarmament and the UNGA, making the Treaty 
provisionally applicable, while Anguel Anastassov prefers an optional protocol to be 
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added to the Treaty. Both options enclose elements that may facilitate the (provisional) 
implementation of CTBT, but neither of them answers all the difficulties, not to mention 
that they would both still require a large support from the States. 
 The proposal of Rebecca Johnson refers only to “certain provisions”, while in 
reality only article XIV is excluded. Number 3 foresees an opt-out mechanism, which 
makes it easier for States and at the same time does not impede those States that want to 
move forward to do so. The proposal also includes States that have only sign the Treaty, 
but still lack its ratification. In this case, the procedure is different, there is an opt-in 
mechanism requiring the State to inform the depository that it intends to apply the 
Treaty provisionally. The provisional application expires with the entry into force, 
apparently with no intermediate period. 
 Anastassov suggests a Protocol to be adopted by the Conference of Article XIV 
and only by the States Members of the Preparatory Commission, which are all the 
Signatory States, and which have adopted the resolution for the creation of the 
Preparatory Commission. Although the Protocol is supposed to be adopted by 
consensus, States may accede to the Protocol whenever they want – nothing is said 
about the procedure to accede from the beginning, so it could be assumed that the 
procedure is the same, by a formal letter to the Chairman of the Commission. The 
preamble of the Protocol refers the object and purpose of the Treaty, like the VCLT 
does, and presents a justification for its adoption. On-site inspections as such are 
excluded from the proposal of Protocol, but included as a confidence building measure 
(this is somehow confusing with the Treaty text that in its article IV clearly separates 
these two activities).  
This may be one of the justifications for the use of the expression “mutatis 
mutandis” referred in number 1 of the proposal. Finally, the protocol includes a date for 
its entry into force and validity and the Protocol concludes by excluding the provisions 
of article XIV from the provisional application instrument, which mean that nothing 
changes regarding the conditions for entry into force. There is a respect for the alleged 
preparatory works during the negotiations of the Treaty, as Rebecca Johnson has 
mentioned. 
 When compared, the two proposals could indeed be complementary. If 
Johnson’s proposal is lighter, easier to apply and broader in its scope, the legal 
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architecture of Anastassov’s suggestion is clearer, mostly because it includes some extra 
elements (namely the date of entry into force) that make the protocol more feasible, but 
it is substantively more restrictive. On the other hand, the reference to 10 years may not 
be adequate once the Treaty is dragging for 16 years already. From the procedural point 
of view, the different way for the States to notify their options regarding either the 
agreement or the protocol reveals a different assessment of the role of the Chairman of 
the PrepCom, whom is recognised a larger importance in Anastassov proposal 
compared to Johnson’s submission which does not make any reference to the Chairman 
of the PrepCom.  
It does not seem legally clear that Signatory States, like Johnson’s sustains, 
would address themselves to the depository, once until the deposit procedure is 
concluded there is no link between them, meaning that the link between the depository 
and the State is only established when the State has completed the national ratification 
process and deposits its instrument. In reality, the establishment of this relation means 
that for the State concerned, the Treaty can enter into force. 
 Regarding the more substantive aspects of the two proposals, it is interesting to 
verify that both exclude something from the provisional entry into force, but they are 
not the same, thus clearly translating the problem of entry into force of CTBT is only 
political, no matter the kinds of issues that may be argued. In reality the two authors 
exclude one of most difficult clauses of the Treaty: article XIV, and Anastassov also 
excludes part of article IV – on site inspections. 
 Both texts do not refer to the use of IMS or IDC in case of provisional 
application, so it should be assumed that the CTBT provisions would apply. However, 
some questions regarding the use of national technical means, or the data from auxiliary 
stations, or the access to data are not answered by the Treaty.  
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Chapter IV - Enhanced cooperation: an EU model. Flexibility and 
integration 
 
1. The importance of a concept 
 
Almost four and a half centuries ago, Shakespeare in one of his most celebrated 
scenes asked, what’s in a name? We shall not dare to provide an answer, but we will try 
to benefit from the fact that the question has been raised long ago to restate it in the 
context of law hermeneutics. The use of concepts is obviously of prime importance in 
all academic studies. The definition of a concept is usually never fully complete, 
especially if dealing with Human rules, and, besides the definition, the interpretation of 
the concepts also contributes to render the approach of the intended study more 
accurate. It is common sense that definitions imply interpretations, and this applies to 
law as well. As we will see, we will try to limit the definition and interpretation of the 
concepts that are at the basis of this dissertation to the provisions in the TEU and TFEU, 
and the ECJ positions on those definitions, if any. We shall bear in mind that in several 
other instances some concepts, like enhanced cooperation, may be subject to different 
approaches, reasoning or use. 
 The difference between the EU definition and others definitions, like the ones of 
UN or APEC, is that it is much more than the junction of an adjective and a noun. 
Taking the risk of over passing linguistic rigour, we would suggest that enhanced 
cooperation, within the EU framework, is an entire concept, even if it is formed by a 
noun along with an epithet. The fact is that this binomial became a single concept in EU 
law.   
Regarding the absolute definition of concepts in law, the literature on the subject 
is extremely extensive and it is then mandatory that all studies make a choice. We opted 
by recurring to different approaches that seemed better answering to our perspective of 
analysis
413
. We will try to take all the concepts within an historical-political-social 
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framework, as it is difficult for us to understand an absolute intangible definition in law, 
once it deals with norms and rules, but also with contexts and human beings
414
. 
We consider that above all, the concept must be viable in law in order to be 
used
415
. Moreover, and in accordance to the literature on the subject, there are some 
criteria that must be respected to avoid misunderstandings and, above all, the lack of 
legal significance. On the other hand, and independently of any theoretical notion of 
concepts, it must be taken into account that concepts in law, because of their deep 
attachment to Human life, must have a very precise use in daily life or else the whole 
regulatory system would be put into question. 
The scope of a concept must also be taken into account to assert its legal 
meaning, and it is also essential to note that usually there are concepts that have closer 
definitions to the concept intended to be defined (as we will see further on). The 
problems previously raised concerning the explanation of a concept are necessarily 
valid for all concepts. It is often required to come up with several categories in order to 
theoretically and legally limit the scope consequences of a too broad concept
416
.  
 
2. Flexibility within EU – the possibilities offered by the TEU and TFEU 
 
Flexibility as a wide concept should be understood as a constructive tool and not 
as a threat to the integration process
417
. At the same time, the detail of the treaties 
creating both the European Communities and the European Union might suggest that 
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there was no margin for differential approaches and different rhythms of deepening the 
integration between Member States. Or nothing could be more untrue
418
.  
From the very beginning there were signs of flexibility in the EU Treaties, either 
to allow future actions, or to preserve existing realities (these were the case, for instance 
of the Benelux and the Nordic Council special situations recognised by the Treaties
419
). 
To impose an excessively rigid system would have the undesired effect of narrowing the 
goal stated in the EEC Treaty, “to establish the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the European peoples”420,  right from the very beginning in 1957. This objective 
could and can only be possible by, at the same time, widening and deepening the 
Union
421
. This is another long and fruitful discussion within the EU legal debate that has 
substantially contributed for the present state of affairs. The idea of a closer Union is 
referred within the ECJ at different stances and in different formats, but the goal 
presiding to its reference is the same
422
. 
Despite what the different assessments may be in terms of options, the 
recognition of this double need (deepening and enlarging) is clear
423
. Within the EU 
context, flexibility always meant different ways to accommodate diverse positions in 
one single framework, to avoid exclusions that might engender disruptions in the 
integration process
424
. Enhanced cooperation will prove to be a way to strengthen the 
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Union from within
425
. By allowing some States to go faster in the integration process it 
not only opens new horizons, but it also makes possibility a reality. It serves as an 
example for Member States that opt for not participating in a specific process and, as it 
promotes integration, it may appeal to those Member States to join later. 
In legal literature regarding EU, the notion of flexibility is often confused or at 
least used indistinctly with the concept of differentiated integration
426
. By doing so, 
many authors immediately accept that despite the model of that so-called flexibility, it is 
an attempt by the EU to induce integration measures, but within this framework it is the 
EU that develops them and not the Member States. It is prudent to underline from the 
very beginning that the “differentiated integration”427 is not just another name for 
flexibility. Although from the linguistic and theoretical point of view different 
integration is a form of flexibility, when it comes to EU law flexibility, this is mostly 
identified with article 352TFEU and the principle of subsidiarity
428
, but differentiated 
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Regarding article 352TFEU, both Declarations 41 and 42 annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon on article 352 should also be taken 
into account in this assessment. 
Both articles refer to the principle of conferral, whether directly or not, and they both sustain that the 
exclusive competences are never at stake. The same goes to the enhanced cooperation. One major 
difference between the two processes (flexibility-differentiated integration) is the role of national 
parliaments as it is excluded in the enhanced cooperation mechanism (although at the national level there 
may be an imposition of the sort). 
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integration is not. Different integration is a process, while flexibility refers to means for 
that purpose – this is a major difference between the two concepts. 
Unless stated differently, the quotation of the articles of the Treaty of the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as of 
the Protocols and Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon will refer to the versions published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union, C-83 of 30 March 2010. 
In reality, both the subsidiarity principle and article 352TFEU are intended to 
provide the EU with more or, better, enlarged competences in order to realize the goals 
of the Treaties
429
. We shall not extensively comment this here, because the question of 
competences in EU
430
 is not the goal of this exercise. However, a note cannot be 
circumvented. Unlike Member States, with the exception of the competences they have 
transferred to some other instance (“In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der 
Meister”431), the EU is limited in its competences by the principal of conferral432. This 
limitation to EU competences has been often reiterated by the ECJ
433
. It was thus 
forceful that some sort of mechanism existed to extend EU competences without 
necessarily having to review the Treaty. 
 Both article 352 TFEU and the subsidiarity principle
434
 are not options intended 
for the Member States, therefore if there were not a similar mechanism allowing 
Member States to act when the EU cannot do it, it might defer or even endanger the 
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politics, and Treaty reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: p. 183. This inquietude was taken by 
the German Constitutional Court that ruled  in its judgment of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 
BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 and 2 BvR 182/09, n. 2, al. ee) that the exercise of the 
competences predicted in article 352 would require the ratification by the German Parliament. 
430
 The Treaty of Lisbon tries to answer the question raised on this issue by  Joschka Fisher, From 
Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Berlin: Humboldt 
University, HTTP://DWFED.ORG/PP_CONFED_TO_FED.HTML, 2000: 4p. 
431
 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sonnet Nature and Art, “It is self-limitation that reveals a true master”. 
432
 Article 5 TEU and article 7 TFEU. 
433
 Case C-403/05, European Parliament v Commission of the European Communities and Kingdom of 
Spain, in particular paragraph 49. 
434
 We shall not enter here in the argument between Paul Craig and Stephen Weatherill, on the 
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integration process. This reality was felt from the beginning and the EU, or the 
communities before, found different ways of overcoming an eventual deadlock
435
.  
Article 352 TFEU is known as the “flexibility clause”, which means that 
Member States can attribute new competences to EU institutions, namely the Council, 
in order to guarantee that the EU has the necessary authority to accomplish its core 
ends.  The Treaty of Lisbon extended the provision of former article 308 (now article 
352 TFEU) by putting aside the reference to the internal market, and thus opening the 
door to a broader spectrum of actions. Article 352 TFEU extends, in fact and de jure the 
scope of EU competences, and even the domain of competences
436
. The difference 
between article 352 TFEU and other forms of flexibility is that it refers to the EU 
flexibility
437
 and not to the Member States flexibility
438
. 
It is one of these flexibility mechanisms – enhanced cooperation – that we will 
further develop. Other options for the Member States were the opt-in and opt-out 
possibilities, as well as the constructive abstention
439
, although in this case, and unlike 
enhanced cooperation models, the Member State does not participate in the decision, 
but is affected by it. The so-called constructive abstention was a procedure foreseen for 
the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The use of this kind of abstention presupposed three rules: in case of abstention, 
the Member State can make a declaration qualifying its decision, and deciding not to 
implement the measure at stake, although accepting it
440
; if the number of States making 
such declarations is more than 1/3 of the weighted votes in the Council, than the 
measure is not adopted; in order to fulfil the principle of EU solidarity, Member States 
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439
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shall refrain from taking any measures that may clash with the EU decision. Solidarity 
should be understood in two dimensions: between the Member States and within the 
Member States
441
.  If it were not for all these provisions, it could be admitted that 
construction abstenction is very similar to the consensus rule of decision, as we have 
ssen before, once a non-intervention does not impede the adoption of a decision. 
Unlike the enhanced cooperation, as we will see further on, the constructive 
abstention is an extreme discreet procedure, which is often very convenient for the 
Council and it does not implicates the creation of any legal measures because of its use, 
only not impeding a measure to be adopted and not establishing any alternative or 
concurrent legal instrument
442
. On the other hand, the constructive abstention, especially 
when compared to enhanced cooperation, is much more unpredictable and, furthermore, 
it is a decision taken in the end of the process, while enhanced cooperation is taken from 
the very beginning, meaning that its possibility is clear from the start, while with 
constructive abstention the uncertainty until the decision moment may be a undesired 
challenge. 
The double possibility – either the intervention by EU or the Member States if 
their action can produce results that the absence of action option would endeavour – 
confers the EU a dynamism that definitely pushes the integration process. Member 
States that might have decided not to go ahead may benefit either from the examples set 
by the actions resulting from the application of these different mechanisms, or by the 
pressure resulting from its implementation on the initially self-excluded State. That was 
the case, for instance, for the waiving of the opt-out on social policy by the UK. This 
Member State eventually decided to accede to the general rule. Enhanced cooperation 
may have this same effect, as exclusion is hardly an option.  It remains to be said that 
whenever the EU acts as a whole it affects all the Member States, while when an 
enhanced cooperation group of States take the lead, their action only affect them. This a 
major difference between the two sorts of differentiated integration. 
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3. Variable geometry – a vague approach to old realities 
 
Variable geometry is a concept taken from the aeronautics and which refers to a 
peculiar way of changing the form in order to stabilize a flight. It has been often used in 
the context of European law, more within International Relations framework, than in 
law, as opposed to flexibility or differentiated integration, as we shall see further on. It 
is a vaguer concept than those ones and does not intend to limit a priori any assessment 
on different forms of integration. It has the advantage to be very broad and metaphoric, 
thus being of easy understanding and application. 
It refers to the variations of shapes and means that can be in differentiated 
integration. This concept saw light in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. Being a very 
broad concept, it has the advantage that most of the others can fit in
443
, while not 
impeding other precisions. This theory considers that any State has two political options 
on setting its policy, either independently or interdependently. In this case, all forms of 
collaboration between two or more States may be theoretically accepted
444
 as examples 
of variable geometry.  
It should be stated that variable geometry does not have an absolute connection 
with a geographical area; it may focus on policies, actions, programs, regions, countries, 
States, as long as it creates a difference between different partners of the same system. 
One other aspect that must be taken into account on any variable geometry is the 
existence, or not, of symmetry assumptions
445
.  
In order to implement a variable geometry system, it is necessary that there is no 
stable objection, once this category of objection will impede one of the parties to join 
the whole, or the whole itself to proceed. However, this kind of permanent objection 
should not be confused with any opt-out or constructive abstention, it refers to an 
objection impeding a specific measure and not allowing it to be implemented even by 
those who might want it. 
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d’Études Prospectives et d’Information Internationales, 1995, p.3 
444
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4. Differentiated integration: the concept and historical perspective 
 
Before entering into the analysis of the diverse “differentiated integration”446 
that may be recognisable in the word of the Treaties, an historical overview of the 
concept in the EU history seems to be adequate, specially taking into account that it 
started from the very beginning in 1957, by conferring the Benelux a special status in 
the Treaty and still keeping valid some of the more integrative elements of that Union. 
There are two different forms of differentiated integration, a de facto integration and a 
de jure integration
447
. This duality of pragmatic and epistemic (or in this sense, 
normative) perspective should always be present when dealing with a vibrant legal 
system like European or International law. 
The EU has always been a dynamic organisation that has been built by “small 
steps” (in Jean Monnet’s sense) on gradual and sectoral integration. Since very early in 
time, the goal of a political Union has been behind the thoughts of many scholars and 
politicians
448
, either in the sense of Monnet and Schumann federalist view, or in an 
integration perspective without necessarily aim at any sort of federalism. The debate on 
this subject has fed thousands of pages since the end of World War II, and it does not 
seem to be exhausted.  
To avoid losing the focus in our study, we will keep ourselves to this small 
reference. Just to quote some of the major authors on EU federalism, we could name, 
apart from Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, Konrad Adenauer, Dennis de 
Rougemont, Dusan Sidjanski, Altiero Spinelli, Jacques Delors, Andrew Duff, Hannes 
Swoboda, Guy Verhofstadt, Pasqual Maragall, Joschka Fischer, Mario Monti, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit, Mário Soares and many others in all EU States, all of them different 
between themselves, coming from different political parties and families, some arguing 
towards a stricter form of federalism than others. Even if federalism is a complex 
political and legal theory susceptible of several interpretations, the above list only 
intends to show an inventory of authors, from different Member States, that have argued 
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about a more and more integrated Union, and by no means intends to be an exhaustive 
list. 
Several models
449
 and theories
450
 on different integration have been suggested; 
in many cases the differences are minimal and most of them are just a statement of a 
situation and not the elaboration of a real system, i.e., it is not always clear how some of 
the models should (or could) be taken into practice
451
. 
The idea of a multi-speed Europe set the tone when Willy Brandt spoke of a 
two-speed Europe (1973), and even more after the Tindemans Report
452
 (1975). The 
basic idea by then was that, despite the common level of integration, there could be 
some temporary or exceptional forms of integration, for those States which would be 
prepared to move forward faster. 
Immediately after, in 1979, Ralf Dahrendorf came up with the idea of a Europe à 
la carte (which had been refused by Tindemans
453
), where States could freely pick and 
choose bearing in mind the respective policies. The reason for this proposal was to try 
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to implement Tindemans ideas.  Almost than 20 years had to pass over the Tindemans 
report before concrete proposals of partial integrations saw the light of the day. 
After the Maastricht Treaty, which first raised the issue, in the mid-90s, some 
other proposals were presented. One of the more favourable opinions regarding different 
integration was unsurprisingly expressed by the former British Prime-Minister John 
Major
454
.  
 One other proposal that was discussed by then was what is called Europe of 
concentric circles. This was a model where a hard core group of States would set the 
pace for the other Member States and for the integration process as a whole. The hard 
core group of States was supposed to be formed by Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and later also by Spain. The first to make this suggestion 
in 1994 was the by then French Prime-Minister Édouard Balladur
455
. The idea was then 
developed by Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers
456
. Within this idea of concentric 
circles, we could also recognise some other models which in reality follow closely this 
proposal; for instance the initiative by Michel Rocard in 1994 of the “active nucleus” 
Although not suggesting a concrete model, Jacques Delors, by the time he was 
leaving the Presidency of the European Commission in 1995, spoke of different patterns 
to be used for integration, which, coming from someone who for 10 years was handling 
the symbol of supranationalism and communitarisation, reflects an apparent general 
feeling, independently of political forces, institutions or regional specificities, of the 
need to find ways to move forward the spirit of integration, even if some concessions on 
its rhythm had to be made. 
Another proposal
457
 is the case of the avant-garde group, or group of pioneers, 
following upon Schäuble and Lamers proposal of concentric circles, suggested by 
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former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer
458
, in 2000, which some 
authors call the “gravitation core”459. From the flow of the speech, it seems that there 
has not been any doubts on allowing some Member States to proceed quicker than the 
other, leaving the question on whether a directory was needed or not. 
In that same year, French President Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder raised that model again. An attempt to isolate the British Prime-
Minister Tony Blair during the IGC that was then taking place? Unlike the Europe à la 
carte, that is based on policy choices, the model of concentric circles concerns States
460
 
that is, it is structured on a geographical, national or regional, criteria. The 
differentiation results from a group of States that act together regarding policies and not 
just a fixed pre-determined group of States despite the whole integration process. In the 
concentric circles model, it is not clear, first on the effects on the acquis and, on the 
other hand on the possibility of other Member States to join. In reality, none of the 
models was ever presented in a way that it would answer all the legal needs for its 
implementation as well as with the compatibility with the EU Treaties. 
Despite the meagre results of these debates, these have still been the theoretical 
proposals for a differentiated integration with a view to develop the integration process. 
This is a long process and it is possible not to count on all Member States at the same 
time.  
In concrete terms, it is required to verify the texts of the successive treaties in 
order to identify signs of differentiated integration that may already be de jure 
recognitions of such a possibility. It could be argued that differentiated integration could 
endanger the goals of EU and contribute more to divisions than to integration
461
. This is 
true for some of the models (eg. concentric circles), but it is not the case when an 
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openness is set from the beginning of the model, allowing all Member States to be part 
of the integration process (as is the case of enhanced cooperation). 
After this succinct overview of the different models and theories that have been 
developed in European law, not to mention the use of enhanced cooperation in other 
instances, a subject that will be resumed in Chapter VI, it is high time to present some 
examples of differentiated integration
462
 that can best illustrate what has been said 
above. 
 
5. Examples of differentiated integration463 
  
Throughout time, the examples have indeed been many, even if not always 
acknowledged as such. The first one, as mentioned, was the special situation of Benelux 
that, within the provisions of the EC Treaty in 1957, was allowed to keep some of its 
more integrative mechanisms
464
.  
The possibility of issuing Decisions just for one Member State or the fact that 
Directives leave their legal transposition to Member States also allows some degree of 
differentiation. This flexibility on procedures, and sometimes time frame, of the 
measures to be adopted by Member States clearly reflects some kind of different speed 
in which the EU legal order is implemented, not to mention that it also allows Member 
States to accommodate EU rules differently,  
Another example of differentiated integration is the transitional periods granted 
to new Member States. Those intermediary phases are always marked by derogations, 
longer or shorter, in order to allow the integration to be conducted as a smooth process. 
These derogations are temporary and from the beginning clearly fixed, although in some 
cases they may be later extended. 
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One of the first options available to EU Member States that did not want to 
proceed with the rest of the EU was the possibility of opting out, a derogation that has 
been created for some States following particular intransigent stances. Unlike the 
enhanced cooperation, the opt-out is an option of no participation in an EU mechanism 
and not, like the enhanced operation, in the creation of a mechanism that will allow 
some to go further with integration. In both cases the integration process is not stopped, 
but it becomes differentiated. The opt-out mechanism has been used before the 
enhanced cooperation was foreseen in the Treaties and it has also lived together with 
it
465
. 
The United Kingdom and Ireland have an opt-out from Schengen
466
; Denmark 
and the United Kingdom have an opt-out of the common currency, while Sweden 
benefits from a de facto opt-out concerning the Euro. Denmark has opt-outs for CFSP, 
European Citizenship and JHA. The United Kingdom, Poland (and eventually the Czech 
Republic) have opted-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom also have an opt-out from the provision in the Treaty of Lisbon on 
the change in the decision process in police and criminal cooperation
467
 in criminal 
matters from unanimity to qualified majority. This opt-out is the continuation of a much 
more extensive one these two Member States had regarding JHA
468
. 
The opt-out option (as well as the opt-in; although in this case the possibility to 
join at an ulterior moment is kept, while regarding the opt-out it is a definite position) 
needs to be fixed in a Protocol attached to the Treaties and cannot, like the enhanced 
cooperation, benefit from a direct legal reasoning from the Treaties. Thus, the opt-out is 
a fixed mechanism thought for a concrete subject and not, like the enhanced 
cooperation, a mechanism defined to be used as a resort when needed, without a specific 
domain of intervention from the start. 
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Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1990, as they have been included in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
467
 Although we try to use British English all along this text, we have chosen cooperation instead of co-
operation because this is the spelling used in the Treaty of Nice and Treaty of Lisbon. 
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 Peers, Steve, “UK and Irish opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law”, Statewatch 
analysis – EU Lisbon Treaty, n. 4, 2009: 27p. 
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In parallel with these opt-outs, Ireland and the United Kingdom may opt-in 
regarding JHA but they have to inform the Council that they want to proceed (in terms 
of procedures there is a difference between Denmark, and the other two States. 
Denmark cannot opt-in
469
 as it has as an opt-out Protocol).  
Another example of differentiated integration is the case of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, in which not all member states participate in the same degree, as some 
have decided not to move to the third phase, while others still have not achieved all the 
requirements to participate in the single currency.   
Although it must be said that the Schengen Agreement was negotiated and 
approved outside the EU
470
, as it happened with the Treaty of Prüm
471
, later 
incorporated into EU law
472
, it was decided to include it in the EU acquis. Although 
some of the Member States were not full Schengen members, that situation prevailed. 
Nevertheless the Schengen Protocol, attached to the Treaty since Amsterdam, foresees 
conditions of ulterior participation for Member States
473
, as if it were an enhanced 
                                                                
469
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edition, edited by Annette Schrawen, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2002: p. 70; Bribosia, Hervé, 
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économique et monétaire, Florence : European University Institute, 2007 : p. 225 
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 Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to Flexibility?, edited by Joanne Scott and Gráinne 
de Búrca, 2nd. ed., Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001: 404p, in particular the chapter by Bruno de Witte, 
“International agreements between member states of the EU”, p. 31-58 
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 Ziller, Jacques, “El Tratado de Prum”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, n. 7 2001: p.21-30 
and “Le Traité de Prum. Une vraie-fausse coopération renforcée dans l'espace de sécurité, de liberté et de 
justice”, EUI Working papers, n. 32, 2006: 28p. 
472
 Dehouse, Franklin, Sifflet, Diane, Les nouvelles perspectives de la coopération de Schengen: Le Traité 
De Prum, Egmont Papers - Royal Institute for International Relations, Ghent: Academia Press, 2006: 
13p. 
473
 At this stage a note seems to be necessary regarding the understanding of the Schengen Protocol. If it 
is true that the Protocol attached to the Amsterdam Treaty foresaw a closer cooperation and the Treaty 
reflected the conditions of such cooperation, the fact is that Protocol n. 19 attached to TFEU on Schengen 
matters retained the wording “closer cooperation” and refers that its implementation “shall be conducted 
within the institutional and legal framework of the European Union and with respect for the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties”.  
However, there is no other mention in the Treaty to closer cooperation. We could admit that as there is a 
change in the wording of closer cooperation into enhanced cooperation in the rest of the Treaty, the same 
should apply here. Nevertheless, the question must be raised. Moreover, this is the only way to 
understand, and eventually accept, the opinion expressed by the Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi in 
case C-482/08, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union. 
Curiously, the Court in its judgment does not refer to enhanced cooperation, but Paolo Mengozzi does. 
Yet, both the Court and the Advocate General quote the same legal basis in their argument. 
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cooperation
474
. However, in reality the wording used to refer to Schengen cooperation 
as far as primary law is concerned is not enhanced, but closer cooperation
475
. And that is 
the language endorsed by the European Court of Justice
476
. The move from closer to 
enhanced cooperation was not a substantive one, but a terminological one. 
Doubts have been raised on the legality of extra-EU cooperation since there is a 
form of cooperation that allows differentiated forms of participation (or not)
477
.  
Besides the opt-out, and opt-in options for the States that wanted to maintain 
certain independence on some subjects, a mechanism was needed to legally allow an 
action, that requires unanimity, to be adopted by Member States, even if a particular 
Member State for specific reasons may not want to be part of that decision (though 
being equally affected by it). That is what was called the constructive abstention, i.e., a 
Member State, although not supporting a specific measure would not block the 
process
478
.  
Opt-outs are defined for some States and for some areas; they are not conceived 
for EU policies as such. Furthermore, the opt-out (and opt-in) options are voluntary 
exclusions, which is not the same as the derogation imposed, for instance, in the states 
that have not fulfilled the requirements for the third stage of EMU. The opt-outs permit 
integration to be used in sectors where the exclusion of some Member States could 
impede the communitarisation or an EU agreed action. 
The problem with this option is that it can only be applicable to known sectors or 
policies at the time of the Treaty, and not, as the enhanced cooperation, to questions that 
may arise in the future. While the opt-out is a specific mechanism, the enhanced 
                                                                
474
 The ECJ refers to the Schengen Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty as an authorization for an enhanced 
cooperation, Case C-137/05, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, supported by 
Ireland and the Slovak Republic v Council of the European Union supported by the Kingdom of Spain, 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Commission of the European Communities, para. 8. 
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 Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, 
Preamble and article 1. 
476
 Case C-77/05, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, supported by Ireland and the 
Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic v Council of the European Union, para.8. 
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Constantinesco, Vlad, “Les clauses de coopération renforcée. Le protocole sur l'application des 
principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité”, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, n°4, 1997, p. 751-
765. 
478
 Constructive abstention is, nevertheless a process involving several procedures. It is only valid for 
CFSP decisions; the Member State that opts to abstain has to produce a declaration classifying its 
abstention as such upon the voting moment; the number of abstentions cannot be bigger than the number 
of votes needed for a blocking minority.  Urrea Corres, Mariola, “La toma de decisiones en el ámbito de 
la PESC: la abstención constructiva como alternativa a la unanimidad”, Revista electrónica del 
Departamento de Derecho de la Universidad de La Rioja - REDUR, n. 0, 2002: p.154-155. 
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cooperation is a versatile system that can be applied to a multitude of cases, situations, 
subjects and policies and it does not requires a Protocol to define its policy scope (the 
protocol on enhanced cooperation is intended to the regulatory measures of the 
mechanism only). 
Taking into account the amount of terms that have been used in EU to refer to 
differentiation and heterogeneity, and the fact that differences have been tried to clearly 
distinguish one from the other, there is indeed a risk of “semantic indigestion”479 for an 
almost excessive use and terminology discussion on this matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
479
 Stubb, Alexander, “A categorization of differentiated integration”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 34, n. 2, 1996: p. 283-295. 
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Chapter V - Enhanced cooperation: an EU mechanism 
 
1. General  
 
There has been a significant change in the International order for the last few 
years, especially after the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change that highlighted the 
need to move faster and more effectively in international cooperation. An obvious 
change in multilateralism could be identified. It was clear that the EU has to be more 
present, needs to be more active, more committed, and to keep on bringing novelty in 
order to maintain its relevance in the International order. EU Member States, and, first 
the communities, and now the Union have always had a prominent role in law making, 
especially taking into account the influence of its Member States over the years in the 
world. This influence has been particularly notorious concerning the definition and 
implementation of different legal orders. After all, the EU Member States do not all 
share the same law regimes and this diversity has very productively been used by the 
EU as a whole to develop a new and effective legal order. 
Apart from its economical weight, the comprehensive legal framework that EU 
and its Member States have developed might be one of the most fertile paths to bring 
EU back to its former foremost position, by being an example of regulation and legal 
solutions finder. The normative role EU has had is an asset that by no means should be 
discarded. By choosing innovative legal solutions, EU should and can be an 
international reference.  
Although the concept of Europeanization
480
 seems to be developing in law 
academies and more and more authors use it mostly because of its laconic definition, it 
must be very clear that it is not purpose of this study to identify any signs of 
Europeanization in International law, as the title of the study could suggest. The idea is 
to analyse concrete European law models and from there verify their practicability and 
applicability within International law, a direct transposition to International law will not 
                                                                
480
 Gonçalves, Maria Eduarda, Guibentif, Pierre, Novos Territórios do Direito. Europeização, 
Globalização e Transformação da Regulação Jurídica, S. João do Estoril: Princípia, 2008: 156p., and in 
particular the chapter by Jacques Ziller, p.23-36. 
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be argued, but the use of some of the European solutions that have been found for the 
last 60 years as models of solutions to International law difficulties will be evoked. 
If we look into the acquis, many examples could be mentioned; we shall 
concentrate in a specific one, the enhanced cooperation, because it is regulated by the 
Treaties and may be of horizontal application regarding different policies. 
 As the first examples of enhanced cooperation have been adopted only in 2011 
it remains to be explained why it was done so late (after all the mechanism exists since 
1989) and not before and if this kind of cooperation can constitute a future for the 
alleged inertia of EU in several areas, namely on foreign policy. Being one of the goals 
of enhanced cooperation the management of the growing heterogeneity of Member 
States
481
, it should never be seen as a mechanism that will make integration more 
difficult, quite on the contrary, especially for the example it sets. 
The strict legal analysis of enhanced cooperation will be based on its definition 
in the Treaty of Lisbon, including its Protocols and Declarations, and on the doctrine 
that has been produced so far on the subject. At this stage the specific case law 
concerning enhanced cooperation is still very sparse, although this analysis will benefit 
from the jurisprudence regarding other situations which has developed interpretations 
on the acts and procedures that can be taken by enhanced cooperation, and also in 
alleged similar situations. 
Picking up from the previous chapter, enhanced cooperation is perhaps the most 
peculiar kind of differentiated integration
482
 and, furthermore, the clearest one provided 
in TEU and TFEU. This model of differentiated integration is thought to be inclusive 
and to foster integration, by not denying any State the possibility to participate, even if, 
and at the same time, not forcing any non participating State to be affected by any 
                                                                
481
 Kurpas, Sebastian, Crum, Ben, de Schoutheete, Philippe, Keller, Jacques, Dehousse, Franklin, 
Andoura,Sami, Missiroli, Antonio, Hagemann, Sara, Bribosia, Hervé, The Treaty of Lisbon: 
Implementing the Institutional Innovations. Brussels: European Policy Centre - Egmont - CEPS, 2007: 
p.99.  
482“Trata-se de um conceito equivalente ao de flexibilidade, de geometria variável, de integração 
diferenciada, aproximando-se da ideia de círculos concêntricos, e não excluindo a perspectiva de um 
directório composto por um grupo limitado de países” (“This is a concept equivalent to flexibility, 
variable geometry or of differentiated integration, approaching the idea of concentric circles, and not 
excluding the prospect of a directory comprising a limited group of countries”, our translation), Cunha, 
Paulo de Pitta e, “As cooperações reforçadas na União Europeia”, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, vol. 
61, n. 3, 2001: p. 1219. This is a synthetic paragraph of what enhanced cooperation is and its relation to 
the different models and systems mentioned before. Nevertheless, like all synthesis, it is necessary to get 
into its details to avoid misunderstandings.  
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decision. Some authors call it “integration laboratories”483. The enhanced cooperation as 
a mechanism does not prejudge any geographical scope of implementation, unlike the 
opt-out settled in Protocols attached to the Treaties; it does not refer to any State or 
region specifically, nor is it restraint to any specific policy
484
. (Until the Treaty of 
Lisbon CSDP, or ESDP by then, was excluded
485
. Despite the fact that the Treaties now 
refer to structured cooperation fo this policy, the fact is that it is not excluded anymore). 
 Unlike the examples in the previous chapter, it does not establish a clear time 
line
486
 for the implementation of the action, but by institutionalising one form 
flexibility
487
 (and it is the only case in the Treaties, once it is of horizontal application) 
that may be identified in the Treaties, in particular the opt-out and opt-in options, it 
creates its own legal and regulatory framework of action. 
 It must be justified on the basis of the EU interest, according to the text of the 
Treaty, in particular in its article 20, n. 1 TEU, and unlike the opt-out and opt-in 
mechanisms that only reflect a specific Member State interest
488
, enhanced cooperation 
is intended to preserve or to create a common target, and it is of general application to 
all interested Member States. Nevertheless, we consider that we should refrain from 
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 Kurpas, Sebastian, De Clerck-Sachsse, Julia, Torreblanca, José I., Ricard-Nihoul, Gaëtane, "From 
Threat to Opportunity: Making Flexible Integration Work", European Policy Institutes Network, Working 
Papers, n. 15, 2006: 9p. 
484
 “Un mécanisme de coopération renforcée peut aussi être conçu comme une solution – fut-elle partielle 
– à des problèmes qui, de manière générale et récurrente, pèsent sur le fonctionnement de l’Union. Parmi 
les partisans de ce nouveau mécanisme, certains cherchaient  à : 
 surmonter les blocages décisionnels au sein du Conseil ; 
 encadrer le développement anarchique de la flexibilité à l’intérieur de l’Union ; 
 fournir une alternative à la révision quasi continue du cadre institutionnel ; 
et éviter le développement de coopérations hors traités dans les domaines de compétence de l’Union”, 
Philippart, Eric, "Un nouveau mécanisme de coopération renforcée pour l'Union Européenne élargie", 
Études et Recherches - Notre Europe, n. 22, 2003: p.3. The third bullet is controversial as it may generate 
some confusion when we talk about institutional revision, it does not refer to any sort of revision of the 
Treaties.  
485
 “Enhanced cooperation pursuant to this title shall relate to implementation of a joint action or a 
common position. It shall not relate to matters having military or defence implications.”, Article 27b, 
TEU, after Nice revision.  
Dagand, Sophie. "The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP", ISIS Europe – European 
Security Review, n. 37, 2008: p.5 
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 Bribosia, Hervé, Les cooppérations renforceées : Quel modèle d’intégration différenciée pour l’Union 
Européenne. Analyse comparative du mécanisme général de la coopération renforcée, du projet de 
coopération structure permanente en matière de défense, et de la pratique d’autres coopérations 
renforcées « prédeterminées » en matière sociale, au sein de l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice, et 
dans l’Union économique et monétaire, Florence : European University Institute, 2007 : p. 43 
487
 “Institutionalization of flexibility is a new issue in the history of European integration, but flexibility 
itself is not”, Flexibility in Constitutions. Forms of closer cooperation in federal and non-federal settings. 
Post-Nice edition, edited by Annette Schrawen, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2002: p.49 
488Thym, Daniel, "“United in Diversity” – the Integration of Enhanced Cooperation into the European 
Constitutional Order", The German Law Journal, vol. 6, nº 11, 2005: p. 1731-1748. 
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referring to enhanced cooperation as a flexibility mechanism – although in practical 
terms it is one – and to reserve this expressive term for the provision in article 352 
TFEU
489
. This option has only a methodological justification and by no means should 
reflect any political or legal assessment. If we were to consider that flexibility can imply 
major consequences on the political and finance equilibriums of the EU, on its legal 
architecture and functioning of the EU institutions, we shall try to demonstrate that 
enhanced cooperation fits all of these criteria, our only remark, we reiterate, is only a 
question of the ordre du discours
490
. Taking enhanced cooperation as a way of 
codifying flexibility, by setting up specific rules for its implementation, it is another 
reason to use its specific name, so that a formal distinction regarding other forms of 
flexibility is established from the beginning. 
 Enhanced cooperation was first named as such in the Nice Treaty; although in 
Amsterdam Treaty the model was already set up
491
, but, by then, in the English version, 
was called closer cooperation
492
. By considering the creation of European law a 
continuous process, we could say that Maastricht created
493
; Amsterdam regulated; Nice 
modified the legal framework
494
; and Lisbon generalised it
495
, making it transversal to 
both the TEU and TFEU. By establishing a new legal framework for the enhanced 
cooperation, the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies its horizontal nature in the TEU
496
 and then 
defines the rules
497
 and procedures to be taken for enhanced cooperation in TFEU.  
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 “Aunque con frequencia en vex de la palabra “flexibilidad” se utilice la expression “cooperación 
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492
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l’Union Européenne, n.1, 2001 : p. 111-171 and “Différenciation et avant-gardes au sein de l’Union 
Européenne”, Cahiers de droit européen, vol. 36, n. 1-2, 2000, p. 57-116. 
495
 One of the more detailed overview of the historical evolution of enhanced cooperation up to the Nice 
Treaty can be found in Urrea Corres, Mariola, La Cooperación Reforzada en la Union Europea. 
Concepto, naturaleza Y régimen jurídico, Madrid: Colex - Constitución Y Leys, S.A., 2002: 421p. As a 
general overview of enhanced cooperation in its primary phase, vd. Junge, Kristin, Flexibility, Enhanced 
Cooperation and the Treaty of Amsterdam. London: University of North London, 1999: 74p. 
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 Art. 20 TEU.  
497
 Arts. 326-334 TFEU.  
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This separation between the two Treaties not only does it reflect the need of a 
better legal economy of the text, but it is also a way of making it transversal to the 
whole Treaties in a more consistent and clear manner. Contrarily to the former Treaties, 
enhanced cooperation no longer excludes any policy.  We could even say that it 
contributes to building on European integration
498
, and including in its ultimate aim, the 
political integration
499
, once, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the rules for enhanced 
cooperation have been made more flexible as well as more extensive, thus allowing it to 
be implemented
500
, as it has been seen by the adoption of two enhanced cooperation, 
two years after the Treaty of Lisbon had entered into force, while 23 years passed since 
the mechanism has been included in the Treaties or 12 years since it has been modified. 
Those rules are horizontal and applicable to all subject matters
501
. The 
conditions for its applicability are extensively foreseen in the Treaties. There is a special 
provision
502
 in the case of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
503
, which 
we will deal with later, allowing a certain automatism on the decision taking process in 
the Council. 
 Unlike the opt-out mechanisms, that are forms of co-operation between Member 
States within the EU structures
504
, the enhanced cooperation procedure establishes a 
form of cooperation between Member States by making use of EU structures. Thus, the 
enhanced cooperation is an EU mechanism clearly regulated by the Treaties and it is 
entitled to use all the institutions, structures, and means available to EU. The Treaty of 
Lisbon, following on previous steps, makes the enhanced cooperation conditions easier 
to be understood and implemented and by doing so contributing to avoid cooperation 
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499
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Massimo, Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law, University of Edinburgh – School of Law, Working 
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Lisbon Treaty: Law, politics, and Treaty reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: p. 442-443 is 
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outside of the Treaties
505
. The enhanced cooperation mechanism is also a way of 
disciplining Member States that wanted to go further
506
 or to cooperate among 
themselves without hurting EU main goals, policies or structures
507
, while being also a 
way to defend some of the EU principles, namely the EU solidarity
508
, which can 
certainly be better accomplished within a cooperation framework where States help 
each other to achieve their own goals
509
. Unless stated otherwise, solidarity will be 
taken here as a general principle and not in the restraint assessment that the TFEU has 
given it in article 222. 
 Differently from the opt-out model where a decision is made by the Member 
State not to participate and by doing so abstain from using the existing EU institutions 
for a specific purpose
510
, the enhanced cooperation assures a full use of EU institutions 
for its implementation and does not, like the opt-out, leave for the Member States the 
option on handling or not the cooperation. Despite what it may seem, we reiterate that 
enhanced cooperation is a mechanism of integration, created for the EU and based on its 
structures. Enhanced cooperation is a method to be used by the Member States for the 
EU and within the EU. The opt-out is an option circumstantially created for specific 
Member States that decided not to participate in the common effort, but which is 
consecrated in a protocol, while the opt-in gives Member States an autonomous 
capability to decide without necessary having to accommodate itself to others position. 
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Edições Almedina, 2010: p. 294-295. 
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affect the EU on the exercise of its competences, Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities 
v Council of the European Communities (European Agreement on Road Transport, ERTA), paragraph 22. 
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Enhanced cooperation might contribute to avoid possible directories, once it 
does not impose any exclusion or leading role. Moreover, the rules foreseen in the 
Treaties establish a regulatory framework that ensures the participation of an enough big 
number of States, thus making the policy to be followed to be representative of the 
choice of a quite important group of Member States. The two enhanced cooperation 
counted on 15
511
 and 25
512
 Member States respectively. With the enlargement it would 
have been too difficult to continue to accept the blockage by one single Member State. 
Enhanced cooperation is (now) a clearer provision of the Treaties and it is easier to be 
applicable
513
, as reality has shown, by the fact that only with the Lisbon wording was it 
possible to implement it.  
Nevertheless, it must be said that even though it has not been implemented 
before, it has been particularly useful to persuade some Member States to overcome 
their intransigency, as was the case of the European Arrest Warrant that Italy did not 
want to approve. It was when an enhanced cooperation was suggested on this domain 
that Silvio Berlusconi decided to move along. In this particular case, taking into account 
the subject dealt with, an enhanced cooperation by all of the other States and leaving 
Italy outside would put that State in a very delicate political situation, not to mention 
that it would make Italy an “out-law” area which would be then much more difficult to 
control by its own authorities
514
. This “out-law” was only possible because Italy was the 
only Member State against the enhanced cooperation
515
. 
 The term enhanced was the result of the insistence of the Latin languages on the 
word “renforcée”, “reforzada”, “reforçada”, “rafforzata”. The United Kingdom 
considered that the option for the word enhanced might be considered too integrative for 
its nationals but once it already had a few opt-outs it knew it would be difficult to get 
some extra concessions, special because of a word that it did not, apparently, have any 
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legal meaning. Up until then, the English versions of the Treaties used the word “closer 
cooperation”516. Moreover, from the International Law perspective it was more and 
more difficult, specially taking into account the future enlargement, to continue to admit 
that a multilateral Treaty would not be identical in all languages. The other versions of 
the Treaties already spoke of the equivalent to enhanced cooperation. This kind of 
imprecision is a mistake that EU cannot make and it affects its credibility.  
Some authors question why the United Kingdom, as well as Denmark, since the 
ICG in 1996, tried to avoid the creation of this mechanism, once they were used to the 
opt-out mechanism, it could be easier to accept different forms of integration. However, 
it must be underline that the opt-out possibility already served their interests and the 
enhanced cooperation could put them in jeopardise, once instead of creating a 
differentiation for the States that did not want to participate, it created a possibility for 
some to go further, leaving the ones that did not want to participate behind. Because the 
opt-out kept those States out of some Treaty provisions, while the enhanced cooperation 
creates a new framework for action, those States saw in this possibility a threat to this 
autonomic decision process and regarded enhanced cooperation as a undesirable game 
of incertitude
517
. Opt-out and opt-in were ruled by separate Protocols to the Treaties and 
its application was clearly defined before the Treaties enter into force. Enhanced 
cooperation is a theoretical mechanism to be applied according to rules but without any 
pre-definition of any domain. 
 
2. Pre-conditions for an enhanced cooperation 
 
There is a minimum threshold of participants in an enhanced cooperation
518
. It is 
required that nine States start the procedure
519
 (it used to be eight), but there is no other 
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specification, that is, there is no connection with the population they may represent or 
any other criteria as it is used to define qualified majority in the Council
520
.  
The idea of establishing a rule of 1/3 of the Member States, evoked during the 
negotiations for the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, was not retained, but 
the fact is that 9/27 is, indeed, 1/3 of the Member States. In case of new accessions this 
number of nine may probably not change, thus becoming the smallest threshold ever 
considered for an enhanced cooperation and it shall not follow the 1/3 rule anymore (as 
it will happen from 2013 on the accession of Croatia, lowering the ration to 9/28). 
There are concrete reasons to have a group of States requiring the authorisation 
to initiate an enhanced cooperation
521
 instead of trying to have some sort of cooperation 
outside the Treaties framework:  
i) It includes a group that is big enough to ensure effectiveness of the 
enhanced cooperation;  
ii) The costs are born by a big number of partners, thus contributing for its 
launch;  
iii) Prevents different actions within EU in diverse senses, especially in the 
cases the Commission has to make the proposal to the Council;  
iv) Minimises the risk of institutional tension;  
v) Due to a larger participation of Member States, its legitimacy is more 
secure.  
It is always difficult to generalise and more often than not it is necessary to find 
different systems to answer different realities
522
.  
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Unlike the opt-out/opt-in schemes, as referred in the clauses of inclusion (opt-in) 
and in the clauses of exclusion (opt-out), which are fixed regarding the States they were 
created for, the enhanced cooperation is always open to the participation of other 
Member States
523
 that did not join it from the start
524
. It is relevant to underline that this 
openness is permanent
525
 and no extra conditions can be imposed either by the 
Commission or the Council than those valid for all the other Members, except the 
respect of the “enhanced cooperation acquis”526.  It couldn’t be otherwise, or one of the 
purposes of the enhanced cooperation – to further integration527 – could not be achieved, 
as instead of integration, the enhanced cooperation would create more difficulties for 
Member States to go further. Nonetheless, the new acceding States to enhanced 
cooperation already in place have to deal with a few extra procedures
528
, that have to do 
with controls on their capacity to participate in the enhanced cooperation, namely to 
follow the acquis meanwhile adopted by the Member States parties to the enhanced 
cooperation. 
A remark seems opportune at this stage. The idea of an “enhanced Union”529, 
sometimes touched upon in literature, should not be pursued; otherwise the goal of 
increased integration will be disrupted making therefore this instrument an enemy of the 
Union and not an auxiliary for its achievement. In reality, such an option will be a clear 
contradiction of the main purposes of the Union and of the enhanced cooperation main 
task which is to be at the service of the Union and not to compete with it
530
. This is a 
risk that legally is not clearly avoided and will require the political determination of 
Member States to refuse it. The problem we anticipate with this option is the legitimacy 
deficit it may be argued by the opponents to enhanced cooperation. It is worthy to 
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remind that enhanced cooperation is also a solution to impede that cooperation action 
take place outside the Treaties, and regardless of the Treaties
531
. 
It is admissible, like some authors argue that enhanced cooperation may be more 
useful (or easier) for “soft” integration, including the creation of regional structures or 
non-statutory agencies
532
.  It is always easier to make less mandatory rules accepted 
than those that imply a more fixed legal framework, or with binding character, 
especially in the case of enhanced cooperation, once only some of the Member States 
are affected by it. 
The enhanced cooperation will generate legal provisions that will constitute the 
enhanced acquis. This acquis will only be valid for the Member States of the enhanced 
cooperation
533
 and, unlike it happened with other forms of differentiated integration, 
namely the Schengen acquis, it shall not be imposed on acceding States to the EU
534
, 
but it will have to be accepted for ulterior participations
535
 in the enhanced cooperation. 
Moreover this particular acquis cannot affect the acquis communautaire
536
 and EU 
primary law. Some authors even consider it redundant or superfluous to make such a 
statement
537
, we disagree with this perspective, as clarity in EU law is never too 
much
538
.  
Although it would be easier to consider enhanced cooperation a lex specialis that 
would impose itself to the lex generalis of the Treaties, it must be recalled that the 
agents producing both laws are not the same, and therefore, it cannot be considered to 
be a lex specialis but just a legal framework existing in parallel with the Treaties and the 
acquis. Moreover, this, indeed, is one of the reasons of enhanced cooperation; it exists 
because it was impossible to adopt an act valid for all Member States. Furthermore, the 
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enhanced cooperation law does not fulfil the same criteria as the lex generalis once it 
does not have any primacy over national law, nor direct effect over all Member States, 
but only in those that have opted for the enhanced cooperation, and even though, it 
remains to be seen its compatibility with the Treaties. As there is no hierarchy between 
the EU law and the enhanced cooperation law, this one cannot be taken as a lex 
specialis, but only as a kind of International law. It must be reminded that norma 
normarum of EU law is an international Treaty (the same is valid for enhanced 
cooperation), so there is always a possibility to look at European law as a form of 
international law, even if with its own specificities.  
A question unanswered by the Treaties regards the possibility of withdrawal by a 
Member State from an enhanced cooperation already approved. The provisions of the 
treaties foresee that Member States can withdraw from a permanent structured 
cooperation
539
 and even from the EU itself
540
, but nothing is said on their right to 
withdraw from an enhanced cooperation, therefore once the right is not expressed it 
should not be assumed as granted, especially once the treaties do it in other 
circumstances
541
.  
If there are only nine Member States, if one leaves, can the enhanced 
cooperation still persist? We believe if there were more than nine States, the answer 
would be obviously yes, but if the number goes under nine, then the principle rebus sic 
stantibus should prevail just for the fact that the conditions that originated the enhanced 
cooperation are not fulfilled anymore. It remains to be seen what would happen with the 
enhanced cooperation acquis. We would argue that this acquis remains valid for the 
Member States that adopted the enhanced cooperation, but no more acts can be adopted 
in that framework for lack of quorum.  
Unlike what is predicted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties in 
its article 55
542
 regarding multilateral treaties, the enhanced cooperation is just a 
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mechanism within the EU Treaties and should not benefit from any ultra vires 
interpretation of article 55 VCLT. After all, the number of nine States is a precondition 
of the enhanced cooperation and not just an element to allow its implementation, it is an 
element of the treaty that cannot be surpassed as it does not concern the whole treaty, 
but just one provision of one mechanism, and if the treaty is in force, it must be used in 
all its provisions, and it is difficult to accept that some could be waived according to 
conjunctural conveniences. 
However, any Member States is free to withdraw from the process of an 
enhanced cooperation before it is approved
543
 and not after the moment a binding 
decision is adopted. It could constitute a legal deadlock to know, in cases where only 9 
Member States decidided to pursue an enhanced cooperation, if the enhanced 
cooperation could still persist with less than the minimum of Member States. There is a 
a clear distinction between the authorisation of enhanced cooperation and its 
establishment. The only link that Article 328(1) TFEU makes between the authorisation 
and the enhanced cooperation itself is that the Member States that participate in 
enhanced cooperation must comply with “any conditions of participation laid down by 
the authorising decision”. The authorisation decision does not necessarily implies any 
sense of compulsion, that is achieved by a distinct instrument. 
This may be understood either as a lacuna or as political intention to make the 
enhanced cooperation less flexible, especially in those cases when only the minimum of 
9 States would take part in, but this reasoning would also have to be applied to 
structured cooperation, and that is not the case. Any possible conclusion on this gap will 
always be counter-argued, as it cannot be other than speculation
544
.  
The question of withdrawal, as Nicholas Fernandes stated in the House of 
Commons, has to be taken at different levels and under distinct principles. The Treaties 
do not prohibit it, but they also do not allow it. We would sustain that once there is not 
any right on this matter recognised to Member States, it should not be inferred that it 
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exists
545
. After the enhanced cooperation has been established its functioning rules are 
the ones defined either by the Treaties or the Decision itself and not by former rights, 
competences and attributions that would not exist if it were not for the enhanced 
cooperation.  
One other question is the understanding of the time frame of enhanced 
cooperation and its legal regime. The doctrine is very contradictory; on the one hand 
some authors argue that enhanced cooperation is almost perennial; others, like us, prefer 
to consider it as a temporary mechanism
546
. Furthermore, there are others that have a 
more subtle position and only call it a non permanent mechanism
547
. The fact is the 
Treaties do not mention the permanent character of the legal regime created by the 
enhanced cooperation, but it should be assumed that if all the Member States participate 
than it is no longer justified. 
As far as the acts of enhanced cooperation are concerned, a distinction must be 
made between the kinds of acts that an enhanced cooperation can adopt, which result 
from the policies that they are applied to and not from enhanced cooperation itself. As 
we have seen, however, although not being part of the acquis communautaire, the 
enhanced cooperation is still of legal value for the States that start or accede to an 
enhanced cooperation and its binding character results from the specific act adopted. 
It is not clear from the provisions on the procedures of enhanced cooperation 
which entity is responsible for verifying if the several requirements foreseen are met. It 
seems to us that the institution responsible for authorising the proposal – the 
Commission or the Council –, and not for its approval, should be the stance responsible 
for that review
548
, as who decides should borne the responsibilities of control.  
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All EU Member States participate in the deliberation process of enhanced 
cooperation acts after its launching, but only those Member States that participate in the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism take the decision, the other Member States are  
excluded from the decision taking phase
549
. 
 
3. Starting an enhanced cooperation 
 
The TEU refers to enhanced cooperation as a possibility, not as a mandatory 
procedure, for integration, once the EU structures are available for its 
implementation
550
. It should be understood both as a potestative integration mechanism, 
once the Treaty confers the freedom to the States to go ahead with this kind of 
integration, and at the same time the freedom to make use of the provisions foreseen by 
the Treaty to implement the mechanism
551
, and also as a dispositive mechanism
552
, that 
is, the enhanced cooperation clauses refer to the same procedures as the rest of the 
Treaties, and they dispose basically the rules to participate in, and to start an enhanced 
cooperation, as well as the validity of its decisions. 
 It is a right the States have, but it is not a mandatory obligation, the EU provides 
a mechanism if the States want to use it, but it does not impose the obligation to use the 
enhanced cooperation. This is a very relevant aspect, as the voluntary character of 
enhanced cooperation is cleary set in the Treaties. The same happens with the EU 
structures, they may be used, but their use is not compulsory
553
. On the other hand, it is 
exactly the use of the EU structures that concur for the coherence in EU law and 
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between the EU acquis and the enhanced cooperation acquis
554
. Not to mention that this 
possibility solves many legal problems regarding procedures and decisions, once the 
Treaties and the EU acquis
555
 are particularly rich in this field. 
Since the beginning there were some rules
556
 that have not changed, while some 
others have been made more flexible
557
. One example of this is what is normally called 
the “last resort” clause558, that is, an enhanced cooperation can only be started once all 
the other existing procedures in the treaties have been tried without success
559
. The 
procedural rules foreseen in the Treaties assure a time frame that guarantees the “last 
resort” clause has enough time to be exercised. In case something comes up after the 
request by the Member States for an enhanced cooperation, it is still possible to stop the 
process and because of its lengthy procedure no Member State or Institution can allege 
that it was a decision taken without enough debate time. 
Although being an integration mechanism, it excludes the States that decide not 
to participate, but it permanent openness sustains the integration process. This has been 
the way found by legislators to make sure that the adoption of enhanced cooperation 
would not take place before other more extensive integrative mechanisms have been 
fully tried. Once the new wording of the Treaties waves the former possibility of veto 
by the States in most of the cases – all those not implying unanimity –, the last resort 
clause acquires an even more relevant character for the enhanced procedures, as it is the 
guarantee to Member States that integration and “an ever closer Union” remain one of 
the main goals of the EU. 
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The Treaty of Lisbon establishes the general framework of enhanced 
cooperation in TEU, article 20, reserving the regulatory articles for the TFEU (articles 
326 to 334). This new legal systematic approach to enhanced cooperation in the 
provisions of the Treaties reflect the change of perspective of enhanced cooperation, 
once it defines the mechanism as some current “functioning mechanism of EU”, that has 
its political boundaries defined in just one article of TEU. Once now there is a 
horizontal possibility it is easier to have a “universal” mechanism which is not 
discriminatory in its functioning logic. The end of the division in pillars of the Treaties 
also contributes for this new approach, and once all the rules adopted cover the whole 
treaties, unless expressed otherwise, that also includes enhanced cooperation. Despite 
there are still some specificities for some policies (e.g. automatism – AFSJ; unanimity – 
CSFP), solutions have been put in place to ease the process, for instance the passerelle 
clause. 
In terms of the legal logic of TEU
560
, it should also be noted that enhanced 
cooperation is presented with all the other “common provisions”, before it deals with 
specific policies, showing clearly that it is now a mechanism that can be used 
horizontally. As for the TFEU, enhanced cooperation is included in Part Six
561
 
(Institutional and Financial provisions) under an autonomous title, but still in the part on 
institutional provisions. The place chosen for the enhanced cooperation in the TFEU is 
fully justified for the fact that it is indeed an institutional procedure in the sense it 
implies institutions, presupposes the possibility of using the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties, and only defines the rule not the matter to which it can or cannot be applied to. 
To start the enhanced cooperation procedures, several other criteria have also to 
be respected
562
, most of them were already contained in the Treaties before the Lisbon 
revision: 
i) it is not applicable to EU exclusive competences563;  
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ii) it must protect the principles and goals of the Treaties564, moreover enhanced 
cooperation have to comply with the Treaties and EU Law
565
;  
iii) it cannot undermine the internal market, or economic, social and territorial 
cohesion
566
; 
iv)  Nor can it be a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member 
States
567
; 
v) Member States may make use of EU institutions and exercise the 
competences
568
 by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties
569
. 
This last criteria as we have seen above, is only a possibility for Member States, 
not a mandatory requirement, like the others criteria mentioned, to the launching of an 
enhanced cooperation. Overall and it will never be excessive to reiterate that one of the 
major goals of the enhanced cooperation is to develop the objectives of the Union
570
, as 
this is what makes enhanced cooperation a common project, and fully justifies that this 
form of cooperation is developed within Treaties’ boundaries. 
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If it is not applicable to EU exclusive competences, it remains to be defined to 
which competences it refers to
571
. Taking into account article 4 TFEU, a list of shared 
competences is clearly identified; therefore it is possible to admit that enhanced 
cooperation can take place in any of these areas, while the actions referred in article 6 
TFEU may also be included in a hypothetical list of competences to which enhanced 
cooperation might be applicable. The players in these cases are the Member States, in 
the name of the group of members of the enhanced cooperation, even if the use of EU 
institutions is provided
572
.  
The Treaty of Lisbon, by defining the competences more clearly, avoids some of 
the problems that have been identified by some authors regarding the competences that 
can be applied to enhanced cooperation
573
. But it does not solve all of the inaccuracies 
in the Treaties
574
. We assume here, along with the British House of Lords, that 
competence is the term used to define the responsibility for decision making in a 
particular field
575
. Despite it may be considered a very narrow assessment of a 
complicated subject, as competences are, it is nevertheless sufficiently clear and wide in 
the context of this reference. 
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180 
 
First we consider that to have competences, it is required to have legal 
personality to exercise them. If we take into account the Treaties in their pre-Lisbon 
wording, there is not such a provision regarding EU. We admit the implied international 
legal personality of EU
 576
, as an international organization, but in reality the EU until 
the Treaty of Lisbon is only granted some external powers, as the rest of the 
competences remain either with the Member States or with EC. It is relevant to quote 
here article 43 of TEU, according to Nice version, “remains within the limits of the 
powers of the Union or of the Community and does not concern the areas which fall 
within the exclusive competence of the Community”. The Treaty does not speak about 
EU competences, but only vaguely about Union powers, reserving the concrete term 
competence, which is dealt all along in the Treaties, to the Community. 
Despite the fact that article 5 TEU admits the use of the subsidiary principle for 
non-exclusive competences of the EU, it states that, in that case, it is the EU that 
develops the action in name of all Member States, thus establishing a clear separation 
line between the two mechanisms, i.e., enhanced cooperation and subsidiarity
577
. Even 
if enhanced cooperation could also be called subsidiarity, in the sense that it allows 
some of the actors to take the lead in a particular subject, we sustain that clarity is 
needed, and once the Treaty refers to subsidiarity referring to EU’s role, we shall 
respect this distinction
578
. Although from a linguistic point of view and taking into 
account what has been stated about enhanced cooperation, we could use the term 
subsidiarity, we argue that EU Primary law has given this concept a very precise legal 
definition that should be preserved when dealing with European affairs, therefore we 
consider that this term should be avoided to refer to enhanced cooperation to discard 
any misunderstanding
579
. 
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The limits imposed by the categories and areas of Union competence
580
 do not, 
however, exclude any policy, while it may be argued that the discrimination is not 
exhaustive, the conferral principle enlightens on those that are not referred (and which 
remain Member States competence). In reality, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces some 
changes regarding CFSP and CSDP as far as enhanced cooperation is concerned. One 
major change is the fact that enhanced cooperation is no longer excluded from CSDP
581
. 
It must be retained that CSDP is part of CFSP
582
. 
Recognising the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, the fact is that the 
specific kind of cooperation that has been set for CSDP (permanent structured 
cooperation
583
) although it is a special rule, it does not replace enhanced cooperation nor 
does it intend to just detail the general rules of enhanced cooperation
584
. It is another 
form of cooperation, another example of differentiated integration and unlike enhanced 
cooperation it is reserved for just one policy. This is not the only specific kind of 
enhanced cooperation, although this term is not literally applied to those two forms we 
refer to: the Schengen area and the Eurogroup
585
. Both already existed before the Lisbon 
revision of the Treaties and although from the substantive legal point of view they are 
similar to enhanced cooperation provisions, the use of the term to refer to those two 
situations sould be avoided, as they did not result from the enhanced cooperation 
procedure. 
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The kind of cooperation envisaged for CSDP is an extra kind of cooperation, 
even if it is specific; therefore, there is no hierarchy in law between the two kinds of 
cooperation and therefore it should not be considered that the permanent structure 
cooperation replaces the enhanced cooperation. In reality the two legal provisions, even 
if one is horizontal to the whole Treaty, and the other is a special one for a specific 
policy, they do not interfere with each other from a theoretical point of view. Having 
said this, it is easy to conclude that this lex specialis, in this particular case, does not 
abrogate or prevails over the legi generalis, they are both applicable once they refer to 
different realities
586
.  
Taking into account there is a specific kind of cooperation in this area, it is 
perhaps too difficult for the Council to adopt an enhanced cooperation on CSDP, even if 
from the legal point of view nothing impedes it. It would also be difficult to politically 
argue in favor of an enhanced cooperation instead of the permanent structured 
cooperation. Furthermore, and to take the possibility to the limit, the CSDP, being a part 
of CFSP, is by force of law ruled by CFSP legal framework, unless stated otherwise in 
the Treaties, which means that in the hypothetical case there was a permanent structured 
cooperation that might go against CFSP policy, namely an enhanced cooperation, it 
would not be null and void once CSDP would be seen as a lex specialis, while CFSP as 
the legi generalis. Nevertheless, it does not seem credible that politically the Council 
would adopt two contradicting decisions just by using the two mechanisms available. In 
the case of CSDP we will only probably see permanent structured cooperation. 
This assumption of respect by the principles of the Treaties is also meant to 
impede diversity to be established in the Union and thus distorting one of its main aims, 
which is the increasing integration.   
Despite the fact that referring to the respect by the principles of the Treaties in 
the Treaties themselves may seem redundant, this was the best formula found to make 
sure that enhanced cooperation would take place within the EU and not aside, like it had 
happened, for instance, with the Treaty of Prüm
587
. Only respecting the principles of the 
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Treaties can the Member States apply the normal EU legal order, i.e., the normal rules 
and procedures provided in the Treaties, its rules of decision and policies, as well as the 
acquis, and initiate the mechanism by making use, as foreseen, of the EU institutions. 
It is difficult to synthesise the principles referred to in the Treaties as not only 
are they part of the preambles, but also others are dispersed in several articles of the 
Treaties. However, a distinction can be made between the general principles (the 
democratic principles, the respect for Human Rights, the significance of the UN 
Charter, among others) and the more operational or executive principles (like the 
subsidiarity, proportionality or conferral, thought mostly to make the Union work, or 
others like the principle of effective judicial protection
588
). All of these principles must 
be taken into account when deciding upon enhanced cooperation. 
Although mentioned in different stances of the Treaties, the internal market, 
economic, social and territorial cohesion are goals that have been continuously 
reaffirmed by the Treaties and in their revisions as well. Despite the assessment any of 
these concepts may have, whether with more or less extensive interpretation, the fact is 
that they constitute objectives of the EU according to the Treaties and therefore they 
must be fully taken into account in all EU activities, as is the case of enhanced 
cooperation. 
The Treaty of Lisbon, by creating one single entity (the Union, and thus 
overriding the communities), makes it easier to make full recourse for an enhanced 
cooperation to the framework of the Treaties as they all refer to the same entity. By 
framework it should be understood not only the institutional structure of EU, but also all 
of its acquis
589
. This use cannot affect the Member States that do not participate in the 
enhanced cooperation.  
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This important principle, that enhanced cooperation is an EU activity
590
, makes 
it an even more integration mechanism, and the fact that participating Member States in 
the enhanced cooperation are able to make full use of the single institutional framework 
of EU is an important step.  
Finally, another fundamental principle that is applicable to enhanced cooperation 
– as to the whole of the Treaties – is that it cannot be a barrier to or to generate any 
discrimination in trade between Member States. This is a basic principle of EU and any 
initiative for an enhanced cooperation will have to take it into account, especially in 
cases of harmonisation of laws
591
. 
Enhanced cooperation cannot be used to harmonise laws between Member 
States which may result in barriers or discrimination in trade. This is a particularly 
relevant aspect to take into account once commercial policy is an exclusive competence 
– so excluded from enhanced cooperation. It must clarified here that policies are not 
excepted from enhanced cooperation, but competences, even if it means that the result 
in the end is the same – as well as the competence regarding the competition rules for 
the functioning of the internal market. But the internal market is more than trade (that is 
why overall it is a shared competence), and trade and commerce are the same. The 
provisions of the Treaties, we assume, do not refer to enhanced cooperation in these 
areas, namely regarding trade policy, but to the spill-over effects on these domain of the 
acts adopted in other fields. 
As seen, enhanced cooperation is a mechanism clearly defined in the Treaty but 
still with a few exceptions, regarding its implementation or application. Just to quote a 
few examples we would mention the specificities of CFSP and CSDP, as well as the 
new provisions regarding judicial cooperation in criminal matters
592
 and police 
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cooperation
593
. It must be said that in the case of enhanced cooperation affecting the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and which constitute new articles of the 
Treaties
594
, and unlike the general rules for enhanced cooperation, the matter can either 
be referred to the European Council (in a first moment) or an enhanced cooperation can 
be addressed to the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, according to 
their own competences on the subject, and the enhanced cooperation is then deemed 
granted.  
This principle of almost automatism is new in the Treaties. In the pre-Lisbon 
version of the Treaties, it was possible to address the European Council to block an 
enhanced cooperation in all domains; this is no longer possible in any domain. 
 
4. Phases of the enhanced cooperation process 
 
There are four phases in all enhanced cooperation processes. Not all actors that 
intervene in all of the phases are necessarily the same in all situations. It is only possible 
to infer which institution has competence to intervene according to the areas the request 
for the enhanced cooperation intends to address. Even though, in terms of procedure, 
these four phases are: the request, the authorisation proposal; the consultation; and 
eventually the deliberation
595
. These phases do not refer to the extra procedures that 
acceding States to enhanced cooperation have to follow
596
. 
There are two sets of procedures, one regarding enhanced cooperation 
concerning CFSP matters, and another one for the rest of the situations. The general rule 
states that any group of nine States may request authorisation for an enhanced 
cooperation
597
, which will be then transformed in an authorisation proposal to be 
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submitted to the Council. This proposal is made by the Commission to the Council. The 
request reflects the fact that enhanced cooperation is a right that can be, or not, granted 
to a group of States, according to Treaties’ rules. By no means is enhanced cooperation 
mandatory, not at its launching phase, nor later. 
 The Commission, after receiving the request by the interested Member States, as 
long the request does not deal with exclusive competences of the Union nor with 
common foreign and security policy, is entitled to issue the authorisation proposal to the 
Council that eventually will adopt it, after obtaining consent from the European 
Parliament. The Council adopts the proposal following the qualified majority rule
598
. 
We shall note that article 329, n.1 does not state the rule of decision; therefore we 
conclude it by default, especially taking into account that n. 2 is clear on the exception. 
Neverthless, this is not politically obvious, and may rise some doubts, especially in 
areas like banking union or fiscal union. In these particular cases the problem of the 
competences may also be raised. Once fiscality is still an unanimity policy, it may be 
difficult, at least for the States that supported this unanimity from the very beginning, to 
accept that an enhanced cooperation on these matters may be adopted by qualified 
majority. It may be a legal debate, but most surely it will answer political concerns and 
opinions. 
The Commission is not forced to present an authorisation proposal, but if it opts 
for not doing so, it has to justify its choice to the Council
599
.  The Commission cannot, 
at this stage, decide upon the conditions of each Member State to participate in the 
enhanced cooperation, as nothing in the Treaty foresees it
600
, but it can do it for further 
participations (it is always easier to catch the train at the station than on the move), but 
may refuse the requests because of policy reasons. The Treaty of Lisbon dropped the 
veto possibility by Member States and introduced quality majority voting for most of 
the cases, except CFSP and CSDP
601
. 
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 In the case of a request dealing with common foreign and security policy, the 
Member States must address their request to the Council that will forward it to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will give an 
opinion on its consistency with EU common foreign and security policy (and of CSDP 
as an integral part of CFSP
602
), and to the Commission, that will give its opinion on the 
consistency with the EU policies
603
. The Council shall keep the European Parliament 
informed. The decision is taken in the case of CFSP by the Council acting unanimously.  
The TFEU is not clear on who is responsible for the authorisation proposal in 
this situation, but taking into account the different roles expressed in the Treaty, we 
shall assume that in reality there is no authorisation proposal, and that the Council will 
act based on three different elements: the request by the Member States; the opinion by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and the 
opinion of the Commission. These two opinions are only opinions, with no binding 
effect. 
The request addressed by the Member States to the Commission must specify 
the scope and objectives of the enhanced cooperation. Remarkably, this is only 
mentioned in Article 329, n.1 TFEU. The TFEU leaves then a certain margin of 
interpretation on the real dimension of this obligation as far as enhanced cooperation on 
common foreign and security policy is concerned. In Article 329, n.2 TFEU there is no 
boundaries of the same kind to the request, being up to the Member States the sole 
responsibility for the definition of the framework of the enhanced cooperation and, once 
there is no authorization proposal, it could be admitted that only the decision granting 
the authorization for the enhanced cooperation will define its scope and objectives. 
However, for a practical and legal logic, it seems more adequate to consider that these 
elements should already be mentioned in the request presented by the Member States to 
the Council, at least as a reference for its further work. 
There is a bilateral mechanism instituted in the Treaties
604
 that, on the one hand, 
guarantees the Member States that do not participate in the enhanced cooperation their 
competences, rights and obligations, and, on the other hand, impedes those Member 
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States to hinder the enhanced cooperation of the Member States that may want to start 
it
605
. This new formulation goes much beyond the former constructive abstention
606
, 
which has been waved from this mechanism. Despite it may seem a very twisted way of 
interpreting, it should not be excluded that a Member State may decide to participate in 
the enhanced cooperation just to block its implementation
607
, once there is no veto. 
However, machiavelism and politics go often hand in hand. 
Blocking an enhanced cooperation is only possible for Member States regarding 
CFSP (and CSDP) matters as the decision is taken by unanimity
608
. The treatment of an 
abstention situation is not foreseen so it is admitted that it is not possible, otherwise 
unanimity would be put into question
609
 with no alternative, as constructive abstention 
has been dropped.  
The Treaties anticipate the possibility of a passerelle for enhanced cooperation 
acts, although not for matters having military or defence implications
610
 (we understand 
that, theoretically, there may be enhanced cooperation in military or defence areas, 
despite the existence of permanent structured cooperation, which is distinctly ruled by 
articles 42 and 46 TEU, as well by Protocol n. 10, as there is no exclusion of any 
policy). As for the area of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, there is no passerelle 
foreseen, but it must be clear here that in this situation, the general rule for AFSJ in the 
Treaties is the qualified majority, we tend to assume that if the enhanced cooperation is 
thought to overcome the unanimity blockage, it would not make sense to impose that 
same rule of decision to the States that have opted to go faster in its integration process. 
And therefore we conclude that enhanced cooperation in AFSJ is ruled by qualified 
majority. This also one of the results of the suppression of the pillar system in the 
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Treaties, as the full integration of AFSJ in the Treaties makes the  common procedural 
rules of decision applicable to AFSJ as well. 
There is a duty of information “where appropriate” by the Commission and the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the 
European Parliament and the Council. The expression “where appropriate” should be 
considered an extra control instituted by the Treaties regarding enhanced cooperation
611
. 
We consider that “where appropriate” also means “when appropriate”, as it is 
inconceivable to institutionalise permanent information, otherwise it would block the 
decision process. Nevertheless, “where appropriate” remains an extreme and 
deliberately vague expression that may result in very diverse assessments, even 
contradictory, among the different actors involved (European Parliament, Commission, 
Council, 27 Member States, High Representative for CFSP). 
According to the Treaties
612
, it is up to the Council and the Commission to 
ensure the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of enhanced cooperation 
and the consistency of such activities with the policies of the Union. Finally, but no less 
important, is the fact that the Treaties impose an obligation of cooperation on the 
Council and the Commission regarding the enhanced cooperation
613
. It should be 
reminded that there is also a provision
614
 in the TFEU referring to the role of 
cooperation among Member States as far as enhanced cooperation is concerned. This 
blended duty of cooperation of all of the actors involved is also a means to underline the 
principle of EU solidarity
615
. 
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In reality the Treaty of Lisbon almost only standardised the requirements for the 
enhanced cooperation, as the Treaty of Nice had already extended it to more domains
616
.  
The Treaty of Lisbon, nevertheless, goes deeper into its definition, uses and procedures. 
 
5. Acts of the enhanced cooperation 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon creates a triptych typology act: legislative, delegated
617
 
and implementing acts
618
. The binding acts predicted in article 288 TFEU can be used 
in all of these forms
619
. Intended to be a full fledge EU mechanism  the wording on 
enhanced cooperation of the Treaties does not exclude
620
 the possibility of adopting 
any kind of act, as it does in the articles of CFSP
621
, which lead us to conclude that all 
kinds of acts foreseen in the Treaties could then be adopted within an enhanced 
cooperation,  but being valid only for the participants
622
 in the mechanism and 
following the same procedures and criteria (adjusted to the number of participants)
 623
 
predicted in the Treaties, namely in articles 4
624
, 16 and 17 TEU and 288 TFEU and 
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the Member States involved in an enhanced cooperation are also obliged to follow the 
exceptions that the Treaties may foresee on the adoption of certain acts, whether in the 
case of certain policies (like CFSP) or because of the competences definition (the case 
of delegated acts). 
Intended to be a full fledge EU mechanism, enhanced cooperation is not limited 
to any sort of acts. Member States, as long as they follow the Treaties rules, they can 
adopt all type of acts, its adoption will depend on the policy they are addressed to and 
the actors concerned. It is important here to distinguish between a legislative act, 
which, by its own intrinsic nature, is binding, legal acts with binding effect, namely 
the decisions (taking into account that the Lisbon IGC opted for dropping the 
suggestion of the Constitutional Treaty on clearly distinguishing legislative and non-
legislative acts, it is perhaps useful to clarify which category of acts are we dealing 
with), and acts without binding and direct effect
625
. This means, that not only can the 
Member States involved in the enhanced cooperation adopt political acts, but also 
legislative acts, even if with a restraint application, only for EU Member States that 
participate in the enhanced cooperation.  
The question regarding the adoption of a legislative act by the Council in an 
enhanced cooperation format raises the question of the European Parliament role as 
co-decisor. The provisions on enhanced cooperation do not refer to this, so it should be 
assumed that as long as there is a legislative act envolved, the European Parliament 
has to be involved.    
Enhanced cooperation as a mechanism of action is not excluded from the 
possibility to recur to any legal acts mentioned in article 288 TFEU, it is the policy in 
which those are applied or the matter addressed by the act itself that limits the choice of 
the kind of acts. The Treaty of Lisbon has the merit to make the variety of acts available 
for the EU institutions more limited, by terminating with the specific acts that existed 
for the former third pillar (JHA) and by imposing only one legal act to CFSP, the 
decision
626
. The enhanced cooperation mechanism, which is a mechanism, not a rule of 
                                                                
625
 Piris, Jean-Claude, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010: p.93-94. 
626
 The Lisbon Treaty. EU constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?, edited by Stefan Griller and 
Jacques Ziller, New York-Vienna: Springer, 2008: p.88-90. 
192 
 
decision or a competence, has to be compatible with the rest of the Treaties
627
. Co-
decision is the ordinary legislative procedure in the Treaties, and the same applies to 
enhanced cooperation.  There are, however, different rules predicted for some policies 
as well as for some non legislative procedures. 
The choice of the kind of act must have at his root a clear definition of the legal 
basis. This choice has always constituted a problem for EU to act, once a wrong option 
might make the act ineffective and inapplicable
628
. Not only does the legal basis 
establish the competence to act and the institution or agent responsible to do so, but it 
also defines its scope. It may even serve as guidance for the implementation of the act 
intended to be taken, by taking into consideration the judgments by the ECJ
629
 on 
cases dealing with similar legal basis
630
. 
It is not the name of the act that defines its hierarchy. It is possible to find 
regulations attributing another institution (normally the Commission) or the Member 
States the task to implement measures (implementing acts – article 291 TFEU)631. 
These measures are often adopted either by a regulation (that must be in line with the 
basic regulation that precedes it) or a decision. The Treaty of Lisbon also speaks of a 
new kind of acts (delegated acts – article 290 TFEU).  
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The delegated acts
632
 include a time frame for its duration
633
 and therefore a 
“sunset clause” must be present in the legislative act that delegates the powers. These 
acts are supposed to be exercised by the Commission, and therefore they are out of the 
scope of enhanced cooperation, once, as we have seen, the actors of an enhanced 
cooperation are the Member States. It is not the enhanced cooperation that is excluded 
from the possibility of adopting delegated acts, but once they are just reserved for the 
Commission
634
, which is not part of the legislative process in the enhanced 
cooperation framework, the adoption of delegated acts is therefore impracticable. 
It must be stated however, that although enhanced cooperation acts become 
acquis of the enhanced cooperation, they cannot be taken for more than that. It is not 
an easy task, but still this must be the legal reasoning
635
. 
As for the procedures regarding the adoption of the acts, the provisions on 
enhanced cooperation do not include any such reference; therefore it is deduced their 
adoption follows the normal rules in the Treaties
636
. 
Without sharing the view of an “enhanced cooperation council”637, which might 
jeopardise EU goals just for the fact of institutionalising a discriminatory instance 
within EU, the truth is that, in reality, with this concept it is easier to grasp the real 
involvement of different actors in enhanced cooperation, i.e., there is in reality a small 
group formed by the participating Member States in the enhanced cooperation that 
follow the same (adapted) rules of procedure as the Council does, but this group is not 
a legal institution, and is only restraint to the enhanced cooperation and does not have 
legal personality
638
. Moreover, each enhanced cooperation has its own members, so 
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the format of that hypothetical council will change from one enhanced cooperation to 
another one. 
 All of the legislative acts adopted within the enhanced cooperation framework 
may be subject, as any other legislative act of EU, to judicial review
639
 by the ECJ
640
. 
And the same is valid for the decision by the Council on launching an enhanced 
cooperation
641
, as it is also a legislative act, after all Member States are allowed to adopt 
legislation by this procedure
642
. 
 
6. Financing enhanced cooperation 
 
The principle of “costs lie where they fall”, which was common to ESDP 
missions, for instance in the case of the operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has 
been recuperated for the enhanced cooperation
643
.  The costs of enhanced cooperation 
shall be assumed by the Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation
644
, 
with the exception of administrative costs which shall be the EU institutions 
responsibility. It seems clear that expenditure resulting from enhanced cooperation 
cannot be attributed to the EU budget. There is a technical reason for that. Once 
budgetary lines are mostly defined according to policies, it would be impossible to 
define an amount for a policy which may not be known by the time of budget 
discussions, or even if it will happen. Moreover the versatility of enhanced cooperation 
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may require several budget lines at the same time, depending on the activities and 
policies that may be tried to be reached. 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility of changing that rule by a unanimous decision 
by the Council after consulting with the European Parliament. Unlike it happens with 
the ESDP missions
645
, it is not referred that it shall be managed in accordance with the 
procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union, which is 
quite clear from the fact that the European Parliament is only consulted, nothing is said 
on the binding effects of that consultation, which means that it is not probably the 
case
646
. However, even with the end of the division of obligatory and non-obligatory 
expenses, which were subject to different procedures, it remains to be seen what will be 
the role of the European Parliament in the new context of enhanced cooperation 
expenses, if any besides the consultation.  
The Treaties refer to the costs of implementing an enhanced cooperation and not 
only to the launching and existence of the enhanced cooperation per si, as this surely 
does not involve costs that cannot be borne by the EU general budget, besides they are 
already foreseen in the Treaties when administrative costs are referred. 
It is important to underline here that the provisions regarding enhanced 
cooperation, both in TFEU or TEU, when referring to the financing of enhanced 
cooperation do not refer specifically to the financing to the acts adopted in that context. 
It is admissible, nevertheless, that the rule of “costs lie where they fall” shall be kept, as 
it would be strange to impose in the Treaty a provision of a financial obligation to 
Member States that may not participate in the implementation of the act. When we 
mention implementation of the act we refer to the procedures intended to execute the 
said act, and not the exactly the legal implementation of the act. All Member States that 
have decided to constitute the enhanced cooperation are equally financially responsible. 
Nothing is said on the allocation of expenses among them, but one of two criteria 
should most probably be considered. One possibility would be to consider that “costs lie 
where they fall”, and therefore each participant knows the financial consequences of 
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participating in a given act; the other possibility would be to use the allocation scheme 
of the EU budget, adjusted to the effective members of the enhanced cooperation.  
  
7. The adopted enhanced cooperation cases 
 
To illustrate what has been discussed above, an analysis of the enhanced 
cooperation adopted so far will follow in order to recognise the composing elements 
and, if the case may be, some possible ulterior problems resulting from the enhanced 
cooperation adopted. 
 
7.1. Enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and 
legal separation
647
 
 
The decision that has been taken on 12th July 2010 concludes a process that 
started in 2006, having the request been presented in 2008. It is interesting to note that 
one Member State (Greece) withdrew its request, bringing the initial number of 10 
States (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Romania, 
Slovakia and Spain) to the minimum 9 Member States required by the Treaties, but 
other Member States (Germany, Belgium, Malta, Latvia, Portugal and Lithuania) have 
joined in a later state and others can still do it. All these situations are foreseen in to the 
Treaties. In a nutshell, this decision intends to allow European citizens (of the Member 
States concerned) to be able to choose which State’s jurisdiction should apply to their 
divorce.  
As a regulation could not be approved, an enhanced cooperation was launched in 
order to allow the adoption of legislative measures regarding conflict-of-law rules in 
order to determine which substantive law applies to an international divorce that has 
connections with more than one legal order, whether for the nationality of the citizens 
involved or the place of residence or the legal order that might have been defined upon 
the marriage. This is a question that will have to be addressed at some stage. This 
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decision is a mark in EU law history, as it is the first time that the enhanced mechanism 
is applied in full according to the rules and provisions of the Treaties, although at its 
origine enhanced cooperation was not foreseen for private international law issues, but 
to facilitate the internal market and to be used for economic affairs
648
. 
The presentation of the proposal of a decision by the Commission to the 
Council
649
 for approval shows it had been accepted by the former. The other formality – 
the consent by the European Parliament – was also given650. In its proposal, the 
Commission recognises that all the conditions foreseen in the Treaties are met
651
. It 
should also be noted that Denmark, Poland and Sweden abstain on voting the enhanced 
cooperation decision, by doing so they allow it to continue without further 
procedures
652
. They could abstain because only a majority voting was required. 
This enhanced cooperation includes more than the minimum number of nine 
States required by the Treaty to be launched
653. It also refers to the “last resort” 
requirement
654
. In reality it clearly reiterates it, by referring that the request had been 
presented two years before with no results
655
 (not to mention that at the origin there was 
a regulation proposal from 2006). Both the Commission, who made the proposal, and 
the Council, that approved the decision agreed that, at least in this case, two years was 
enough to try to reach a decision valid for all Member States. The decision on the whole 
seems to be directed to the approval of the preceding Commission proposal for a 
Regulation amending Regulation No. 2201/2003 as regards jurisdictional rules and 
introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters (the broken off  
“Rome III” Regulation), which could not be approved by the Council. 
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 It also refers to the procedural articles on enhanced cooperation, namely the 
provisions of articles 326 and 329
656
. It is particularly evident the concern by the 
Council on scrupulously respecting the wording of the Treaties, by following all the 
articles regarding enhanced cooperation, even if just to repeat them without any 
comment or presentation of sustaining arguments, after all this is the first enhanced 
cooperation and any legal failure might jeopardise the use of the mechanism forever. 
Article 81 TFEU refers to judicial cooperation in civil matters, the decision is 
taken in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, clearly civil 
matters. Despite the specific simplified procedure for enhanced cooperation in AFSJ, it 
was not used once the process started before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. A 
question that must be considered is what the competences of the States and of the EU in 
civil matters are, especially after the creation of AFSJ. Other situations resulting from 
divorce, namely family law, are probably excluded from the scope of the enhanced 
cooperation
657
. 
According to the decision of the Council, the enhanced cooperation that has been 
decided does not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial 
cohesion
658
 and it even goes further by laying down the possibility of the enhanced 
cooperation participate in the development of the internal market
659
 . 
The enhanced cooperation will respect the rights and obligations of Member 
States that do not participate in and it does not affect any pre-existing acquis
660
. It 
remains to be seen how this enhanced cooperation will handle the situations of litigious 
divorce and not amicable ones, as there may not even be an agreement on which legal 
order to use. 
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Finally, the openness granted by the Treaties to ulterior memberships is also 
accommodated in the Decision
661
. 
The single article of the Decision does more than just repeating the wording of 
article 20, n. 1 TEU, once it imposes that “establish enhanced cooperation between 
themselves in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation by applying 
the relevant provisions of the Treaties”, which the TEU has considered as a possibility 
only
662
, but it does not refer to the use of the institutions. The use in the TEU of the 
word “may” refers to both things otherwise instead of the word “and”, the legislators 
would have use a full stop
663
. 
The Decision, following upon the Treaties, does not establish any conditions for 
participation in the enhanced cooperation, neither at its launching, nor for later 
participation, so it should be assumed that the Commission, when making its evaluation 
of a further request, will have little to control, except the transposition of the acquis of 
the enhanced cooperation, but surely a Member State would not request to participate 
without doing it, as it is a binding rule from the Treaties.  
The assessment of “relevant provisions of the Treaties” is extremely vague, 
probably to allow a high level of flexibility to the Member States. We would recall that 
this is an expression in the general article on enhanced cooperation in TEU, but it could 
easily have been better defined by referring, for instance to the scope foreseen in article 
81 TFEU. Reproducing the Treaties is not enough, however it is easier. The idea of 
having a decision on enhanced cooperation is also to fix some boundaries for its 
implementation. The Treaties do not take into account any particular case, they have to 
be general, while the enhanced cooperation is indeed vested with a very determined 
object and therefore it could indeed be on the benefit of the Member States involved and 
of the Union to specify better which are provisions intended to be used and in what 
terms that use will be pursued. 
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The document approved by the council authorising enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation says nothing on what kind of 
acts the Member States can adopt regarding the enhanced cooperation, and it was not 
expected that it would.  
This enhance cooperation may be seen as an integrative form of impeding 
harmonisation, for the simple fact that if there is mutual recognition, there is no need to 
harmonise once no conflict exists
664
. Indeed there is no haromisation of laws, but there 
is an harmonisation of criteria of which law to apply.  By imposing mutual recognition 
it strengthens the integration process, which is a condition for enhanced cooperation 
according to article 20, n. 2 TEU
665
.  
 
7.2. Enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection
666
 
 
The idea of a common patent protection was first raised in 1975, but did not lead 
to any concrete action. The fact that the TFEU, in its article 118, includes a clause 
creating the European intellectual property rights facilitates the process for a unitary 
patent system, even if the article has so far been scarcely used as a legal basis for 
matters regarding patent. 
The enhanced cooperation creating a unitary patent goes behond what the 
European Patent Office has been doing since 1973. While the European Patent Office 
grants European patents, the fact is that they have then to be registered in all nationl 
laws, the granting of the patent is not in question, but without this registry, it is not 
possible to argue in its defense
667
. The enhanced cooperation intends to make the EU 
registry equally valid in all Member States (at least in those that participate in the 
enhanced cooperation). 
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Besides the act of registration of a patent, the creation of unitary patent 
protection where the translations of the patents
668
 could be assured and that a special 
court would be created to control the disputes that may arise regarding the subject of 
patents were also matters that were taken into account. Nevertheless, neither one, nor 
the other has been included in the decision authorising the enhanced cooperation. The 
decision says that it is supposed to allow an enhanced cooperation for the creation of 
unitary patent protection. However, both the Commission and the European Parliament 
reflected in their positions that at least a regulation regarding the translations would be 
adopted. The decision does not determine the number and the kind of acts that shall be 
adopted by the Member States participating in the decision, nor could it. 
As for the hypothetical patent Court, in one opinion, the ECJ considered that the 
creation of a unified patent litigation system is not compatible with the Treaties and 
therefore it was not possible
669
. This opinion was issued before the adoption of the 
regulation. Regarding the question of translations, it is not excluded, but the Member 
States that decided to move forward had already accepted the initial proposal by the 
Commission regarding the language question, much before the last avis
670
 so it is not 
expectable that the problem may arise again between the 25 Member States that decided 
to go further. 
In its structure, the decision on enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection is not very different from the decision on enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. The former 
has one paragraph more in the preamble (sixteen instead of fifteen, in reality a new 
number seven). 
This decision refers to all the needed articles of enhanced cooperation, so that no 
legal emptiness can be found later on, which was the same with the decision the area of 
the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. 
The reference in number 1 and 12 make it clear what kind of competence – a 
shared competence – is at stake in this enhanced cooperation. Regarding paragraph 12, 
it should be noted that not only the competence to act is sustained, but also the policy 
                                                                
668
 Fernández Rozas, José Carlos, “Hacia la patente única por el cauce de la cooperación reforzada”, La 
Ley, Ano XXXII, n. 7558, 2011: p.2 
669
 Opinion 1/09 of the Court (Full Court), 8 March 2011 
670
 Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection, COM (2010) 790 final, 14.12.2010 
202 
 
the act is intended to, thus making a double legal guarantee for the enhanced 
cooperation. 
Although paragraph 13 states that this enhanced cooperation does not distort 
competition between Member States, as it has too according to the Treaty
671
, the fact is 
that it might do so, but it was an option from the Member States to exclude themselves 
to participate in the mechanism, even if it is open to all Member States
672
, moreover 
some harmonisation is better than none
673
. The question arises, which should prevail? 
The exclusion of the mechanism, or the preconditions to the approval of the mechanism, 
after all the existing acquis is binding to all States. It remains to be seen how in practice 
this will really work. 
Unlike the previous enhanced cooperation, this decision includes a provision on 
the conditions of participation, being the ones mentioned in the Decision only those 
referred in the Treaties and therefore already binding. It is of particular importance the 
reference to the last resort character
674
. 
The proposal by the Commission
675
 refers once to approximation of laws and 
once to harmonisation, which, as it says, is the correct expression according to article 4 
TFEU. The use of the term approximation may suggest some legal confusion, which 
should be avoided once approximation and harmonisation are not exactly the same.  
Although the enhanced cooperation on the unitary patent has been adopted, it is 
still considered by some authors not to respect the treaties for creating a division among 
Member States without a clear formulation of its goals and without demonstrating that 
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the system now created will be more helpful for the accomplishment of the Treaties 
goals, namely an “ever closer Union”676. 
There have already been two processes moved by Italy and Spain to contest the 
enhanced cooperation on a unitary patent. Both cases consider that article 20 TEU 
establishing enhanced cooperation regarding a shared competence and not a EU 
exclusive competence has been violated
677
, as they both agree that it deals with an 
exclusive competence and for that reason the correct legal basis should be article 118 
TFEU. Moreover both parties argue that the decision disrupts the internal market and 
the principle of non-discrimination, and therefore it violates article 326 TFEU which 
guarantees that enhanced cooperation must respect EU treaties and EU law
678
. Finally, 
Spain also argues that the decision does not respect the rights of the non-participating 
states, and that goes against article 327 TFEU
679
. The question raised by Spain and Italy 
seem to confuse the legal basis of the enhanced cooperation act and the policy it is 
intended to cover. 
The refusal by the ECJ to accept the creation of a Patent Court also complicates 
the effectiveness of the enhanced cooperation. The problem is due to the fact that the 
EU patent law fights with two different jurisdictions, once the EU law and therefore the 
ECJ which has the competence to pronounce decisions in the subject
680
.  
On the other hand, the market has generally considered that ECJ decisions 
regarding trademarks – and it is admissible the same will happen with patents – to be 
unsatisfactory. There seems to be no doubts that only the ECJ has jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of EU law (but not the single one over its implementation). The patent 
court would have the competence to admit non EU Member States parties and express 
itself over EU law, this contradicts the dispositions if the Treaties, in particular article 
19, n. 3 TUE. Moreover, the patent court is an organisation outside EU legal order and 
its jurisdiction
681
. The patent court could eventually exercise its jurisdiction over the 
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regulation on unitary patent, but that inevitably it will also interpret EU law. Or, if that 
decision would be a breach or infringement of EU law, its jurisdiction, because it is 
fixed outside the EU system, could not be liable agains any court. As the ECJ clearly 
points out, this court is a very different one from, for instance, the Benelux court, fully 
within the EU system
682
. 
It is relevant to note that despite the arguments forwarded by Member States the 
enhanced cooperation regarding the unitary patent is not in itself a problem, nor the way 
it has been adopted, the problems that have arisen are of substance of the matter and 
involve reasons that do not have with enhanced cooperation itself., even if conveniently 
Spain and Italy argued that it could not set as unitary patent titles is an exclusive 
competence according to article 118, n. 1 TFEU. Accepting this reasoning it would 
mean that patent should only be considered as competition rules are concerned, and that 
is not the case, therefore, enhanced cooperation as far as patent is concern should be 
evaluated against article 4, n. 2 al.a) as a shared competence. Regarding the argument 
that it was not used as a last resort, if it is true there is no definition of reasonable period 
683
, nevertheless at a certain moment a decision must be taken
684
, and in the the case of 
the EU unitary patent system, a long period had passed since the beginning of the 
discussions and different decision had already been taken by the Member Stares on this 
domain. 
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Chapter VI - Possible applications of Enhanced Cooperation according to 
EU law: a versatile mechanism 
 
1. The use of enhanced cooperation 
 
Enhanced cooperation, as foreseen in the Treaties, has in reality only been 
applied twice: in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation
685
 and in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection
686
, even if scholarship identifies 
similar forms of cooperation still before enhanced cooperation has been formally 
created
687
, such as Schengen
688
 or, even after its creation but that did not opted for its 
cooperation model as foreseen in the Treaties, like the Euro Group
689
. The fact is that a 
special form of cooperation, independently of the format or nomenclature chosen, has 
been on the verge to be used within the EU area, with a view to an ever closer Union. 
Although enhanced cooperation is a very clear mechanism with a specific legal 
basis and with procedures that have been well defined, the fact is that the EU is not 
always very accurate in using the concept
690
 in all of its documents. It should be 
assumed that the use of the expression enhanced cooperation necessarily reflects the 
meaning and scope adopted in the Treaties, but it reccurently is just the common use of 
the two words combined, without any specific legal or binding meaning or nature. It is 
sometimes confusing to assess the kind of cooperation EU is addressing in its policies, it 
could be reasonable to avoid using concepts that have their own definition according to 
the Treaties in different or imprecise contexts. By doing so, the enhanced cooperation 
formula as foreseen in the Treaties would acquire a higher status on the legal discourse.  
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It must be restated that enhanced cooperation is not a policy but just a 
mechanism or a legal instrument that allows an action to take place in a different 
framework to the general one. This distinction is fundamental. The non-use of enhanced 
cooperation may have found its false justification on the fact that no new policy was 
intended to be created. This is a mistake; suffice it to say that enhanced cooperation is 
applicable to all policies (except defence, for which there is a special form, the 
permanent structured cooperation
691
), but it is not in itself a policy, but just a 
mechanism with rules and a set of procedures for its implementation. 
Almost all policy areas are suitable for enhanced cooperation. Some examples 
will be identified, but many others could be added in the areas of immigration, 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid, internal market, social policy research, technological development, space, air-traffic 
market, energy, among others
692
. The goal here is just to present some examples that 
may attest the diversity permitted by enhanced cooperation, there is no intention of 
being exhaustive, especially because it is a hypothetical exercise and therefore further 
examples could be generously added
693
. 
 
2. The possible use regarding energy 
 
Jacques Delors has suggested the use of enhanced cooperation in the field of 
energy
694
. It should be a step to an energy community. It must, however, be recognised 
that there already exists an Energy Community which follows on EU steps, even if with 
some differences
695
. The possibility of enhanced cooperation as a means to achieve that 
bigger goal was presented as a legal alternative to the lack of integration and 
harmonisation in this domain. This option would allow States that want to move 
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forward in the energy domain to do it without putting into question the EU, the Member 
States or EU law for that matter. 
 The substantive and legally binding arguments put forward to justify the 
enhanced cooperation in the energy field are those mentioned in article 194 TFEU
696
, 
the novelty is the suggestion to recur to enhanced cooperation in order to make it 
effective, or to implement it. As energy is referred in article 4 TFEU as well, due to the 
fact that it is a shared competence
697
, it is not therefore excluded from the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation application, quite on the contrary
698
. 
 From the historical point of view, the community envisaged by Jacques Delors is 
a follow-up of Euratom and ECSC, but by being so, it also fulfils the mandatory criteria 
of enhanced cooperation and aligns the initiative with the main purposes of the Treaties 
as far as European integration and solidarity are concerned. 
 To ensure a common response to a common problem caused by the lack of 
capability to develop a real energy policy or to affirm its credibility and legitimacy
699
, a 
legal instrument is needed to ensure a possible implementation of a common energy 
policy, even if not common to all EU Member States, at least for those that would like 
to move ahead. Within the existing treaties, the best alternative is recognised to be the 
option offered by article 20 TEU on enhanced cooperation
700
. 
 Unlike official EU texts that tend to use indiscriminately enhanced cooperation, 
the proposal for an energy community, as presented by Notre Europe and Jacques 
Delors, clearly distinguishes enhanced cooperation from strengthened cooperation in a 
clear effort to separate a formal legal mechanism as foreseen in the treaties, from a 
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model of cooperation which may be stronger but it is not a full fledge legal 
instrument
701
.  
 This particular distinction is very significant once it translates the perfect notion 
that, for EU law, enhanced cooperation is an autonomous and clearly legal mechanism, 
with its scope and application ruled in and by the Treaties with a goal to answer the 
gradually larger diversity within EU, namely after the successive enlargements, and to 
promote integration 
 
3. The environment – a particular area for implementation of flexibility 
 
The number of legislation procedures pending in the environmental field is very 
high and the enhanced cooperation could be a way out of that impasse, especially 
because, so far, the solution that has been adopted has been the granting of exemptions 
of transition periods, often extended
702
, which means that differentiation has been 
adopted but in the negative form, while enhanced cooperation could be a positive form 
of differentiation, i.e., instead of not doing, States could do more
703
 if they want. 
If it is true that States that are not exempted are in reality already doing more 
than those ones, an enhanced cooperation mechanism could most probably incentivise 
all States to go further and faster and States would not need to necessarily participate in 
all enhanced cooperation regarding the different possible features. It is unthinkable, 
even if desirable, a single enhanced cooperation on all environmental issues. 
In the case of environmental policy the potential fields of application of 
enhanced cooperation are mostly product and process standards, as well as regulatory 
principles
704
. However, it should be borne in mind that although this field constitutes a 
possibility, it has to take into account the rules regarding the internal market like any 
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other enhanced cooperation. It also must be underline that the environment, in particular 
its protection, is a clear priority of EU
705
, as it is referred in the Preamble and in articles 
3, 21 TEU.  
Furthermore, the environment is recognised as a shared competence in article 4 
TEU
706
, thus a possible area for enhanced cooperation. These are two basic necessary 
elements, though not sufficient, for the adoption of enhanced cooperation. 
Environment protection is an horizontal clause to all EU policies (article 11 
TFEU), and what is at stake with the energy tax it is in reality the environment 
protection, even if it can be argued that somehow it could be included in the wording of 
article 194 TFEU on energy. The horizontal application of the environment 
preoccupation is also referred to in article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
There is though no doubt that the environment concern is an EU major goal. Because of 
its horizontal effect, we tend to consider that it also has direct applicability
707
. 
 
4. The energy tax 
 
An energy tax has been presented for years as a possible test case for enhanced 
cooperation, although the tax is intended to products, the fact is that it is in line with the 
logic of the regulatory process of the internal market and the legal regulatory process. 
The proposal dates back to 2000, but it keeps its relevance and opportunity. The energy 
tax is just one example of possible enhanced cooperation within the environmental 
framework. This is a particularly interesting initiative, taking into account that taxation 
has always been one of the areas where Member States have refused to give in their 
sovereignty, but the proposal dates back to the Nice Treaty times. 
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The combination of articles 114 and 191 TFUE should help to clarify up to what 
level can that kind of cooperation, and in particular the EU action as a whole or part of 
it, take place. It is first needed to establish the competence framework, as well as the 
area of application. Although article 191 TFEU speaks about harmonization, the fact is 
that article 114 TFEU excludes the fiscal provisions, and therefore the introduction of 
an energy tax veiled with an environment argumentation would have to be carefully 
weighted. 
However, it should be made clear there is a huge difference between 
harmonisation of national legislation and the creation of an EU law from the start
708
. In 
the case of the energy tax there would be no harmonisation – which is understood as the 
initiative to make compatible different legal orders – but only a common decision for a 
unique legal instrument, which taken to the limit could even be envisaged as a EU own 
resource. Article 114 TFEU only prohibits initiatives towards harmonisation, but not 
EU common initiatives to common policies especially when they are not intended to 
harmonise different regimes but to create a new single one. 
The fact that article 191 TFEU now includes the combat to climate change
709
 
may suggest that the idea raised beforehand on an energy tax could now be easily 
applied, but still respecting the intention to keep the question on an energy tax 
connected to environment and not to the energy field, taken as an economic sector. The 
tax is one, but not the only possible use of enhanced cooperation within the 
environmental arena
710
, from the protection of species to regulations on dams’ 
constructions, from energy efficiency to forestry; all are areas where enhanced 
cooperation could be envisaged.  
Contrary to what this option for differentiated integration procedures may 
suggest, that a two speed Europe might unwontedly be developed, it must be clearly 
reiterated that it is not at all evident that Member States participating in one enhanced 
cooperation form would inevitably participate in all of them
711
. This means that EU 
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integration speed would not be negatively affected, but instead just pushed forward 
from different sides
712
. 
 
5. Enhanced cooperation and technical rules 
 
With a view to a strategy that would replace the Lisbon Strategy, the Swedish 
Government in 2009 presented a specific proposal as far as technical rules are 
concerned with the aim to promote increased notification according to the Technical 
Barriers to Trade agreement, to facilitate early information on new regulations in this 
domain, to identify new sectors for EU harmonisation
713
 by using a new regulatory 
technique, to encourage the effort to increase the identity between European and 
international standards
714
. The ultimate goal is to increase openness and productivity in 
Europe
715
, and to promote better ruling for the internal market. 
The question of barriers to trade
716
 has been dealt with from the EC early days 
by the ECJ (by then Court of Justice of the European Communities)
717
. The prohibition 
of making use of charges equivalent to customs duties or equivalent measures to 
restriction to imports by imposing quantities restraints or technical barriers
718
 has been a 
constant in the EU history and States have made several attempts to circumvent this 
proscription. The enhanced cooperation could be a possibility to harmonize legislation 
between Member States, thus facilitating a further adoption of technical rules at EU 
level. The use of enhanced cooperation would start a process with a view to a larger 
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inclusion without depriving Member States of their competences to decide to proceed or 
not in that specific area. 
This proposal fulfils the criteria of article 20 TEU, once it does not deal with 
exclusive competences of the EU, but instead with shared competences, once it does not 
include competition rules. It refers to the internal market, as it is mentioned in article 4 
TFEU. The aim is not to define any competition rule or to interfere as far as that policy 
is concerned, but instead to contribute to strengthen harmonisation within the internal 
market. Moreover, the enhanced cooperation decisions may well be later adopted as 
general acquis by all Member States with the advantage of benefitting from a trial phase 
by some Member States. 
As far as enhanced cooperation is concerned, the approach of this proposal is 
somehow unusual. Although it does not seek to suggest a specific enhanced cooperation 
on the domain concern, as it is foreseen in the Treaties, the fact is that it eventually 
concludes that the EU approach to that specific subject-matter is in reality a higher level 
of cooperation
719
.  
The proposal by the Swedish Government refers to a domain where enhanced 
cooperation is virtually possible, without prejudging any specific area for its 
implementation, only quoting the aim of contributing for the development of the 
internal market. 
Moreover, it must be said, there is jurisprudence from the ECJ that limits the 
freedom of Member States as far as technical barriers to trade are concerned
720
 and the 
Treaties, although not mentioning technical barriers to trade as such, already include 
some limitations of the sort, in particular articles 34 to 36 and 114 TFEU. These 
limitations both defined by jurisprudence and included in the Treaties are intended to 
defend the realisation of the internal market
721
. The option for enhanced cooperation as 
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far as technical rules are concerned is already delimited by the Treaties, the acquis and 
the jurisprudence, so that it should not generate any sort of suspicion. 
The choice of technical rules can arguably be used to limit or to expand the 
market, but the goal of the EU and the enhanced cooperation is indeed to make it freer 
while adopting rules for the benefit of the consumer and the economy
722
. It is when a 
technical rule becomes a trade barrier that the enhanced cooperation cannot be adopted 
once it disrupts, or may disrupt, the internal market. 
 
6. Vocational education and training; recognition of diplomas – much 
more than common policies, the reaching of EU goals 
 
Although enhanced cooperation has been used in this domain, in reality it 
basically refers to a form of stronger cooperation, not necessarily deriving from the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism foreseen in the Treaties. The first goal is to reach a 
single framework for the transparency of qualifications and competences. It is a 
question of recognition of qualifications and not an attempt to harmonise the law on the 
qualifications, that is, although a foreign qualification may be recognised by another 
Member States, it does not mean that all Member State laws on qualifications must be 
similar, but the goal is to achieve a framework of understanding that may allow the EU 
citizens to use their own qualifications in another Member States, without having to 
repeat their training or education.  
This aspect is already confirmed by jurisprudence
723
 based in existing 
legislation, but the enhanced cooperation may help to define criteria and procedures that 
will eventually contribute for the freedom of movement and freedom of establishment 
of citizens namely by identifying the best ways to ease the process of diplomas 
recognition
724
. 
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The credit system adopted after Bologna - a system outside the EU framework - 
helps in this by creating a mathematic criterion without requiring a content or 
substantive definition; to apply this system to vocational training is of equal 
importance
725
. However, it must be underlined that Bologna rules were not intended for 
vocational training, but for academic studies, but they can easily be taken as an example 
to be applied for vocational training quailifications. 
Vocational training is addressed in the Treaties along with education, youth and 
sport. Regarding the definition of competences, the EU is given the possibility of 
adopting supporting actions (article 6, al. e) TFEU) in this domain according to the 
definition of such kind of action previously consecrated in the Treaties (article 2, n. 4 
TFEU)
726
.  
The specific legal basis for EU intervention as far as education and vocational 
training are concerned is articles 165 and 166 TFEU, which refer the use of the ordinary 
legislative procedure for the adoption of the recommendation, thus making it a legal 
act
727
, even if not binding
728
.  
Meanwhile, the Council has decided vocational training should be a domain for 
the application of the open method of coordination. Although a more intergovernmental 
method, it still shares with enhanced cooperation the flexibility and differentiation 
character. Despite the option by the Council, it seems clear that the preference for an 
enhanced cooperation model could be more effective, as it is ruled by the Treaties in a 
much defined way while the open method of coordination is not even part of the 
Treaties. Furthermore, enhanced cooperation is much closer to the community method – 
which we consider to be at the basis of the EU as a whole – than the open method of 
coordination. The use of the open method of coordination may eventually be an obstacle 
to the integration due to its intergovernmental characteristics. Although useful to 
overpass deadlocks in the decision process, it shades away from the EU main goals. It is 
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a differentiation method that intends to maintain the national interests above the EU 
interests. 
The instrument applied to vocational training and to the other areas concerned 
by articles 165 and 166 TFEU, although our concern here is with vocational training 
and education in particular, is often seen as a new form of governance or soft law 
instruments
729
. It is important to note that concerning vocational training other 
instruments like action programmes or declarations
730
 are also adopted, making the 
number of soft law more relevant and its effect even broader.  
The acts adopted are intended, as the Treaty refers, to incentive measures
731
 and 
not to harmonise. The adoption of an act by exercising a non-exclusive competence of 
the EU, and the fulfilment of the conditions for a enhanced cooperation, namely the 
ultima ratio character, the full respect for the internal market and the achievement of 
EU goals, it is admissible to consider enhanced cooperation as a possibility as far as 
vocational training and education are concerned.  
The question remaining is the binding nature of those instruments, and therefore 
their efficacy, as they do not assume the character of binding instruments as foreseen in 
article 288 TFEU. The binding nature could be ascertained by national legislations 
when applying the principles and recommendations approved at EU level. In this case 
harmonisation would not be considered, as the decision on the legal instrument would 
remain in the Member States, without any mandatory or binding rule by EU but only 
general guidance. 
 
7. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – different forms and procedures 
of enhanced cooperation 
 
Apart from already existing forms of cooperation that can be assimilated to 
enhance cooperation as far as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is concerned, 
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like Schengen and Prüm, the Treaties include other possibilities, but making, in those 
particular cases, enhanced cooperation an easier procedure. This is a very special case, 
as the Treaties impose from the start lighter procedures regarding enhanced cooperation 
in this field. We argue that this is in line with the advances in the communitarisation of 
this domain that has been facilitated by the end of the pillar structure of the Treaties. 
Those are the cases of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (articles 82, n.3, 
83, n.3 and 86, n.1 TFEU) and police cooperation (article 87, n.3 TFEU). The 
possibility of enhanced cooperation is established in the treaties, but nothing is said on 
which specific matters
732
 should it be used, only the general areas of possible 
intervention are referred to in the Treaties
733
. The enhanced cooperation foreseen in 
these articles does not change any obligation of the criteria established for enhanced 
cooperation, nor does it make them less important, it just reduces the number and the 
difficulties of some procedures. Another interesting aspect is that enhanced cooperation 
is introduced in these areas as an accelerator
734
, and not as a deviation from the 
integration process. 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is taken as a chapter of shared 
competences
735
 between Member States and the EU, and therefore clearly an area where 
enhanced cooperation can be exercised.  
It must be recalled that within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice there is 
already institutionalized differentiation due to the Protocols of United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Denmark. In those cases, differentiation has been granted from the start and 
recognized as the only chance to keep those Member States on board with the rest of 
EU, even if under different criteria. 
 
8. Fiscal and Monetary policies – how to overcome unanimity 
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8.1. Monetary policy 
 
The financial crisis started in 2008 and its ups and downs since then have forced 
EU to find ways to tackle the challenges posed to its financial and economic policies. 
Clearly, when the crisis started – and long afterwards – the EU has proven not to be 
prepared to face it efficiently. The Treaties’ provisions were not enough to address the 
problems
736
, although within the Treaties there could be found mechanisms to address 
the crisis
737
. The option for secondary legislation has been one alternative. 
An innovative reference to enhanced cooperation has been recovered in the 
negotiations and eventually in the text of the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
738
. In this case the enhanced 
cooperation has been referred to (Preamble and article 10) as a means to realize some of 
the aims of the Treaty as long as they do not jeopardize the internal market, as if this 
were the only requirement foreseen in the Treaties. A Treaty that is not a revision of the 
Treaties allows itself to refer to Treaties’ norms (a fact that contributed a lot for the 
refusal by the United Kingdom to sign it) for its implementation. Scholarship is divided 
on considering this acceptable or not
739
.  
However, the reference made in article 10 should be taken more as of political 
nature than of legal efficacy. It interesting to note that in its article 10, the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
reinforced the measures specific to the Euro States with measures that may be applied 
by enhanced cooperation. This is a way of allowing a smaller group within the Euro 
States
740
 to move forward on specific matters if there is a need to do so
741
. Enhanced 
cooperation is understood as a means for the adoption of secondary legislation. 
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Within the Treaty, not only enhanced cooperation is referred but also an “ever-
closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area”, which is basically the 
repetition of the TFEU and TEU idea of an ever closer Union, although restricted to a 
much defined area. Similarly, this preoccupation with an ever closer is clearly at the 
roots of the enhanced cooperation as well
742
. 
We sustain that it is a legally valid option, as the parties of this Treaty are the 
same as of the Treaties (except one, that did not oppose to it), and although it is a 
distinct instrument from the Treaties, it has been adopted within the EU framework (the 
Treaty was approved during an European Council meeting, even if from the formal 
point of view it cannot be called a Treaty). As for the recourse to the EU institutions, 
they are not given new tasks, but only an extension of those they already have and 
therefore they should be admissible as well. Moreover, to attribute new powers or 
competences to EU institutions by this Treaty would not be possible, as those are kept 
under the conferral principle stated in the Treaties. With the new Treaty, there is no 
breach of the law, as the respect for EU law is kept entirely. Moreover the ECJ has 
recognized that Member States may grant EU institutions competences regarding an 
action they decide to take jointly outside the treaties
743
.  This an old problem, that the 
ECJ has addressed in more than one occasion
744
 
Another controversial aspect of the new Treaty is the role of the Court of Justice 
once it must be clarified whether the new Treaty gives an extra jurisdiction to the Court 
which is not referred to in the Treaties. The ECJ itself has concluded in the past that this 
a possible legally valid situation, as long as the extra jurisdiction does not affect the 
core nature of the treaties
745
. It remains to be seen, however, how this will develop, 
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despite the arrangement fixed along with minutes of the signining of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
746
. 
Having said this, we shall note, however, that the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union is not an EU 
Treaty, as it does not address the same the other EU treaties do, and the parties are not 
the same, so it can’t replace any other existing Treaty, but it is only a new legal 
instrument for the parties which are simultaneously member of the Euro area and/or of 
the EU. 
Some authors
747
 argue that the Treaty goes beyond what EU can do, for instance, 
regarding Member States budgets, but the “Six Pack” had already launched the first 
rock. Moreover, article 16 of the new Treaty refers that it should be incorporated into 
the EU legal framework and not into the Treaties (the same had happened in the past 
with the Prüm Convention). 
In reality, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union might not have been needed if the Member States had decided to 
move forward just with an enhanced cooperation on the subject-matter of this Treaty
748
, 
but as it was a mechanism seldom used, its legal effectiveness was seen with suspicion 
and eventually that possibility did not proceed, nevertheless it was later included in the 
new Treaty. The aim of having all of the Member States as parties to the Treaty was 
from the beginning impossible due to the United Kingdom refusal, on the other hand the 
inclusive character of the enhanced cooperation could have left the door open for an 
ulterior decision, as the new Treaty also does (article 15). 
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The goal of the Treaty is to reinforce the economy, the finances and the politics 
in the EU. It reproduces and extends the EU Strategy 2020 goals and the Euro Plus Pact 
although the “Six Pack”749 had already been adopted beforehand. 
Nevertheless, from the formal point of view, the measures applicable to Euro 
area States, as foreseen in article 6, differentiate themselves by the possibility 
introduced in article 10 of enhanced cooperation. It could not be otherwise, once the 
non-Euro states, which have a blocking minority number of votes, might impede Euro 
states to adopt their own rules. Undoubtedly, this may be absurd, but politically and 
legally it had to be avoided. This is why the Treaty is intended to the entire EU and 
there is a clear differentiation regarding the Euro Member States. The adoption of 
secondary legislation according to the Treaties’ rules allow enhanced cooperation to be 
used  in specific circumstances, as referred in article 333 TFEU. Due to the fact that 
enhanced cooperation cannot affect the internal market, it sets the limits of intervention 
as far as rules and regulation affecting the market might be adopted
750
. 
 
8.2. Taxation  
 
Approximation of legislation within fiscal policy is a shared competence and 
therefore a possible area for enhanced cooperation
751
.  
As taxation is concerned, one very specific case is the financial transaction tax. 
Despite the fact that some States already have such a tax in their domestic legal orders, 
the fact is that the effectiveness of that tax could be of much greater importance if it 
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were considered at EU level. Many States refuse and refused to do so, or the tax 
decision must be a unanimous one. Eleven States (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, ,Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia) have said that they 
would agree with such a tax, and 9 is the minimum required number for an enhanced 
cooperation. The financial transaction tax is very warmly supported by the 
Commission
752
 (probably because it can eventually mean extra own resources for the 
EU budget) and after its adoption in the Council, the process will follow with the 
adoption of the needed legal instruments. The process for this enhanced cooperation 
was starting by the end of November 2012, it is expected to be concluded during the 
first semester of 2013. 
The enhanced cooperation regarding this tax may cause its inneficacy as it is 
extremely possible that companies will use different sort of “finance engeneering” to 
escape the tax, namely by playing with the residence definition
753
, or worst, it could be 
applied by two Member States  simultaneously, thus making the tax of 0,2% and not 
0,1% as proposed by the Commission
754
 (some States will even have higher taxes, 
Portugal should fix it at 0,3%). 
Some Member States, like UK, argue that a stamp tax, which already exists in 
Britain, may be a better option. Other States, like Ireland, consider that they cannot 
afford to impose a tax that may drive investors out of its market. 
Another area where enhanced cooperation has been suggested as far as taxation 
is concerned has to do with a common consolidated corporate tax
755
; the question is to 
know if harmonization will be included and if so how
756
. Some authors basically argue 
on the advantages of harmonization
757
, but it is not crystal clear that harmonization on 
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taxation is possible from the legal point of view, not to mention the opposition by 
Member States to follow that path. 
However, the proposal includes other elements that may be autonomously 
treated and then be used within an enhanced cooperation mechanism. The idea of a 
single formula for corporate tax clearly may serve competition and the internal market, 
but is not necessarily the best option for the Member States. The problem of the 
apportionment factors (namely consumption, production, services, and goods among 
others) may change the framework of the enhanced cooperation and may replace the 
question of harmonization
758
.  
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Chapter VII - The notion and uses of enhanced cooperation concept in 
international law 
 
1. Enhanced cooperation as a legal concept 
 
The goal of this chapter is to refer some examples and different uses of the 
concept of enhanced cooperation in international law, without having the intention of 
being comprehensive; it also intends to point out some of the characteristics of the 
concept developed by EU in different contexts. 
Enhanced cooperation is an entity that when used in EU law it dances alone 
while in international law ir is mostly a duet composed by independent partners and 
therefore they can be easily separated. In EU law no separation is possible. Having said 
so, this does not mean that EU always uses enhanced cooperation in that legally binding 
sense
759
, as in some cases it does not do more than all the others international 
organisations and refers to it as the usual combination of just a noun and an adjective or 
modifier. 
The notion of enhanced cooperation is not unknown to international law and to 
political science. However, only the European Union has fully developed it as a legal 
concept
760
, even if there are other rather similar situations in international organizations 
and elsewhere. In most of the cases enhanced cooperation is used as a noun 
(cooperation) with an added modifier (enhanced) with no specific legal meaning. It is 
not unusual that the modifier is replaced by other modifiers referring to the same idea, 
some of them being “closer” or “greater”761. Even the EU started by using closer, but 
eventually opted to clearly distinguish, formalize and institutionalise the concept and, in 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the preoccupation to clearly legally define the concept led to the 
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creation of another one (structured cooperation), which is a deviation of enhanced 
cooperation, but it cannot be called as such, once not all of its features are the same.  
Despite the recurrent use given to enhanced cooperation the fact is that it is 
mostly a discursive artifice without intending by itself to be an autonomous concept or 
to be any sort of notion comprising defined attributes or qualities, and even less to any 
sort of normatitivity in itself. Moreover, enhanced cooperation used elsewhere than 
within the European Union lacks a fundamental element to make it a legal concept that 
is its compliance nature
762
. Nowhere but in EU law is enhanced cooperation mechanism 
fully defined regarding the rules of its implementation, its decision procedures or the 
control of its compliance.  
Not only in international law, but also in domestic law enhanced cooperation is 
often used, but again not meaning more than just a kind of improved cooperation, and 
not with a view to consider it a full legally autonomous concept
763
.  
While in EU law enhanced cooperation is a procedural legal mechanism, in other 
International Organizations it is basically a means of a process, again by only using the 
cooperation concept and its modifier enhanced as such, without any legal provision 
beneath or behind it
764
. However, in some cases there is a preoccupation on the use of 
enhanced cooperation (or some other expression that may refer to the same idea) so that 
the rules of its application are sufficiently defined. However, for these cases the 
normativity of enhanced cooperation is not fully achieved, only EU includes it in its 
primary law, while the others use it on a case by case, even if with some common 
elements. 
There is no aprioristic opposition on using enhanced cooperation in any domain 
(except in EU for defence matters), but the more technical is the domain, the easiest it is 
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to find the concept cooperation added by enhanced once this enhancement is normally 
defined in concrete terms
765
, usually more to impose limits on that enhancement. In 
international law, the economical arena is particularly fertile in uses of enhanced 
cooperation, but as for an abstract utilisable mechanism, solidly legally defined, like in 
EU law, the examples are very few and none is as fully developed as in EU law, in 
particular none gives it the necessary legal normativity
766
. Some organisations develop 
some of its characteristics and refer to the EU notion as a possible endeavour to follow 
(that is the case of ASEAN or APEC), although there is not always a direct reference to 
the origin of the EU concept as a legal entity (most probably for political reasons). 
 
2. Different uses of enhanced cooperation in international organisations 
and international law 
 
 It would be impossible to list all enhanced cooperation forms developed in 
the world or even in the different international organisations. However, a few examples 
have been chosen to illustrate some of the possible and diverse uses of the concept. In 
some cases some of the features that EU law has developed are already present, in other 
cases there is no intention to do so. The presentation that follows intends to reflect the 
versatility of the concept and its possible differentiated uses and applications. Like the 
EU model, it generally allows other participants to accede at a later phase. 
 Apart from the multiple cases where enhanced cooperation is used in UN 
documents in the sense previously referred, that is a composed noun, there are, 
nevertheless, occasions where some differences of approach may be identified, mostly 
in the sense of enlarging its scope and by doing so ensuring a more defined framework 
for its understanding and use. In some cases some of the attributes of the enhanced 
cooperation as the EU defines it are included in those uses. 
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2.1. The case of the United Nations organs  
 
 The UN General Assembly has used enhanced cooperation in several occasions, 
one of them being to refer to the cooperation between all relevant partners, in particular 
in the private sector. It is difficult to identify any specificity on that kind of enhanced 
cooperation when compared to any more developed cooperation, but which is not 
institutionally laid down. Moreover the reports by the Secretary General have hardly 
any mention to enhanced cooperation as such, besides the one in the title
767
.  
 However there is one particular reference that reflects, even if not in a very 
expressive way, the aim of enhanced cooperation to be an open system thus allowing 
more coherence in its action
768
. The idea is that the enhanced cooperation between UN 
and the private sector should not be restrained to the partners mentioned in the 
documents and instead be opened to future relations with other partners. 
The concept of enhanced cooperation in UN discussions is used mostly as a 
political notion and not as an individualized legal concept as the EU has defined it, even 
if some of the elements that have been developed by EU have occasionally been 
identified or considered to be necessary for a set up of a given form of cooperation. 
However, it must be recognised that, in general terms, enhanced cooperation is typically 
just used as a composed binomium of two independent words juxtaposed with their 
ordinary meaning and without intending to develop a new concept. 
 
 2.1.1. The General Assembly 
 
a) The internet case 
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The internet – mostly after the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), 
following a recommendation of the UN Secretary General
769
 and in line with the Tunis 
Agenda of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005
770
 – has been 
one area where the term enhanced cooperation has been very consistently used. The IGF 
not only creates the conditions for enhanced cooperation to take place, but it is itself an 
enhanced cooperation example. It is a flexible and adaptive
771
 mechanism, both 
characteristics of enhanced cooperation according to EU rules.  
In this context enhanced cooperation assumes some features of an integration 
process, as it intends to make all States equal in the discussions and, at the same time, 
allowing all organisations, including NGOs, to intervene in the discussion and 
deliberative processes. Even though, there has been critics on the limited role of civil 
society, and some authors consider that enhanced cooperation should be more 
comprehensive
772
. 
A distinction in “doing” enhanced cooperation and “discussing” enhanced 
cooperation has been identified
773
, meaning that the actors who may discuss it and those 
who are responsible for its implementation are not necessarily the same. These two 
types of enhanced cooperation is an originality of IGF, but in reality it reflects the fact 
that we are dealing within the UN framework where States (and potentially international 
organisations) are the executive actors, which means two different legal orders: the 
international and the domestic, are always at stake. IGF and its enhanced cooperation 
were in reality created by WSIS with the aim to meet the identified challenges resulting 
from a policy vacuum in the area of internet policies.  
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Enhanced cooperation in this context is thus a platform to act, once there is no 
other forum where cooperation on internet matters can take place, despite the works of 
the International Telecommunication Union, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization or the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation. It 
especially allows all the different actors to participate in equal footing. Some authors 
argue that the goals of EU enhanced cooperation and the enhanced cooperation as used 
by WSIS and IGF differ, in the context of internet governance the idea is to create a 
common forum for discussion and decision on basic and fundamental principles
774
 
defined by enhanced cooperation, while in EU the main purpose of enhanced 
cooperation is integration, based on basic and fundamental principles previously agreed, 
that is, in EU enhanced cooperation is a more active process than an essential procedure 
with a view to define a framework of action. 
It is relevant to note that although WSIS and IGF use the concept of enhanced 
cooperation, in reality they do not provide a concrete definition of it
775
. There is only 
one exception of area of intervention which is referred in the Tunis agenda from the 
very beginning, as it excludes “the day-to-day technical and operational matters that do 
not have an impact on international public policy issues”776 from enhanced cooperation. 
The lack of a concrete definition has raised some criticism. 
Remarkably, even without defining enhanced cooperation, there is a decision to 
follow such path. Some States, like Egypt, have strongly criticised this option, 
nevertheless there is recognition of some of its characteristics which the EU also applies 
to its definition, i.e., the fact that enhanced cooperation refers to a process initialized by 
a small group which may be extended to more partners or that the decisions taken may 
be applied by parties that did not participate in the starting group of the process. In the 
WSIS and IGF context there is always the view of enhanced cooperation as a process 
which ultimately should be globally inclusive, an idea that is not strange to EU’s 
definition as well. 
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b) The Rio Conventions 
 
A different way to refer to enhanced cooperation has been found within the 
context of the Rio Conventions
777
 (the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)). Here the concept is 
used only to refer to the cooperation regarding the implementation of legal texts, but in 
reality it also refers to the cooperation that may be developed just by combining 
different means of action referred simultaneously in more than one Convention
778
. 
It is a different use of the concept, where a very specific area and very specific 
purposes are considered. The EU, however, and within the context of the Rio 
Conventions, identifies areas where enhanced cooperation is possible, but by doing so it 
does not imports its own definition of enhanced cooperation, but considers the concept 
as all other partners do. The identified areas for enhanced cooperation by the EU are:  
i) Identification of common areas of reporting, including overlaps of 
information and data;  
ii) Encouragement of the use of common terms and definitions; 
iii) Facilitation of coordinated reporting to the three Conventions at the 
national level.  
 
2.1.2. The Security Council 
 
The UN Security Council has used enhanced cooperation as well in its 
deliberations, but it did not assume any kind of institutionalization of the process. It has 
been used either by Presidents of the UNSC, by the UNSC as a whole or by members of 
the UNSC, but always in the more simple way, that is by considering the enhancement 
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or development of the cooperation
779
 but without conferring it any sort of special or 
specific normativity. 
 
2.1.3. The General Secretariat 
 
The idea of One-UN, where several UN agencies work under the same umbrella, 
though reducing costs and developing synergies among them, could also be a stage for 
enhanced cooperation, but no concrete example has been identified. For this to happen a 
better regulatory system would have to be adopted, once relations have been settled 
bilaterally between organizations and not by all of the participating organizations at the 
same time
780
. The pilot States chosen for this intiative were Albania, Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam. Although the 
purpose of the Deliver as One intitiative intends mainly to enhance cohesion by 
reducing burocratic procedures, the fact is that with enhanced cooperation this project 
could easily be more efficient, and by adopting this type of cooperation it would not be 
violating the four principles of the program: One Leader, one budget, one programme, 
one office. 
 
2.2. The specialized agencies of the United Nations and Organizations  
 
2.2.1. UNCTAD and UNDP 
 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) uses the 
term enhanced cooperation often, but just with the sense of a more developed 
cooperation, not including any sort of institutionalization in its use. Unlike other 
examples, and because of the aim of this organization, enhanced cooperation is 
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commonly regionally limited to an area, in particular to South-South cooperation
781
, 
something also considered by other organisations like UNDP
782
.  
There has been a suggestion within the UNCTAD framework to use enhanced 
cooperation - in the sense of a more developed cooperation - to establish regional bond 
markets
783
 to help solving the financial crisis. The example comes from the Chiang Mai 
initiative used in the past for the Asian markets (but in that case, in the context of 
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The use of regional banks may 
prove to be an effective means to achieve enhanced cooperation concerning bond 
markets. 
 
2.2.2. IAEA 
 
Many States argue upon their enhanced cooperation with the IAEA as a sign of 
good will and as a justification for their opposition to some of the IAEA decisions, by 
doing so they basically refer only to a supplementary effort of their cooperation, which 
in most of the cases is nothing more than just the implementation of the safeguards 
agreement and/or the additional protocol. The figure of an institutionalised process of 
enhanced cooperation distinct from a normal cooperation process is absent in IAEA 
formulations, rules and procedures. 
 There are agreements between States and the IAEA that refer to enhanced forms 
of cooperation on specific areas, but no specific mechanism or procedure results from 
the use of the concept “enhanced cooperation”784 , even if some of the traces of the EU 
concept can be identified, for instance, there is a reference to the fact that enhanced 
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cooperation is a starting point with a small group, but that small group is not the end in 
itself. 
 
2.2.3. CTBT 
 
In the case of CTBT, some uses of the enhanced cooperation concept can also be 
found. To start with in the sense the UNGA uses the concept, when it refers to the 
cooperation with the United Nations and its programs, funds and specialized agencies. 
The agreement between CTBTO and UN clearly states that example of advanced 
cooperation but without defining any special form of its implementation and scope of 
such concept
785
. Another example of enhanced cooperation mentioned in CTBTO 
documents refers to the cooperation with the scientific community
786
 and in particular 
with WMO regarding Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) since 2003. Despite the 
attempts to find other specific areas where the concept enhanced cooperation could be 
found within the CTBT context, apart from sporadic references, no other specific areas 
were identified, especially as far as ratification, accession or entry into force procedures 
are concerned. 
One recent example of the use of enhanced cooperation within CTBT framework 
was mentioned in the sppech of the Executive Secretary in Astana
787
, but again it was 
only used as a vague notion and not as a legal one. However, it has the merit to be 
applied to non-proliferation and disarmament. 
 
2.3. OPCW 
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The concept of enhanced cooperation has been present in the works and 
speeches of OPCW. However, and once again, it is basically used as a combination of a 
noun and and adjective and not as a legal mechanism. OPCW does not provide any 
special conditions or characteristics for this use. However, at least in one case, it is 
interesting to note that it speaks of enhanced cooperation among Member States with a 
specific purpose: the enforcement of the Convention’s prohibitions788. Not only the 
Director General of OPCW refers to enhanced cooperation, but differente instances of 
the organisation use it, even if with the usual limited approach
789
. 
 
2.4. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
 
The EU enhanced cooperation model of integration has generated similar views 
in other integration organizations. Due to the fact that ASEAN acts basically as an 
economic integration organization (although the purpose of its creation was a political 
one, and despite that an ASEAN Economic Community is only foreseen for 2020
790
), as 
EU was at its beginning, it is not unsurprising to recognize in the ASEAN process some 
similarities with the EU process
791
. From the institutional point of view, the ASEAN 
does not require the transfer of national sovereignty
792
, thus being different from the 
EU, and that includes the differences in using the enhanced cooperation mechanism in 
its policy.  
The flexible mechanism of integration within ASEAN was formerly suggested 
by the Thai Prime Minister in 1998 and was called “enhanced interaction”. It differs 
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from the formal way in which ASEAN used to act and cooperate. The new proposal 
allowed some flexibility to be used, but clearly set some boundaries by imposing the 
full respect of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs
793
 of its members. 
Although at a first stage this kind of openness and flexibility was kept intramural
794
, the 
fact is that it evolved and today it may include partners outside ASEAN, the difference 
is that it was created as a political means, while the use that is given to it in this broad 
manner is mainly for economic purposes. 
The enhanced interaction has different shapes, like the ASEAN minus X or the 
co-shepherd mechanism (which includes two States only or two States that conduct 
together the process), and it is intended to deepen cooperation without any sovereignty 
transfer to the organization. The institutionalization of the enhanced interaction is not 
intended to take place as fully as the EU enhanced cooperation does
795
.  
Although the Bangkok Declaration
796
 that launched ASEAN intended first to be 
a political framework, it would eventually evolved to an economically strong 
organization, where indeed new cooperation forms have been attempted. 
Flexibility is today understood within ASEAN as a fundamental means to 
integration
797
, even if the idea is not clearly stated – because of political constraint – , 
but it will hardly be institutionalized in a legal text  as it might require some sovereignty 
                                                                
793
 Despite that some authors prefer to refer to the principle of non intervention, according to the Friendly 
Relations Declaration (UN General Assembly, 1970), the principle at stake is defined as “No State or 
group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
elements are in violation of international law”. Therefore, the intervention is just one of the forms of 
interference, while in ASEAN the idea is to bar them all. 
794
 Haacke, Jürgen, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: 
Intramural Challenges to the “ASEAN Way””, The Pacific Review, vol.12, n. 4, 1999:p. 581–611. 
795
 “A much less intrusive principle than flexible engagement, enhanced interaction reflected an uneasy 
truce between the reformists and the conservatives. The principle of non-interference remained the norm 
for the region, but states could voice their concerns over developments in one country that could affect 
them or the whole region. Adopting an optimistic perspective, enhanced interaction illustrates the debates 
taking place within the organization and reflects a step taken in the right direction. It is an expression of 
the changes, albeit incremental and evolutionary, taking place in the ASEAN Way and hence the way 
ASEAN engages in regional security cooperation to manage new security challenges”, Loke, Beverly, 
“The “ASEAN Way”: towards regional order and security cooperation?”, Melbourne Journal of Politics, 
vol.30, 2005: p. 10. 
796
 The constitutive instrument of an international organization does not have to forcefully be a treaty. 
Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: p. 1303-
1304; International Court of Justice, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in armed conflict, 
Advisory Opinions, I.C.J. Reports, 1996: p. 75. 
797
 Tong, Goh Chok, “Deepening regional integration and co-operation”, WEF East Asia Economic 
Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 08.10.2002: p. 3. 
241 
 
transfer - an anathema in ASEAN context - to the regulatory body of the enhanced 
interaction.  
The recourse to a concept starting with inter reflects the ASEAN view of 
intergovernmentality and not of community, after all, for now, it is only an association, 
even if there is an intention to transform it into a community
798
. 
ASEAN works closely with other institutions to develop its own model of 
enhanced cooperation at economic level. One of the partners that is very present in this 
implementation is the ADB (Asian Development Bank). The ADB raises extra 
questions on the flexibility promoted by ASEAN. It speaks of horizontal and vertical 
integration to identify different relations between partners within ASEAN itself. In 
technical terms, the ADB is used to facilitate the cross-border collaboration among 
partners, namely regarding capital markets
799
. The programs adopted by ADB and 
ASEAN to enhance cooperation in some areas have proven to force the Members of 
ASEAN to adopt legislation and regulations to facilitate such cooperation, as for ADB 
there is a need of some harmonization to enhance cooperation as far as capital and 
equity markets are concerned. The harmonization does not, however, answer any Treaty 
principles, but it is just the result of the need to cooperate, there is no legal obligation of 
such harmonization, but it is a consequence of the cooperation and not a preceding 
requirement. The goal is just to make the enhanced cooperation more efficient. 
Flexibility in ASEAN exists, but it is much more restrained when compared to 
EU different forms of flexibility. As for the implementation of the enhanced interaction, 
when compared with enhanced cooperation, the difference is quite significant. In the 
case of the EU model, the mechanism has been defined in the Treaty and its rules may 
be applied to a specific case as a last resort mechanism; in the case of ASEAN, a project 
is constructed from the beginning as an enhanced interaction act and it is not a last 
resort mechanism, but a choice of the partners. The ASEAN mechanism is open to all 
members of the organization, but it excludes at least one from the very beginning and 
that one will always be excluded, thus the integrative character of the ASEAN 
mechanism blocks the possibility of being applied to all ASEAN Members. 
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One special characteristic of the flexibility modes within ASEAN is that they 
were first thought as a mechanism by which the Member States could decide to exclude 
another Member State due to political reasons. This is a huge difference with the EU 
enhanced cooperation, as in EU enhanced cooperation it is not intended to exclude any 
partner, but to allow those who want to cooperate to move ahead, while in ASEAN the 
excluded Member cannot participate.  
Some authors consider that the flexibility applied by ASEAN may be a violation 
of the “ASEAN Way”, intended to be strictly respectful of the principle of non-
interference
800
. On the other hand, it is only because some flexibility is possible that 
ASEAN may develop programs and projects with China, Japan and Korea (the formula 
ASEAN+3) and especially in the economic area this cooperation ensures a much more 
effectiveness to the aims of such programs and projects, like the local currency-
denominated bond markets, where ADB has a major role. 
 
2.5. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 
 
The limitation of action imposed by the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs is also identifiable in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
801
. 
The areas of cooperation are clearly identified, as well as the means and forms of such 
cooperation, being the form of enhanced cooperation developed in SAARC less 
developed than in ASEAN and basically applied to the economic arena
802
. 
 
2.6. APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 
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The APEC created a mechanism which in many ways is similar to EU enhanced 
cooperation, in particular for its openness
803
 – a clear contrast with the ASEAN model 
– as the cooperation may start even if not all Members of APEC are ready or interested 
to follow it but they can all join at a later stage. The process has the name of 
pathfinder initiative. APEC promotes the pathfinder among its Members in order to 
enlarge the participation of partners in a common interest. 
The concept of pathfinder was introduced in 2001
804
. According to the 
pathfinder initiative, the elaboration of the projects must respect the interest of all 
parties and cannot be in prejudice of any of the APEC members. There is a solidarity 
value in the institutionalisation of the mechanism of the pathfinder initiative that 
recalls the EU enhanced cooperation
805
.  
Unlike ASEAN or SAARC, the integration in APEC has, however, been much 
weaker, forcing a voluntary multilateralism, like the pathfinder initiative. It is 
important to note that it is not with the aim of integration that the pathfinder has been 
used, but as the only possibility to cooperate, as the integration level within APEC is 
very low
806
, once, as the APEC defines itself, the organisation decisions are non-
binding
807
. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that APEC is indeed an integration 
organisation
808
, even if not very deep, its framework is much more comprehensive 
between partners than a simple formal cooperation relation between private investors, 
traders or businesses.  
Like the EU enhanced cooperation which has as ultimate goals the development 
of the EU goals, the APEC pathfinder initiative has always in the horizon and at its 
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basis the Bogor declaration
809
 that created APEC. Unlike EU enhanced cooperation, 
the pathfinder initiative was quickly adopted and implemented in different areas
810
.  
From the institutional side, both the EU and APEC have opted for a single 
structure, i.e., keeping the institutional framework that existed in each of the 
organisations and not duplicating or creating new structures, services or institutions. In 
the definition of the pathfinder initiative, and unlike EU’s enhanced cooperation, 
APEC has chosen to establish a very loose framework, which eventually may be, if 
needed, more complex. One of the problems in APEC is its rigidity of the rules of 
decision which only allow consensus decisions; it is not excluded that it might in the 
future be overcome by the formula ASEAN+3 due to this rule of decision which 
impeded flexibility and by doing so contradicts the initiative. 
 
2.7. Regional Economic Communities (REC) 
 
In Africa, the option for REC is clearly defined by the African Union. At this 
moment there are eight REC: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA);  Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC). The Regional Economic Communities are used by the African 
Union to facilitate the development in Africa and one of the goals of the African Union 
is to enhance cooperation between REC, either between two of them or several ones
811
 
at the same time. 
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By doing so, a legal and regulatory harmonization is considered in order to 
achieve those goals. These purposes are similar to those stated by former South-African 
President Thabo Mbeki when he spoke of African Renaissance
812
:  
i) Establishing institutions and procedures, which enable Africa to 
collectively deal with challenges of democracy, peace and stability;   
ii) Achieving sustainable economic development, that results in the 
continuous improvement of the standards of living and the quality of life 
of the masses of the people; 
iii) Qalitatively changing Africa’s place in the world economy, freeing it 
from its international debt burden, and transforming it from being a 
supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods. 
REC exist elsewhere, inter alia, in Latin America (Mercosur, Andean Pact), or 
North America (NAFTA). One of the major areas where enhanced cooperation may be 
well developed is the competition framework
813
. This does not mean that it has to be 
strictly  in EU terms
814
. 
 
2.8. WTO (World Trade Organisation) 
 
Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.  
How often have we heard this in multilateral negotiations is impossible to say? 
Only one organisation has made it its own motto and created a concept that impedes 
any flexibility or any kind of differentiated integration. Negotiations in WTO proceed 
concurrently and not consecutively and all negotiators must agree to everything. This 
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is the so-called Single Undertaking
815
. Unlike other organisations, in reality most of 
them, in WTO the EU mechanism or even a lighter form of enhanced cooperation is 
impossible. 
It must be said that there has been a huge difference from GATT times to WTO 
rules. The plurilateral Codes adopted in the GATT and by the end of Tokyo Round 
could be taken like a EU form of variable geometry, but the single undertaking 
principle put an end to that flexibility. Critics have reiterated that the conclusion of an 
agreement is not a synonym of its efficiency and implementation
816
 and question the 
single undertaking obsession in WTO for considering it more of an obstacle than of 
help in negotiations. 
As it is assumed these days in WTO, the single undertaking is not at all flexible 
and does not allow differentiated processes among negotiators
817
. 
On the other hand, the WTO allows the celebration of Preferential Trade 
Agreements which introduce asymmetric integration among WTO members. However 
a parenthesis should be made here to clarify the difference between this approach and 
the EU one. While PTAs are used to implement preferential relations, they do not 
create new legal procedures or scope of intervention. In enhanced cooperation, 
Member States opt for creating new rules on specific areas and not just to establish 
“special” relations between them818.  
 
2.9. Some other examples of enhanced cooperation 
 
The number of examples of enhanced cooperation in the simplest sense of the 
concept is countless worldwide. However, it must be referred that the concept is not a 
EU ownership, even if as an institutional mechanism it is. The EU was the first 
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international organisation to use it as a legal norm and it has developed it much more 
than any other of the international organisations. The use of the concept can also be 
found in domestic public policies, in bilateral relations, in the most diverse areas, from 
economic to education, from nuclear energy to finances, among many others. 
Moreover, there is sometimes the use within EU of enhanced cooperation to refer to a 
form of deeper cooperation without intending to recur to the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism as it is defined in the Treaties. That is the case, for instance of vocational 
education and training
819
 or the enhanced cooperation areas foreseen by the EU-
Morocco Association Council for its development and granting of a statut avancé to 
Morocco. 
Enhanced cooperation is sometimes taken as a procedural way of acting, but also 
as a value that should preside a given action in order to fulfil the program that is 
intended to be covered, one example of such posture is the identification of enhanced 
cooperation in York County’s school districts, in the USA820. In this case the problem 
of sovereign transfer is very well dealt with and it is not put into question
821
. 
In times of financial crisis and regulatory requirements and suspicions, it is not 
surprising that enhanced cooperation – meaning a deep involvement of the parties in 
order to reach a common level of preparedness to act – is sometimes evoked as a 
possible way to move forward, and in some cases the form chosen for that enhanced 
cooperation includes a clear definition of its purposes, its limits and the issues of the 
relations between partners, and it may go even further and define some of the policies 
involved
822
. 
The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) States have agreed 
among themselves on a tougher form of cooperation to be developed in order to 
overcome the dependence of their economies on the American Dollar. This 
cooperation will be extended to investment, trade and economic relations, but there is 
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no legal framework already adopted or any project of institutionalized form of 
cooperation, but in the negotiations this is a subject that has been pointed out with a 
view to a definition of concrete measures. It seems that, without an institutionalized 
framework, the goals can hardly be achieved. 
 Brazil and Argentina have a deep cooperation regarding nuclear energy in 
several domains, not only for medical purposes, but also for the construction of 
centrals. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the former President of Brazil Lula 
da Silva and the Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner have agreed in November 
2011 to intensify such cooperation and used the need of energy by the Mercosul as an 
extra reason for their cooperation. The fact is that it generated similar initiatives, even 
if only at an emergent stage, between Chile and Venezuela. The cooperation within 
Mercosur has so far not developed any mechanism like EU enhanced cooperation, but 
there are many references to enhanced cooperation between EU and Mercosur. The 
reason is the stage of the integrative process in Mercosur
823
. 
There is a full enhanced cooperation program between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia
824
. It is a very comprehensive program with full definition of actors, projects, 
goals and means for its implementation. It is interesting to note that, although this is a 
program between two partners which have a clear view on what is enhanced 
cooperation. It is presented as a form of cooperation that should be understood outside 
the more comprehensive development budget program
825
 that exists between the two 
States and which has been understood not to be as flexible as needed. The option to 
add an enhanced cooperation program was due to the need to make some of its 
elements more flexible, both in terms of calendar and of use of resources. But the need 
of an efficient management structure is presented as of utmost importance
826
. 
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The USA and Canada built up an enhanced cooperation program as far as 
defence is concerned
827
, but the use of the concept of enhanced cooperation is too little 
developed. The word enhanced is basically a modifier with no specific legal meaning. 
However, and although it is a strictly bilateral program, there are signs of a certain 
openness of that cooperation when it refers to the “enhanced coordination with 
NATO”, as if it could be open as long as it can be enhanced. 
The concept is also used in the relations between States and organisations, that 
is, for instance, the case of the Memorandum of Understanding between China and 
UNDP
828
 where strengthened cooperation is considered, or between India and the 
African Union
829
. 
The enhanced cooperation idea has also been used as a theoretical form of action 
without necessarily being connected to any regional area or State. One of examples 
that have been identified referred to the possible means to help solving some 
difficulties in the litigation area. The subject is complex and goes beyond the aim of 
this study, but a reference, especially for the new approach to the concept, should be 
made here
830
. 
Many more examples could be quoted here, but the intention was just to 
illustrate the diversity of the uses of the enhanced cooperation concept, and not to be 
irrealisticly exhaustive. 
 
3. Major elements of EU enhanced cooperation mostly commonly accepted 
in international law 
 
Following upon the examples quoted, one element seems to be clear: the more 
integrative process, the more complete the enhanced cooperation may be. This may be a 
truism but in reality it would be possible to argue – as many in EU have done, and still 
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do – that enhanced cooperation differentiates more than integrates. But enhanced 
cooperation should be understood – special at EU level – as a mechanism directed 
towards integration, by allowing successive participations. 
The open character of the enhanced cooperation is reiterated in different 
formulas that have opted by using this procedure. This openness is a fundamental aspect 
to ensure the integrative character. The obstacles that in some cases are found regarding 
this open character (in particularly ASEAN) are less and less and a change has been 
identified towards a more flexible unity, bearing in mind that the idea of unity is always 
retained. 
The question of openness must be carefully looked into. Although in the EU, the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism is open to all Member States at any stage of the 
process; it is not open when it comes to leave the enhanced cooperation. According to 
the Treaty there is no provision allowing it, nor impeding it, but if it is not mentioned, 
then it should not be inferred
831
. As to other forms of enhanced cooperation there is not 
any specific detail on this matter, but, on the other hand, none of the other forms is so 
legally binding. 
The delimitation of the matter of the enhanced cooperation also contributes to its 
implementation, once its deeper definition allows a legal framework to be applied in a 
more consistent way and it also may force some legal and regulatory harmonisation 
between the different partners, as it is often understood that with a similar legal 
framework it is easier to implement the enhanced cooperation and to accomplish the 
goals it was set for. 
An aspect that the EU developed in a much larger scale is the institutionalisation 
of the enhanced cooperation, although not doubling existent institutions or creating new 
ones. This option for not creating new and more institutions is also a concern for 
different agents in different scenarios. Institutionalising comprehends all decisions 
tending to establish a regulatory and legal framework of procedures that fix the limits of 
the enhanced cooperation. The limits of the enhanced cooperation are of major 
importance once they also define the capacity and scope to act or react by partners. 
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One feature which is very important for EU – that is, the enhanced cooperation 
must be a last resort mechanism – is not necessarily echoed in other enhanced 
cooperation initiatives. In the case of APEC, for instance, in reality it is the opposite; 
the enhanced cooperation (the pathfinder initiative) is triggered as a challenge to 
partners and not as a result of failed negotiations. 
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Chapter VIII - Proposal to overcome the entry into force impasse of CTBT 
 
1. Comparative law832 
 
In order to attempt a comparative law exercise, as it is intended here, a 
methodological work should be developed beforehand in order to better define the path 
that is intended to be followed. As we speak of comparative law, it seems, however, 
very restrictive to identify ourselves with a single school of thought, as we shall see we 
share different elements of different schools. Moreover, the literature, as far as the 
method is concerned, is abundant and there is no intention here to theoretically 
speculate about it, but instead to use the elements that have been largely identified by 
scholarship and that may be useful for this research. Besides the method to be 
applied
833
, the question of the concepts must necessarily be taken into account as 
well
834
. 
The stalemate of the entry into force of CTBT is a result mostly due to its own 
limitative rules, nevertheless, and unlike the article XIV conferences have been doing; it 
is still possible to address new forms to implement the treaty before its entry into force.  
Two proposals have been made (vd. Part I, Chapter III), but they both were made within 
the same framework, that is, by making use of the CTBT treaty provisions only, just 
anticipating the application of the treaty without providing innovative ideas for it, and 
not answering the difficult question associated with the provisional application of the 
treaty. It is not intention here to establish any sort of ultra vires interpretation of article 
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XIV, but instead to find a way to use it to overcome what it has of more restrictive: the 
entry into force. 
 Besides those proposals, it should also be referred Austria’s suggestion in June 
1995 to include a provision allowing that a simple majority of the states party to the 
CTBT could decide to apply the Treaty provisionally. This proposal was then refused. It 
could be a way of answering the requirement of article 25, n. 1, al. a) of VCLT. We 
consider that the present statu quo of the treaty cannot remain as it is forever, once its 
credibility will eventually be put into question and that might implode the treaty. At this 
stage, this does not seem to be the large majority of States’ option, or else they would 
not tenaciously participate in the Preparatory Commission and other Policy Making 
Organs works and would not meet their financial obligations regarding the treaty. 
Although article 25 refers to the provisional application of a treaty and not to 
another legal instrument on provisional application of a treaty, it does not exclude it as 
well. The fact is that when considering provisional application, both situations must be 
taken into consideration together
835
. It could be of value to try this different approach
836
, 
by combining the elements already elsewhere identified and use them differently, 
recurring to other international law instruments. The recourse to diverse legal orders as 
models, namely the EU legal order, should be useful as well
837
.  
The ultimate aim in this study is to try to apply EU legal provisions as models to 
an international law specific situation. From the political point of view, it is necessary to 
always bear in mind that any attempt to do it in a real scenario might face the present 
increasing suspicion regarding EU initiatives as far as the multilateral context is 
concerned.  
This attempt will be made keeping in mind the specificities of EU law compared 
to international law
838
, and it must also be taken into account the fact that international 
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law does not have any source of legislative regulation, like EU law does, being forced to 
renew and re-conclude treaties on the same subjects
839
 just to introduce new elements. 
“In reality, as long as institutions are non-universal, only problems can play the 
role of a constant”840, it is also with this background that the questions of entry into 
force and provisional application will be dealt with. Although CTBTO, UN and EU are 
very different organizations, the fact is that when it comes down to law, the problems 
are often the same and likely to be treated in a very similar way. International politics 
and international law evolve, can and should adapt themselves to different 
circumstances. Even if a solution for a case may not be fully used in a different context, 
it may still be considered in some of its elements. 
Although praesumption similitudinis should be considered, it does not mean that 
it necessarily has to result in the confirmation of a full similitude. Only by comparing 
the law systems may we know what are the applicable alternatives and the possibilities 
of adaptation. The presumption of similarity has nevertheless to be established to allow 
possible similar aspects to be identified. 
As far as disarmament and non-proliferation are concerned, not only hard law is 
applied by States and courts, but also a reasonable set of soft law instruments is often 
adducted
841
. The definition of soft law is large and encompasses several elements that 
contribute for the full characterization of international law
842
. Moreover, the soft law 
option may make negotiations easier because of its non binding character
843
. The 
pervert effect is that it may eventually become international customary law, and can be 
argued as a valid source of international law
844
 . On the other hand, because treaties are 
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written, they may become obsolete, and they need to be updated, while soft law may be 
easily transformed
845
. 
Again, soft law is another source, though not a legally binding one, to the 
configuration of international law. The option to use soft law as a “ballon d’essai” of 
hard law is often chosen. 
One of those soft law elements is UNGA resolutions
846
. These elements may be 
an important contribution to customary international law, especially because they 
contribute for the formation of the necessary opinio juris
847
. The case of treaties, that 
have been approved by a UNGA resolution and then have been signed by a large 
majority of States and ratified by a large number as well, must be taken, at least, as 
examples of customary international law, if they are not in force and cannot be 
considered hard law yet. That is the case of CTBT. We shall avoid sustaining – although 
we agree – that the repetition of a subject or act makes it customary law, as scholarship 
argues and the ICJ opposes
848
.  
The creation of preparatory commissions is: 
i)  often included as an annexe to a treaty creating an international 
organisation. This was, for instance the case of the IAEA.  
ii) The preparatory commission may also be envisaged in the text of the 
treaty itself
849
.  
iii) In the case of the CTBTO, it is an element which is referred to in the 
treaty, but it is not established in the treaty. The preparatory commission 
is created by a “text” annexed to a UNGA resolution850, thus making it a 
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somehow provisional application of a particular aspect of the CTBT, thus 
replenishing a possible soft law enclave in the treaties
851
; 
iv) The preparatory commission can take decisions, it has legal personality 
and it is almost an International Organisation
852
. Besides the implied 
powers it may have, the text, for instance, that creates the CTBTO 
Preparatory Commission also defines some powers, competences, rights 
and obligations of the Commission. 
One of the first questions regarding a possible provisional application has to do 
with the reception of international law by domestic legal orders
853
. If in many cases 
international law, and in particular multilateral treaties, impose themselves on domestic 
orders (as it is the case of Australia, Canada, the Netherlands), in many others, like 
India, United Kingdom or South Africa they require national legislation to be effective. 
This distinction goes beyond the difference between the monism/dualism debate. The 
role of courts in addressing questions arising from international treaties, independently 
of the approach to the form of incorporation of the Treaties into domestic national 
orders, is much differentiated
854
.  
The interpretation rules applied to treaties by the national courts depend on the 
form the international law is incorporated in national legal orders as well as on the 
general rules of interpretation of treaties
855
. The imperfect reception of the provisional 
application protocol by domestic orders might suggest it is impeded of producing 
effects for that particular State. The fact is that it would not affect the rights and 
obligations towards another party of the treaty. 
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2. Unratified treaties856 and entry into force difficulties 
 
The cases of unratified treaties are numerous, namely in the case of multilateral 
ones
857
. The fact is that one party may impede the rest of the parties to take advantage of 
a treaty, as its non-ratification may imply the non-entry into force
858
of the treaty. That is 
the case of CTBT
859
, because of annex 2 to the Treaty. Nevertheless, the act of signing a 
treaty establishes a compromise
860
 that, even if not legally binding, it has a normative 
character that should not be ignored. Both the VCLT, in its article 18, and the ICJ 
sustain this position
861
. We consider that article 18 reproduces principles of 
international customary law, reiterated several times, therefore, even States that are not 
parties to VCLT, are bounded by those principles. 
The question of retarding the ratification is often used as a political weapon, 
especially because the signature does not legally impose its ratification
862
, even if that it 
is expected to happen in a near future, there is no binding nexus between both stances, 
but signature is clearly the first step for a State to assume a position on a particular 
treaty
863
, and it creates rights, duties and obligations. The same is valid – and even 
stronger – in the cases of accession to treaties. 
Compliance in the case of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
instruments depend on the effectiveness of entry into force of those treaties but for that 
to happen there is a serious of negative and positive incentives that may be applied and 
which literature has extensively developed. As negative incentives we point out the use 
of sanctions; while as positive incentives the scientific and technological cooperation, as 
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well as the civilian use of the means of a treaty may be considered
864
. Moreover, the 
option for provisional application of this kind of treaties is not unusual
865
. 
The idea of compliance in the case of treaties that deal with peace and security 
assumes a greater relevance that makes their entry into force even more urgent. Without 
it, and even if soft law or customary international law issues may be included, the 
chances of those treaties becoming law are very thin. The provisional application is of 
merit to help solving this problem. 
 
3. A few examples of provisional application of treaties 
 
It would be impossible to assess here all the examples of provisional application 
of treaties, the option made was to choose differentiated possibilities both as far as 
procedures and scope of the treaties are concerned, as well as diverse domains of those 
treaties where it has been used, in order to demonstrate that there is no ab initio 
restriction to the provisional application. One particular case is the treaties that create 
Preparatory Commissions of International Organizations
866
 (as it was the case of ICAO, 
IMO, OPCW and CTBTO). They are usually set to create an institution that can develop 
tasks that are required before the entry into force and which will be necessary for the 
implementation of the treaty, namely by facilitating training and scientific studies on the 
subjects concerned, and by fulfilling the tasks that are required for the entry into force 
take place, for instance, the establishment of monitoring systems. 
The most famous case of provisional application is perhaps the Protocol of 
provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
867
, as it lasted 
from 1947 to 1994. This Protocol
868
 lays out the provisional application of the 
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agreement concerned, but establishes a distinction among its different constitutive 
parties. This means that not all of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is 
provisionally applied. Withdrawal from the protocol is also possible. 
The Protocol on provisional application of the revised treaty of Chaguaramas
869
, 
for instance, restrains its application by excluding some of the articles of the treaty, 
which clearly reflects that, although the Protocol may be complimentary to the treaty, 
and it does endorse its full scope, some of its provisions are not included in the 
provisional application. Article 25 VCLT refers to a “treaty or part of a treaty”, which 
means that both possibilities are clearly admitted in international law. 
In the case of UNCLOS
870
, the agreement on implementation of Part XI of the 
Convention is indeed an additional protocol on provisional application of the treaty
871
, 
even if only of a part of the Convention. Unlike the precedent examples, this agreement 
includes much more provisions making it a treaty with broader characteristics. 
Interestingly, its article 7 refers to the provisional application of the treaty, although in a 
complex way
872
. Curious situation, once this agreement serves to provisional apply a 
part of the convention. Moreover, alinea a) of that same number stipulates that the 
agreement will be provisionally applied by all the States that have consented to its 
adoption by the UNGA. Although it is an implementation agreement, it should not be 
taken as only that, as in reality it presupposes the application of UNCLOS
873
 (part of it). 
This was also a way to reflect the concerns of some States that otherwise would never 
ratify UNCLOS
874
. In our view this option goes beyond what article 25 VCLT directly 
foresees and extends several aspects of that article. 
As article 25 of VCLT establishes, this agreement may include a temporal 
provision fixing a date for the termination of the agreement
875
. The question of 
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termination of provisional application answers different questions which literature has 
already deeply developed
876
. 
In the case of UNCLOS there is a more developed model which includes: 
i)  not only a possible date for its cessation (in reality two, either the entry 
into force of the Convention or 16 November 1998, in case its entry into 
force is not possible);  
ii) a complete process for the conclusion of participation in the agreement; 
iii)  the possibility of an opt-out clause. It is clear that UNCLOS allows an 
intervention by the whole international community as far as common 
interests are concern, like the attack on piracy and on terrorism, making 
UNCLOS a convention that reflects a will from the States to address 
those common problems, even if there are aspects that may require a 
distinct approach
877
 (like the questions regarding the seabed). 
Another example of a protocol on provisional application is to be found within 
the context of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
878
. In this case there 
was a deliberate option to only include some of its articles. There is a temporal 
framework for its implementation. In the case of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, several declarations were adopted at the same time, complementing 
the interpretation given by the States to the provisional application. This Protocol
879
, 
although not referring to all the provisions of the Treaty, clearly includes those 
mentioned in its article One and that they will be applied in light and conformity with 
the whole Treaty (i.e. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). A way of 
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respecting article 18 VCLT principles as far as the obligation not to defeat the object 
and purpose of the treaty is concerned. 
The Open Skies treaty 
880
defines on its own text the conditions for the 
provisional application, namely its scope, as not all the treaty is envisaged for the 
provisional application
881
. The time frame of the application is also included in the 
treaty
882
. 
The Energy Charter Treaty
883
 is another example of provisional application
884
. 
The EU, by then CE, took a decision
885
 which firmly establishes its provisional 
application without any other criteria or factor sustaining it, apart from a previous 
communication by the European Commission that considered the Energy Charter Treaty 
of foremost importance for Europe. It must be said that article 45 on provisional 
application
886
 includes the procedures for the application and forces the Parties that do 
not want to apply it provisionally to clearly make an opt-out of the article. An annex to 
the treaty refers the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovakia as States that do not accept the provision of article 45
887
. 
The provisional application of these treaties, as well as others, makes lege 
ferenda to become lex lata
888
. A controversial transformation as usually it implies the 
replacement of one for the other, while as we have seen above, there may be cases of 
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simultaneity of lege ferenda and lex lata regarding the same treaty. This relevant 
dichotomy has also been raised and developed regarding the CTBT 
889
.  
While nothing in the TEU and the TFEU refers to any possible provisional 
application of those treaties, article 218 TFEU (former article 300 TCE) kept the already 
existing provision that authorizes the Council to sign treaties on behalf of the EC and, if 
the case may be, to allow the provisional application of the Treaties. The provision of 
article 37 TEU - granting rights to the EU to conclude treaties within CFSP - must also 
be taken into account. This happened with the Energy Charter Treaty and later with the 
Open Skies Treaty
890
. 
It is questionable if the provisional application of a treaty may grant rights and 
obligations towards third parties, namely signatory parties, but in some cases third 
parties may also be granted rights just for the provisional application from some other 
parties. To avoid doubts on this matter, as well as abuses, it might be of use to expressly 
mention the ruling on this matter in the protocol on provisional application. However, if 
the aim is to move forward, it may be well the case that by granting those rights, it can 
be motivation for other States to sign and to ratify, as well as to provisionally apply the 
treaty. 
The provisional application is intended to answer some questions caused by the 
delay in entry into force of treaties: 
i) Urgency of the matter891; 
ii)  If ratification is sure, then provisional application is just an anticipation; 
iii)  To ensure that there is no breach in the legal development or 
implementation of the treaty. One example, as we have seen, is the 
creation of preparatory commissions to prepare the grounds for the entry 
into force. 
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4. The possibility of provisional application of CTBT 
 
Nothing in the Treaty refers to this possibility, neither is it excluded. According 
to VCLT, article 25: “1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its 
entry into force if: (a) the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating States have in 
some other manner so agreed.” It should be noted that in the definitions list of article 2 
VCLT provisional application or provisional application are not included
892
, but the 
heading in article 25 VCLT restraints its content to provisional application and we shall 
consider that only this is a possibility
893
. 
In the case of CTBT, States may have one or more of three different statuses: 
Negotiating States, Signatory States and Ratifying States. We would recall that a 
ratifying or signatory States does not necessarily have to be a negotiating party. Article 
XIV of the treaty determines that only ratifying and signatory States are supposed to 
participate in the Conference that should deal with the question of entry into force.  
We consider that negotiating States referred in article 25 would be applied to the 
negotiating States of the additional protocol that may be adopted for the purpose of 
provisional application and not to the negotiating States of the treaty, so that States that 
have ratified but did not participate in the negotiations might be excluded, which would 
be in our view contra legem, as the Sates might have differentiated rights. The 
provisional application of the treaty shall not impact on negotiating states that 
eventually did not sign, ratify or accede to the treaty, as they are not part of it. Thus both 
CTBT and VCLT could be fully respected
894
, even if a broader reading of article 25 
VCLT is needed. 
Likewise some of the provisions of the large majority of multilateral treaties are 
by their own legal character supposed to be exercised previously to the entry into 
force
895
; therefore the provisional application of at least parts of a treaty is no strange 
figure in law and practice. Moreover, n. 2 of article XIV of the treaty states that the 
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measures to be decided have to respect international law, which means that these 
measures may refer to international law instruments that address the issue in the cases 
where the article is silent on any question within its scope. 
Article XIV speaks about “measures consistent with international law may be 
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into 
force of this Treaty”. In a very restrictive reading, it seems that provisional application 
is not directly addressed in this provision, and therefore it seems that only VCLT 
provisions could apply for that case, as “measures consistent with international law”. 
We do not share this limitative and narrow interpretation. 
Quite the opposite, the use of the words “accelerate” and “early” makes the use 
of article XIV more flexible. The question is that it does not seem possible that all 
States that have not ratified the treaty, or even those that have, would accept a 
provisional application, especially because it was not agreed beforehand. We consider 
that the provisional application could be object of an additional protocol, which in 
reality would be a new legal instrument, thus contributing for the CTBT to move 
forward and thus to promote its universalisation. 
This additional protocol would have to comply with a few criteria, inter alia: 
i) respect of customary international law896; 
ii) respect of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens);  
iii) respect of  the treaty’s text, Parties’ duties, obligations, and rights. 
One extra problem with provisional application of the CTBT would be the 
financial support of the PTS and of the whole IMS and IDC, as the treaty establishes the 
payment by signatory States, who may not be the same as for the additional protocol 
and which may decide not to let it be at the service of the provisional application 
protocol. 
A new instrument may impose the same provisions as the original treaty, but it 
will be valid only for the states that decide to move forward, as it would happen with 
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the normal entry into force in the case of those states that would not ratify and for whom 
the treaty would not be in force
897
.   
On the one hand, the fact that the question of provisional application is treated in 
a separate instrument of the treaty in question may facilitate its implementation. It can 
be argued that the provisional application based in a non-ratified treaty can hardly be 
admissible
898
, that is, the provisional application by a non-ratifying party, even if 
desired, may be questioned. Nevertheless, and especially in the case of arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, there may be a political reason for it, that is, 
a party may not want to ratify before another one does so, but from the legal and 
technical perspective, the treaty in question may be very well implemented. 
The additional instrument regarding provisional application may be considered 
materially complementary to the treaty in question, once its legal value depends upon 
the treaty it refers to. This is very relevant. Although separate instruments, it must be 
clear that the additional protocol on provisional application requires the main treaty, 
without which it is ineffective.  
In the case of CTBT, this additional protocol, besides the legal questions it may 
involve regarding procedural matters of its approval, ratification and entry into force, it 
will also have to deal with the complicated problem of compatibility with the technical 
provisions of the treaty. 
At first, the problem of use of data and of its confidentiality would have to be 
addressed, should it include all the available data, or only of the States that would agree 
on provisional application of the treaty? Can the states that opt for not participating in 
the provisional application of the treaty impede the interchange of data once it would be 
done by using the IDC network? Once even without the provisional application of the 
CTBT the data is already available to all Signatory States, it seems there is no reason to 
impose any limitation on the matter in case of provisional application. 
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Finally, OSI could still not be applied for the simple fact that the organ that 
should take a decision upon it (the Executive Council
899
) does not exist without the 
entry into force and to transfer its competences to a different organ might seem to go 
much beyond the provisional application of the treaty. However, we tend to admit this 
possibility but as long as it does not change the Treaty architecture. We shall argue that 
the exercise of the competences of the Executive Council could be granted to an ad-hoc 
council of the States that decide to provisionally apply the Treaty. This ad-hoc council 
should respect the same proportional rule envisaged for the Executive Council in the 
Treaty 
 The role of the provisional technical secretariat would remain as it is and it 
should keep receiving the financial contributions envisaged in the legal instrument that 
creates it
900
. 
We shall remind here that all treaties include some provisions requiring at least a 
tacit provisional application, namely as far as procedural tasks are concerned (inter alia 
translation, ratification and deposit). These tasks are normally uniform provisions to 
treaties
901
 and do not have a direct link with the specific object and purpose
902
 of the 
treaty. A provisional application agreement is a legal instrument and therefore it has 
legal effects and not only political effects
903
, which would be the case of a decision by 
the Conference of Article XIV, or even by AGNU. This should be the venue for the 
adoption of the text, but it would only be legally binding after its entry into force, like 
any other treaty
904
. 
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more involved with the provisional application of the Treaty. 
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In the case of CTBT, the resolution that creates the Preparatory Commission and 
its Secretariat
905
 launched the legal basis for the development of some of the goals of 
the treaty, due to the technical requirements needed before entry into force. If it is true 
that the VCLT stipulates that only entry into force makes a treaty legally binding, the 
fact is that there are other forms of making some of its rules binding even before the 
entry into force
906
, whether simply by including a provision on provisional application 
in the treaty or with a protocol on provisional application and/or by including customary 
international law or peremptory norms of international law in the treaty. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, both international custom and jus cogens are binding. 
This is the case of CTBT, i.e. the main object of the treaty is today a customary 
rule, even if it has been violated. Moreover, as far as explosions are concerned, and 
according to the ICJ, the fact is that declarations by States may be assumed as a binding 
legal instrument
907
, thus making that customary law a compulsory law. Some of the 
negotiating States that have not signed or ratified the treaty may be bound by its main 
aim (these are the cases of India and Pakistan). It is important to note that even non-
members in any form of CTBT, may be affected by these customary international 
principals. One case was the use of the CTBT information by the UNSC to fundament 
its allegations of North Korea nuclear tests as a violation of international law 
obligations. Even if the UNSC does not refer to CTBT – because it is still a non-binding 
instrument – it is the data collected by the IMS and IDC and which are of possible use 
by its Signatory States that technically sustain, for instance, and along with IAEA data, 
UNSC resolution 1874. 
The CTBT does not allow any kind of reservations, as we have seen before, 
except for its protocol and respective annexes. Identically, the possible provisional 
application instrument should not be opened to reservations; furthermore this is the 
usual case of provisional application instruments
908
. 
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5. Why a provisional application of CTBT? 
 
Taking into account the delay and impasse on the entry into force of the CTBT, 
its provisional application may facilitate the development of important technologies 
which may be useful for the future implementation of the treaty. Moreover, the CTBT is 
a repository of legally binding provisions, which may not be assumed as such before the 
entry into force of the treaty, while it is clear that the CTBT is an important means to 
guarantee an extra element to international efforts regarding peace. The normative 
character defined by CTBT can in some aspects be applied provisionally without 
compromising an eventual ratification or precluding its entry into force. The provisional 
application would only confer legal effectiveness
909
 to the normative character of the 
treaty, even by making some of its aspects legally binding for some parties. 
The option for a new legal instrument on the provisional application to include 
provisions that can only take place on entry into force if they depend on the overall 
organic of the treaty is a sensitive one. That could be the case of the OSI, as they depend 
on the Executive Council, which shall not exist before entry into force. It is no surprise 
that Anguel Anastassov
910
 excludes OSI from provisional application. We consider that 
provisional application of a treaty should be kept as close as possible to the treaty in 
question there is a way to circumvent the difficulty regarding OSI. 
The Executive Council cannot be replaced by another permanent instance once it 
is formed by a restrictive number of ratifying States, which mean that the CTBT needs 
to enter into force for its creation. The provisional application should not create 
competitive institutions to those that the treaty creates, in reality the closer it is to the 
treaty, the easiest it will be to grasp ratifying States, and even signatory States. Nothing 
should impede, nevertheless, that a group of States that wants to move forward quicker 
is blocked to so because of an institutional question that can be solved. If the 
provisional application is strictly voluntary, so should OSI be. It cannot be the 
Preparatory Commission to replace the Executive Council, but within the group of 
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States that would adopt the provisional application protocol, there could be a provision 
“duplicating”, in an ad-hoc way, the Executive Council. 
 Any provisional application has to ensure some flexibility, namely by allowing 
the possibility of withdrawal, especially in the case of CTBT where withdrawal is also 
possible
911
. 
We have addressed the possibilities of provisional application of CTBT that 
scholarship has presented
912
 so far, only to conclude that none has made a real 
breakthrough, even if they identify the major problems for it to happen. Nothing can 
assure our proposal might be a solution or accepted by the States. 
Clearly, once the treaty does not specifically refer to provisional application, a 
decision on that issue could be considered by all the negotiating States of CTBT, but it 
does not have to be approved by all of them, but only by those who might be affected by 
the provisional application or that can decide upon it, meaning that the text can be 
discussed by the Preparatory Commission
913
. Although the Treaty was negotiated in the 
Conference on Disarmament, the fact is that the Conferences of article XIV are intended 
to address the problem of entry into force.  We concur with Anguel Anastassov
914
 on 
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 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 10 September 1996, http://www.ctbto.org/ 
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 See Part I, Chapter III. 
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 According to rules 21 and 22 of Rules of Procedure of the Preparatory Commission, 
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 Anastassov, Anguel, “Can the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Be Implemented before Entry 
into Force?”, Netherlands International Law Review,  vol. 55, n.1, 2008: p. 96-97. For the benefit of 
reading, and once a proposal on entry into force will be attempted, we re-quote here the two possibilities 
known which have been addressed in Part I, Chapter III, starting with Anastasov’s proposal: 
 
Preamble 
The States Members of the Preparatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Member States”, 
Underlining the objective of the CTBT to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the 
enhancement of international peace and security, 
Concerned about the slow pace of ratification process and slim prospects of entering into force of the 
CTBT in a near future, 
Called for the early signature and ratification of the CTBT by all States that have not yet done so and for 
them to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose in the meantime, by, inter alia, 
preserving the announced moratoria on nuclear testing, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I. Purpose of the Operational Protocol 
The purpose of this Operational Protocol is to put the CTBT into effect on a mutatis mutandis basis even 
though the Treaty as a whole has not yet entered into force. 
Article II. The Organization and scope of activities 
1. The Preparatory Commission shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider 
any questions, matters or issues within the scope of the CTBT, including those relating powers and 
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using as much as possible the means foreseen in the treaty for a possible approval of 
such an instrument, but not exclusively, as long as legally possible,  as not only article 
XIV is vaguer, but also article 25 VCLT leaves room for alternative interpretations
915
. 
It is true that if it is decided to use only the conference of article XIV to adopt 
the decision of the enhanced cooperation protocol, some negotiating parties of CTBT 
would be excluded. On the other hand, as the provisional application is to be decided 
after the treaty has been approved, as a separate instrument and only affecting those 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the CTBT and its 
provisional application. 
2. The Preparatory Commission shall not act as a substitute for the Executive Council on issues 
related to on-site inspections. The latter may be performed as a confidence-building measure at the 
initiative of and as an act of good will by the Member States concerned. 
3. The Provisional Technical Secretariat shall assist the Preparatory Commission in the 
performance of its functions, in accordance with the CTBT. 
Article III. Adoption of the Operational Protocol and accession  
This Operational Protocol shall be adopted by consensus by States participating at the Conference on 
Article XIV (2). Any Member State may accede to this Operational Protocol at any time by sending a 
formal letter to the Chairperson of the Commission thereafter. 
Article IV. Entry into force 
This Operational Protocol shall enter into force immediately after its adoption by the Conference on 
Article XIV (2).  
Article V. Duration 
1. This Operational Protocol shall be applied on a temporary basis for a period of 10 years, or until 
the CTBT enters into force earlier. 
2. After the expiration of 10 years States may decide by consensus to extend the duration of this 
Operational Protocol for another period, or periods. 
3. The provisional application of the CTBT in no way affects the existing requirements for 
ratification and entry into force of the Treaty as a whole. 
and Johnson, Rebecca, “Beyond Article XIV: Strategies to save the CTBT”, Disarmament Policy, n. 73, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd73/73ctbt.htm,  2003: p. 8. 
1.  To promote the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as opened for 
signature on September 24, 1996, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States Parties hereby agree to 
the provisional application of certain provisions of the Treaty. 
2. Without detriment to the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply 
provisionally all other Articles, Protocols and Provisions of the Treaty. 
3. The Treaty shall be applied provisionally [on DATE] by all States which have signed and ratified the 
Treaty, unless they notify the Depositary in writing that they do not consent to such provisional 
application. 
4. The Treaty shall be applied provisionally by any State which has signed the Treaty, which consents to 
its provisional application by so notifying the Depositary in writing. Such provisional application shall 
become effective from the date of receipt of the notification by the Depositary. 
5. Regardless of whether a signatory State has agreed to provisionally apply the Treaty, financial 
contributions for supporting Treaty implementation and verification shall remain as agreed in the 
Schedule [give details] unless a State notifies the Depositary in writing of its intention to alter its financial 
contribution. 
6. Provisional application shall terminate upon the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty. In conformity with Article IX of the Treaty, any State may also withdraw its consent from 
provisional application by notifying the Depositary in writing, and must include a statement of the 
extraordinary event or events related to the subject matter of this Treaty which the State regards as 
jeopardizing its supreme interests. 
915
 Villiger, Mark E., Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Leiden-
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009: p. 442-449 
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who have ratified or signed it, it does not seem required that negotiating parties that are 
not part of any of those groups intervene, as the treaty shall not affect them and they do 
not have to comply with the treaty, as the other two groups have (mainly because of 
article 18 VCLT).  
Any decision on provisional application must fully respect the object and 
purpose of CTBT
916
. This is a mandatory principle, or else instead of being a tool to 
allow provisional application, it would be then a revision of CTBT or a treaty on a 
different matter and on different grounds, and by being so we would be dealing with a 
distinct situation than the one that is intended to be addressed here. 
The CTBT has developed an IMS system which has been paid by the States and 
it is a valuable technical mechanism, and not only for disarmament and non-
proliferation reasons. States also support a provisional technical secretariat, meaning 
that part of the treaty is, in fact, already being applied provisionally.  
Theoretically, it could be possible to argue that CTBT goes much beyond the 
disarmament and non-proliferation law, as it encompasses, for instance, environmental 
and humanitarian law features
917
. Nevertheless, after 16 years, the World has changed, 
so must politics and law and an approach which points out civilian purposes of the 
treaty may be easier to sustain for some States. Moreover, the State Members of the 
Preparatory Commission and the participants in the article XIV conferences have been 
repeating the value of the IMS and the IMS data for civilian purposes
918
. For a full use 
of these data, and besides what the treaty and its protocols define, an extra effort could 
be made in order to facilitate its operationality. 
 
6. Enhanced cooperation and CTBT 
 
The provisional application of CTBT will always count on strong opposition by 
many States, both signatory and ratifying States, as well as negotiating States of the 
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CTBT. The approach regarding such an attempt must ensure it is transparent, inclusive 
and flexible. All these are characteristics of the EU enhanced cooperation model. The 
idea here is to suggest using this model for the provisional application of CTBT and not 
to make it a CTBT mechanism. 
Some of the concerns mirrored in the Treaties on enhanced cooperation are 
worries that could be shared by the negotiating, signatory and ratifying States of CTBT, 
but the EU model has provided answers to the majority of those uncertainties. Some 
specificities of EU enhanced cooperation – namely regarding the questions of legislative 
authority – shall not be considered for the problem at stake, once they are not applicable 
to international law, as there is no legislative instance, as we have explained before. 
The enhanced cooperation may promote vertical application, once it make it 
easier to add different areas of intervention, as well as horizontal application, as no limit 
on the number of states is to be imposed in this cooperation, thus fulfilling the 
inclusiveness character that a possible provisional application of CTBT must respect. 
Often the case of CTBT is compared with the situation of CWC. OPCW has 
already sustained enhanced cooperation among Member States to improve the 
implementation of the Convention
919
 and, as we have seen before
920
, the concept of 
enhanced cooperation is not unknown within the CTBT context, even if used in a 
general and non-legal way.  
To resort to the EU enhanced cooperation model as it is foreseen in the Treaties 
may not be fully possible, but again by counting on praesumption similitudinis it is 
possible to arrive to concrete results. It shall not be possible to institute a full enhanced 
cooperation at EU standards in CTBT, but many of its fundamental elements may be 
applied. These elements include the reasoning behind enhanced cooperation and the 
purposes for its launching. With this methodology, States may give another input to the 
implementation of article XIV and of CTBT. 
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7. Justification for the proposal for the provisional application of 
CTBT as an enhanced cooperation model 
 
It is no aim here to rewrite CTBT, but to contribute with a proposal to overcome 
the entry into force impasse of CTBT, bearing in mind that even if legally it may be a 
feasible suggestion, the fact is that it will always depend on the political will of the 
States involved, which is far from granted. 
The flexibility allowed by EU enhanced cooperation both regarding the 
participation, the aims it includes and the decision making process may well be a 
stimulus for provisional application of CTBT. 
EU enhanced cooperation assumes that it cannot be used unless it is addressed at 
the aims of the Treaties and it should only be used as a last resort option
921
. In the case 
of the CTBT the respect for the purpose of the treaty, and because it is precisely a 
treaty, is beyond question, especially because article 18 VCLT also forces the full 
respect for the object and purpose of the treaty. This also means that the possible 
instrument to be adopted should not try to rewrite CTBT (as we have seen, this is not 
always the case, like it happened with UNCLOS and its protocol on provisional 
application of part XI of the Convention). The enhanced cooperation ensures the full 
respect for the Treaties
922
, and so should the instrument on provisional application of 
CTBT do.  
We consider that there is no reason for a treaty that does not admit reservations 
to be changed before entry into force, especially in the case of CTBT because at this 
stage a large majority of States has already signed and ratified the treaty. 
Like in any other treaty, a possible protocol on provisional application will only 
be binding on the States that take the decision to implement it
923
. As far as the 
deliberations process is concerned, and after the adoption of the Protocol on provisional 
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application of the CTBT, we are of the view that all interested States should be able to 
participate in the process – as long as they are also able to participate in the Preparatory 
Commission –in order to preserve consensus. However, if voting might be necessary,  
only States affected by those deliberations, that is, the parties to the provisional 
application protocol, should vote
924
.  This distinction can facilitate States to accept this 
idea easier. 
The possibility of letting non-members of the protocol to participate in its 
deliberations ensures transparency and attractiveness to the process. Furthermore, and 
like EU enhanced cooperation is conceived
925
, any Signatory or Ratifying State should 
be allowed to accede to the Protocol at any time. This openness may also be useful to let 
more States to participate. Although enhanced cooperation does not include a 
withdrawal clause, we consider that this option should be given to the parties, especially 
as it is a possibility foreseen in EU for structured cooperation, which deals with defence 
matters
926
. 
An important difference regarding EU enhanced cooperation is that, in our view, 
if the number of States is reduced to a smaller number than the one necessary to 
establish one, then the rebus sic stantibus principle applies (although we do not foresee, 
as previously explained, how this could be possible). This is not the case with a protocol 
on provisional application for the fact this is a full treaty and not a provision within a 
legal instrument, but an autonomous one. Because it is a treaty, the safeguard of article 
55 VCLT
927
 allows it to be kept valid, and this cannot be applied to EU enhanced 
cooperation because that is no treaty, nor is there any provision in the existing Treaties, 
to support it. The idea of initiating a process with a view towards a protocol on 
provisional application following EU enhanced cooperation mechanism has to be 
developed in order to identify the actors in the process and their competences. 
It is impossible to refer to a relative number as the universe of putative members 
is still flexible. Only concrete figures are to be admissible. Relative references will be 
impossible as the reference universe is not defined. To consider the Annex 2 States 
would be to duplicate CTBT and, what is worse, the difficulties for its entry into force. 
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A number equal to annex 2 States, which is 44, seems to be adequate. That same 
number – of signatory or ratifying parties, and not negotiating parties – would be 
enough for provisional application of the treaty. We consider, however, that an extra 
layer could be added, and that it would be that within the minimum of 44 States, all the 
regions of annex 1 of the CTBT should be present, independently of how many States 
of a particular region would take part in the protocol. The goal of universalisation would 
be better kept this way. 
The request for the enhanced cooperation for a  Protocol – which text is to be 
adopted at an article XIV Conference – should be addressed to the Preparatory 
Commission, which, supported by the Provisional Technical Secretariat
928
, that already 
exists, should have the competence to validate its legal consistency with the content of 
the treaty.  The Preparatory Commission should be the organ to decide upon the 
possibility to go ahead with such an initiative. 
The consistency of a possible protocol on provisional application with the 
CTBT, that in its original text does not refers to its provisional application, is to be 
found in the combined reading of different sources and taking into account precedents 
in international law. Two major legal sources should be consistently and simultaneously 
considered:  CTBT article XIV
929
 and article 25, n. 1, al.b) VCLT
930
. VCLT is silent 
regarding the time frame for a protocol on provisional application, both as far as its 
duration is concerned and far as its adoption. 
At first it seems the best option would be to adopted along or within the treaty it 
refers to, but it has been demonstrated that its need may be only subsequently identified 
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and not at the signing moment of the treaty
931
. This is the case of CTBT. The so-called 
enthusiasm of 1996 fade away after the American Senate refused to ratify the treaty, 
making its implementation a hard question to deal with., 
Some of the major benefits of EU enhanced cooperation may be well applied to 
CTBT, thus reinforcing the possible application of this mechanism for the provisional 
application of the treaty. Taking into account what was previously presented
932
, we will 
try to see that in its application to CTBT: 
i) It includes a group that is big enough to ensure effectiveness of the 
provisional application and it is an open group which means that any 
possible allegation of exclusion, common when dealing with, arms 
controls, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, cannot be accepted ;  
ii) Prevents bilateral arrangements between parties and may allow the use of 
CTBT structures. The proposed model ensures a level of flexibility that 
makes it easier for States to participate. At the same time, while there is a 
common project on provisional application of the treaty, possible 
intentions of having just bilateral agreements on this matter may be 
avoided
933
;  
iii) Minimises the risk of institutional tension between the different States 
and with the provisional technical secretariat, as it was involved in the 
process from the beginning. 
 
8. Proposal of a text on the provisional application of CTBT to be 
adopted by an article XIV Conference 
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The text should be adopted at an article XIV Conference as a decision
934
. The 
idea is to avoid the multiplication of instances and instruments and benefit from the 
inclusive nature of the Preparatory Commission (something that the Conference on 
Disarmament would not have for this purpose)
935
, as this would be the organ to decide 
on the possibility to go ahead, as the conference of article XIV is not a political organ, 
but just a venue for the act to take place. 
Although formally it is a decision, in reality it will adopt a text of a treaty which 
launches an enhanced cooperation even if depending on another treaty. The fact is that 
article XIV only refers to “measures consistent with international law”, and enhanced 
cooperation is consistent with international law, as we have already seen. 
A possible text could be drafted as follows: 
 
Protocol on provisional application of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty 
 
Preamble 
 
The Signatory Members of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
936
 
(hereafter the Member States), 
Appealing to all States that have not still done so, to proceed with the signature 
and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to facilitate its entry into 
force and at the same time appealing for meanwhile maintain the announced moratoria 
on nuclear testing, 
Recalling the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty
937
, 
Having regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and in particular 
article XIV thereof,  
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Having regard to encouraging the progressive development of international law 
and its codification
938
, 
Having regard to the request made by at least 44 Signatory Members of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
Having regard to the decision by Preparatory Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion the Provisional Technical Secretariat, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
 
Article I – Object and purpose of the agreement 
 
1. Following the request presented by at least of 44 Member States to the 
Preparatory Commission, Member States decided to agree on enhanced cooperation 
between those States for the conclusion of a protocol between interested Member States 
to proceed with the provisional application of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty. The decision adopting the text of the enhanced cooperation shall be taken by 
consensus. 
2. The present working structure (Preparatory Commission, Working Group 
A, Working Group B, Advisory Group, Provisional Technical Secretariat
939
) will 
remain unchanged. 
3. The Provisional Technical Secretariat will analyse the technical and legal 
consequences of the enhanced cooperation and will formulate a non-binding opinion on 
the request. 
4. Decisions shall be taken by consensus and if needed by voting of the 
enhanced cooperation members according to the rules of procedure of the Preparatory 
Commission proportionally adjusted to the number of Members of the enhanced 
cooperation.  
5. Decisions taken will only affect the Member States of the enhanced 
cooperation and cannot be regarded as binding instruments on other Signatory or 
Ratifier States of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or Third Parties.  
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6. With the agreement of the Preparatory Commission, common structures, 
and instruments, inter alia, namely the Provisional Technical Secretariat may be fully at 
the disposal of the enhanced cooperation Member States. 
 
Article II – The Preparatory Commission 
 
1. Until the definite entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will remain the principal decision organ. It 
shall not be able to revise the decision on the protocol of provisional application of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, neither of the ad-hoc enhanced cooperation 
council referred in article III. 
2. The enhanced cooperation Member States shall have the obligation to 
inform the Preparatory Commission of the uses they will consider for and give to 
International Monitoring System (IMS) and the IDC (International Data Center) data. 
 
Article III – On-site inspections 
 
1. Member States part of enhanced cooperation agree on on-site inspections 
(OSI) according to the general rules of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
its Protocol adjusted to the number of Member States part of enhanced cooperation. 
2. For the purposes of OSI, Member States of the enhanced cooperation will 
agree on an ad-hoc executive council which will be the sole responsible for OSI. The 
ad-hoc executive council will be constituted following the same proportionality as 
foreseen in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for the Executive Council,.  
 
Article IV – Costs of enhanced cooperation 
 
Costs arising from the enhanced cooperation shall be born only by the Member 
States that participate in the enhanced cooperation.  
 
Article V - Signature and ratification 
 
283 
 
 This Protocol shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force. 
It shall be subject to ratification by signatory States according to their respective 
constitutional processes.  
 
Article VI – Accession and withdrawal 
 
1. This protocol is open to all Member States that want to join at further 
notice. In this case, a notification to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission is 
required. 
2. Each Member State shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the 
right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Protocol or the  Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty have 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
Article VII – Depositary 
 
1.  The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of 
this Protocol and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of 
accession.  
2.  The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding 
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification 
or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol.  
3.  The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Protocol to the 
Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.  
4.  This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
Article VIII – Authentic texts 
 
This Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
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texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.  
 
 
Article IX – Validity and entry into force 
 
1.             The present Protocol will remain valid as long as the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not enter into force. On that occasion its effects will 
immediately cease. 
2.             The present Protocol enters into force 30 days after the twenty-second 
deposit of ratification or accession. 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Comparative law 
 
In the attempt to achieve the aim of this study, The EU enhanced cooperation 
model: possible application to the entry into force impasse of CTBT, we were faced 
with a parallel evaluation within International and European law regarding enhanced 
cooperation. Although a comparison between the two legal jurisdictions as such was not 
intended, an assessment was made in order to recognise similarities in the usage of the 
concept, just to conclude that nowhere but in EU is the concept so largely developed in 
legal terms, even if it is used (sometimes in slightly different format) in other stances. 
We argue that European law may well provide examples and solutions to 
International Law issues, and not necessarily just by imposing its own model. Clearly 
European law endorses the main concerns of International Law, as this is clearly stated 
in the Preamble of the Treaties, and its legal development is unique and can be 
translated into other realms outside Europe.  
The EU is facing a very serious crisis, mostly financial, but also social, 
demographic, cultural and political. It is a serious situation that must be looked at 
carefully as it seems clear that in the future no EU state will have the possibility to 
survive alone, that is, without being integrated within EU
940
.  
The Treaty of Lisbon has put EU at stake at international level by granting the 
EU a legal personality and so far it has not been able to assume its role. Despite the 
UNGA resolution on its status, the fact is that in many other instances, EU still does not 
have a status; such is the case of CTBT, a situation that makes it more difficult to act in 
the international arena. Within this logic, we wanted to demonstrate that the EU legal 
order is a living and adaptable one and can be applied in very different situations, 
suffice it to be politically handled with care. 
                                                                
940
 Piris, Jean-Claude, The Future of Europe. Towards a two-speed EU?, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012: 166p. 
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If the EU is clearly an economic entity
941
, we cannot forget that the Treaties also 
speak of an “ever closer Union”, which, in our view, is not attainable just by economic 
reasons, even if this can be its first or one step
942
. The EU will be stronger and closer if 
it stops looking exclusively to itself and reaches the outside changing world by 
widening the scope of areas where its intervention, model and expertise can de an 
added-value, and where it can clearly be a reference. The legal development can clearly 
be one of the arms of EU external relations, just as important as its economic role in the 
world. 
The role of the European States and the EU as a whole as far as International 
Law is concerned is unquestionable. Mostly multilateral international instruments 
commonly use EU Member States law (both civil law jurisdiction and common law), 
even if added with inputs from other jurisdictions, like Islamic law or others. This 
happens not only because it is diverse, but also because it has been developed for long 
and exported to many other States which have used EU Member States Law for the 
fundaments of their own jurisdictions. Due to the fact that EU law is itself a 
combination of civil law jurisdiction and common law, it is able of a kind of flexibility 
that national jurisdictions might not be able to cope with alone. 
Within this comparative framework, between European Law and International 
Law, also between CTBT and VCLT, this study has tried to point out similarities that 
contribute to solidify the urgency to pressure for the entry into force of CTBT. We tried 
to identify correspondences between different elements to prove that there is a 
consistency that contributes to make norms binding easier. 
Enhanced cooperation is largely used both within and outside the EU, but hardly 
in its proper legal meaning. The EU, even if still recurrently using the two terms without 
any legal meaning, went further by giving this binomium a specific connotation, both 
politically and legally. However, its use took some time to be applied and it is still 
surrounded by lots of suspicions within EU.  
                                                                
941
 Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European 
Council in close collaboration with José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission,  Jean-
Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, 
05.12.2012 or Communication from the Commission. A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union. Launching a European Debate, COM(2012) 777 final, 28.11.2012: 51p. 
942
 Communication from the Commission. A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union. Launching a European Debate, COM(2012) 777 final, 28.11.2012: p. 13. 
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Nevertheless, it recently has been used and evoked for very different contexts 
and we are convinced that the legal model could be transposed into International Law. It 
is a way of going further, without compromising the common goal. We have suggested 
it to be used for the provisional application of CTBT, but the same could also be said 
regarding other treaties, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations or The 
“Rotterdam Rules” (i.e., the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea), which are still not in force, 
though a thorough analysis is required. 
 
2. The multiple uses of enhanced cooperation 
 
After divorce and patent, now taxes
943
, it is clearly a proof that enhanced 
cooperation may be applied to generally all sort of issues, as long there is the will for it. 
By doing so, it does not change the Treaties, it allows flexibility to the States to 
participate or not, and once in force it may entice less receptive States to change their 
mind. Collectively, enhanced cooperation allow tasks to be executed that otherwise 
could not be implemented. Its contribution to deepening the EU should prevail over the 
“attacks” sometimes enhanced cooperation receives for allegedly jeopardizing the 
integration rhythm of EU
944
. This is a false quarrel; enhanced cooperation somehow 
existed since the beginning of the EEC or the EU and it does not fragment the EU or its 
legal framework, but instead it is a step ahead, a step all that want may take. The 
important fact of this mechanism is that it does not replace or contradict the acquis, and 
therefore it cannot be accused of being responsible for any fragmentation. There must 
be, however, some attention to avoid confusing enhanced cooperation with 
intergovernmental initiatives, as the enhanced cooperation is at its root a EU mechanism 
                                                                
943
 Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax, Brussels, COM(2012) 631 final/2,25.10.2012: 12p. 
944
 As the European Council of 18 October 2012 clearly states, Communication from the Commission. A 
blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a European Debate, 
COM(2012) 777 final, 28.11.2012: p. 16. 
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created by the Treaties
945
 and not an intergovernmental instrument. Although an 
agreement between a few, it is constituted according to the Treaties. 
Enhanced cooperation is thus a very effective means for an “ever closer 
Union”946, especially with a growing number of Member States. The fact that the 
enhanced cooperation is an open model, meaning all States can join at any moment, 
reflects the spirit of integration behind the Treaties. 
If it is true that EU enhanced cooperation has an integrative purpose – at least 
this is our view –, the fact is that its legal model can be used in a more loose way in 
International Law, just helping to define procedures and roles and not necessarily being 
exclusively focused on integration. However, in this case we would question, is not a 
treaty always an example of integration, in the sense that two or more parties share the 
same goal and join forces to its reach? 
The consequences raised by a non-entry into force of a treaty are probably more 
of political nature than of legal logic. However, there have been cases where the legal 
framework has been used to justify the political option not to move forward with the 
procedures to bring a treaty into force. In the case of arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament treaties there is often some misuse of the legal question while in reality the 
goal is purely a political one, in many circumstances to force decisions in different 
matters involving same partners. The CTBT is one of those cases. 
 
3. The special case of provisional application of treaties – the CTBT case 
 
Any provisional application of a treaty must keep as final goal its entry into 
force. The enhanced cooperation model does not include any element that may impede 
it in any sort of way, thus using its norms it may be possible to conclude a protocol on 
                                                                
945
 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, 
27.11.2012, paras. 166-169. 
946
 Communication from the Commission. A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union. Launching a European Debate, COM(2012) 777 final, 28.11.2012: 51 p. We have seen in the past 
that the “threat” on enhanced cooperation give the opportunity for the European Arrest Warrant. We do 
not expect in the future – just because the number of Member States has greatly increased – that this kind 
of pressure may enable so fast results, but we are confident that in the medium and long term it will have 
similar effects. 
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provisional application that respects all the rights of the States, still it is flexible on its 
application and does not preclude anything regarding the effective entry into force of 
the CTBT. However, taking into account that it is an EU model, it can politically cause 
suspicion in non-EU Member States when suggested in international fora, but that 
should not be a reason to avoid the attempt. 
In general, some of enhanced cooperation model characteristics are shared by 
International Law when referring to this kind of instrument. The open character of 
enhanced cooperation is usually referred in other instances. However, if openness is 
ensured as to participation, it is not always considered as far as withdrawal is concerned. 
This is the case of enhanced cooperation in EU law, but not of structured cooperation. 
We consider that the subject matter of CTBT, as it happens with the treaty (article IX of 
the Treaty) justifies the possibility of withdrawal. 
Article XIV provides a venue for the adoption of such a Protocol; our proposal 
does not exclude any Signatory States. All ratifying States are also Signatory States, and 
the provisional application should be granted to Signatory States for the simple fact that 
a Signatory State has duties (like financial duties towards the PrepCom) and rights (as 
for instance access to IMS/IDC data). Those States that have excluded themselves from 
the process, even if they had been negotiating parties of the Treaty, should not interfere 
with a provisional application that shall not affect them. 
One other aspect that is relevant for enhanced cooperation is the clear definition 
of its purpose, and we have worded our proposal in that sense, that is, the idea here is to 
apply enhanced cooperation as a legal procedure allowing the provisional entry into 
force of CTBT, but it does not foresee any other aspect of the treaty. The different 
inclusions in the proposal on specific matters were made to, first, justify the provisional 
application, and then to enlighten on what it refers to. It was not our intention to apply 
enhance cooperation to the whole CTBT, but to use it just for one specific matter. 
The EU model insists that enhanced cooperation should be used only as a last 
resort provision. This is not shared by all International Law when using enhanced 
cooperation or similar procedures, but again we consider that one of the added-value of 
the EU Law is the ability to answer to difficulties that no other solution has found. 
Moreover, if enhanced cooperation would be possible from the start without any other 
attempt, one could question the logic behind a treaty that is intended to be universal, or 
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better, comprehensive. All the same, the case of CTBT entry into force, especially after 
so many unfruitful conferences on the subject, is well positioned to admit a “last resort” 
project. 
We have included a provision on ulterior participation by States so that it reflects 
its openness character, as it happens in the case of the EU model. This openness is by no 
means strange to the CTBT, which foresees the possibility of accession. In the proposal 
presented in this study, the large majority of procedural steps that are referred to in the 
Treaties have been included, after the necessary adaption to a different universe.  
With a protocol on provisional application and specially by using the enhanced 
cooperation method, we can conclude that for us the CTBT has another chance to be 
implemented. This is also an experience from the legal point of view that could be of 
value to EU Law, by showing its advantages and reflecting its possibilities. 
Enhanced cooperation, as we have demonstrated, can be applied theoretically to 
a wide range of domains without having necessarily to be applied within EU law 
framework. It is a legal mechanism likely to be used as an alternative to full 
participation of all members to any instrument, facilitating the process to move forward 
and not jeopardizing any rights of participants or non-participants. In the case of CTBT 
we do not see any other option for its implementation that does not allow some 
flexibility taking into account the formalities foreseen in the treaty. It seems that there is 
indeed a need to find alternative paths to make CTBT a reality.   
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is the product of decades of 
discussions on non-proliferation and disarmament instruments, and also arms control. It 
includes some provisions – even if adapted – of other treaties on related subject matters. 
It is the mirror of a specific moment in time, as it follows the 1995 conference of 
revision of NPT, the end of Cold war and the change of the defence paradigm in the 
World that came with it. There was always an effort – still very much sustained by the 
PTS and many State Members – that CTBT is a technical treaty and should not be 
politicized. However, reality has demonstrated that this is more often than not just a 
telluric idea (the same goes to the IAEA). 
For the first time, and unlike previous treaties, CTBT includes a ban on all 
nuclear tests in all environments. The treaty is very detailed on the verification regime, 
but lacks to impose itself due to an entry into force clause that makes the treaty hostage 
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of 44 specific States’ political will. It will never be excessive to recall that States should 
do all that is possible to ensure ratification and entry into force of a treaty
947
. It clearly 
has not been the case with CTBT. We reviewed the treaty text not focusing so much on 
its technicalities of the verification regime, but to identify and point out elements that 
could facilitate the entry into force, as this was our challenge. The question on entry into 
force is included in article XIV, but it is necessary to see the whole treaty, so that 
elements that may help the process of entry into force may be identified. 
The proposal presented in the last part of this study for the provisional 
application of CTBT intends to allow a large majority of States to be able to use it fully 
and by doing so incentivise others to do the same. It is necessary to find ways to 
overcome the impasse of CTBT, as more than 150 States are hostages of just a few, and 
in some cases there seems to be no indication they will change their position regarding 
the CTBT in the near future. 
Clearly on line with VCLT, there is no intention to consider provisional entry 
into force (which some States, like Portugal, even refuse constitutionally) but just its 
application until full entry into force. This provisional application option has been used 
elsewhere
948
 with proven success. 
The venue for the adoption of the Protocol on Provisional Application of the 
CTBT has also been subject to an analysis taking into account that the CTBT has been 
negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament; the treaty text was adopted by a UNGA 
resolution; and submitted to the States for its signature and ratification. The possible 
Protocol could take advantage of the possibility open by the conferences foreseen in 
article XIV of the CTBT. 
 
4. Possible changes in the enhanced cooperation model 
 
  If there is political will, there is always a possibility for a change to happen. 
Regarding the EU enhanced cooperation model, two aspects may be object of concern, 
the minimum number of States in a growing number of Members of the EU and the 
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 International Court of Justice, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Preliminary Objections, I. C. J. Reports, 1998: p. 
275-327. 
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possibility of leaving the enhanced cooperation. In this particular case, the situation 
seems to be very odd, as Member States can leave the EU and structured cooperation, 
but not the enhanced cooperation, that is, there is no legal provision in the Treaties that 
allow it. Would it be possible to create an opt-out situation for enhanced cooperation? 
Theoretically it seems possible, but politically it seems to contradict the aim of the 
enhanced cooperation regarding the enhancement of integration. 
 As far as enhanced cooperation could be applied to International Law, it remains 
to be seen the context and the legal instruments – if we were to think only about the 
provisional application of a treaty – that are at stake. The advantage is, as the model 
does not have a legal international base, but it just a legal model, it could be adapted or 
adjusted in the instruments
949
 that are to be adopted for its putative implementation. 
 
5. Final note on concepts used 
 
As far as CTBT is concern we tend to admit both disarmament and non-
proliferation in reference to the Treaty, but would rather avoid arms control. Even if the 
goal of impeding nuclear explosions may inevitably contribute to arm controls, and the 
Treaty refers that all aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation should be taken into 
account, we tend to consider that arm controls is one specific chapter within that process 
and CTBT is a comprehensive treaty. We consider it should be clearly differentiated 
from multilateral export control regimes like the NSG or MTCR. 
The approach as far as concepts regarding military treaties has been intended to 
clarify the different possibility of uses of those concepts and in particular its scope. Not 
only the definition of the purpose of such treaties is important, but also the meaning 
given to some of the concepts used in those treaties may set the boundaries for the 
analysis. Moreover, some of these concepts, in particular for some States due to internal 
reasons, acquire a more significant relevancy than others. One of the possible mitigation 
                                                                
949
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Signatory States, and the EU already has a corpus legis that includes it on general terms, while CTBT 
does not have any provision on enhanced cooperation. 
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of the concepts, and which is identifiable in treaties, political statements and scholarship 
has been the adding up of qualifiers that restringe (or enlarge) the scope and 
implementation of the concepts.  
We have analysed the CTBT and complemented its analysis with other 
International Law instruments, namely the VCLT. If it is true that VCLT is not a 
binding instrument on all the 185 States Signatory of the CTBT, the fact is that some of 
its provisions are already customary International Law, and others can be assumed as 
jus cogens.  
Some of the jus cogens principles included in CTBT have erga omnes effects. It 
is interesting to note that CTBT also generated moratoria on States that refused to sign 
or ratify the treaty, thus clearly demonstrating its jus cogens philosophy. Although a 
peculiar assessment of peremptory norm, the fact is that it still requires a legal 
instrument to be binding. It is clearly a new approach to jus cogens, the norm is not 
peremptory in itself but reality makes it a peremptory one, we refer to the prohibition of 
nuclear explosions. We would recall that whether ruled by a treaty, another instrument 
or being a jus cogens norm, nothing can ensure that States will not violate it. 
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 Liaison officer of the Tunisian delegation at the Ministerial Conference on 
Cooperation of the Western Mediterranean (Dialogue 5+5), 25 and 26 January. 
 Chief of the Portuguese delegation at the Commission meetings of the 
Committee “Visa Model”. 
 
1999/2001 
 Participation at the European Union Council meetings on Justice and Home 
Affairs’ groups: Visa, Frontiers, Migration and Expulsion. 
 Chief of the Portuguese delegation at the Commission meetings of the 
Committee “Visa Model”. 
 Supervisor at local elections in Kosovo (28th October 2000), organized by 
OSCE, deployed to Klina.  
 Supervisor at local elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (8th April 2000), organized 
by OSCE, deployed to Sarajevo, Ilidza-Federation. 
 Desk Officer of the Embassies and consular posts, discriminated hereinafter for 
all the visa matters (namely: authorizations of concession, evaluation of the processes of 
the demands, support on procedures, applicable rules and legislation, etc.): Havana, 
Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Valencia, Lima, Buenos Aires, Santiago do Chile, 
Montevideo, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, S. Salvador, Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, 
Porto Alegre, Recife, Santos, S. Paulo, Abidjan, Kinshasa, Luanda, Benguela, Lagos, 
Praia, Rabat, Argel, Tunes, Cairo, Manila, Bangkok, Tokyo, Seoul, Macao, Hong Kong, 
New Delhi, Goa. Sometimes he is responsible for all Embassies and consular posts.  
 Desk officer for the agreements on the abolition of visa requirements and 
readmission of people on irregular situation.  
 
1999/2000  
 Desk Officer of the Embassies and consular posts, discriminated hereinafter for 
all the visa matters (namely: authorizations of concession, evaluation of the processes of 
the demands, support on procedures, applicable rules and legislation, etc.): Havana, 
Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Valencia, Lima, Buenos Aires, Santiago do Chile, 
Montevideo, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, S. Salvador, Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba, 
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Porto Alegre, Recife, Santos, S. Paulo, Abidjan, Kinshasa, Luanda, Benguela, Lagos, 
Praia, Rabat, Argel, Tunes, Cairo, Manila, Bangkok, Tokyo, Seoul, Macao, Hong Kong, 
New Delhi, Goa. Sometimes he is responsible for all Embassies and consular posts.  
 Proceedings of the processes of the agreements on abolition on visa 
requirements and readmission of people on irregular situation. Analysis and suggestion 
of proposals, proceedings of the negotiation processes and formal conclusion of the 
processes for their entry into force. Study of bilateral and multilateral kinds of treaties. 
 
1999  
 Translation of history of art texts into Portuguese for catalogs of exhibitions at 
the Museum of Evora. 
 
 
1997/1999  
 Proceedings of all international relations themes within the office of Dr. Mário 
Soares, namely in what concerns European affairs and the International European 
Movement; Office/document support of the Fact Finding UN Mission to Algeria leaded 
by Dr. Mário Soares; Theoretical and practical support of Dr. Mário Soares’ work on 
the Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations’ report on 
Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions. Bibliographical and document research 
for Dr. Mário Soares. International contacts because of Mário Soares Foundation 
projects and Dr. Mário Soares activities. Preparation of files and texts on a wide range 
of different subjects on international relations.  
 Organization of the International Congress The New Geopolitical Data in 
Austral Africa, in the Congos and the Great Lakes’ Region , OPorto, 21st to 23rd 
May: logistics, scientific and international questions. 
 Reading, Proceedings and analysis of files on international politics, e.g., human 
rights, democracy, citizenship, environment, arm controls, culture of peace, peace, the 
relations between Portugal with other countries, especially with Latin America and the 
members of CPLP. 
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 Organization of the meetings of the Steering Committee of the World Water 
Contract, in January and September 1998. 
 Permanent control of the organization of the Congress of the Hague which took 
place in the Hague from 9th to 11th May 1998. 
 Support to the activities of the Mário Soares Foundation under the initiative 
of its President. Occasional contacts with the press.  
 Pre-show production of the invited artists to participate at the cultural events at 
the Frankfurt book fair (Portugal-Frankfurt 1997) Control of the entry into force of the 
contracts of those artists.  
 
1995/1997 
 Translation of texts of history of art for the Instituto Português do Património 
Arquitectónico e Arqueológico (IPPAR) for the catalogues of exhibitions on Miró and 
for the magazine of that Institut. Translation of texts for a brochure of the Museu 
Nacional de Arte Antiga.  
 
1995/1996  
 Portuguese language and culture teacher to primary students residents in 
Switzerland and children of Portuguese citizens. Work developed within the consular 
frame, with pedagogical support from the consular services.  
 Responsible for the verification of the entry into force and execution of the 
contracts of representation of music editors hold by Musicoteca. Control of Intellectual 
Property at the Intellectual Property Society of some of contract dispositions in result of 
that representation. Check-up of irregular situations as a result of the playing of 
represented pieces. Proceedings of the solution in those cases. Study of the viability of 
the representation of Wenger (musical equipment supplier) for Portugal.  
 
1993/1995  
 Developed all secretarial work of the administrator of the Department of Classic 
Music and Opera of Lisbon 94, European Capital of Culture. Responsible for the control 
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of entry into force and execution of the contracts of the artists for the program of the 
department; for the control of payments and financial treatment of the expenses of the 
department; for the executive budget of the department. Developed international 
contacts within his functions for the execution of the objectives of the department. 
Participated in translations, revisions and text editions of some of the programs of the 
area. Co-responsible for all pre-show production (execution of contracts, verification of 
the existence of all technical requirements for each show, logistics of the numerable 
participants at the shows - hotels, trips, etc.) of the Department of Classic Music and 
Opera of Lisbon 94, European Capital of Culture.  
 
1992  
 Teaching of English language programs to 7th, 8th and 9th grade, levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, at the Colégio de Santa Clara of Casa Pia of Lisbon. Developed extracurricular 
activities (study and leisure time) with pupils, most of them belonging to problematic 
contexts, both social and family. Responsible, sometimes alone, for his classes on those 
activities namely outside the school. 
 Responsible for the treatment of the correspondence for the International 
Seminar Judeus e Árabes da Península Ibérica: Encontro de Religiões, Diálogo de 
Culturas, as well as invitations and information on the Seminar. He worked under the 
direction of Drª Helena Vaz da Silva, President of the Centro Nacional de Cultura. 
 
6. PUBLISHED WORKS 
 
- Articles 
 
“Os caminhos de Santiago. O primeiro itinerário cultural do Conselho da Europa” in 
História (dir. by Fernando Rosas), N. 28, year XIX, new series, Lisboa, Projornal, 1997, 
pp. 54-61. 
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- Critical Essays 
 
 Garde, Paul, Vie et Mort de la Yougoslavie, Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 
1992 in História (dir. by Fernando Rosas), N. 21, year XVIII, new series, Lisbon, 
Projornal, 1996, pp. 62-64. 
 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994 in História 
(dir. by Fernando Rosas), N. 4, year XVII, new series, Lisbon, Projornal, 1995, pp. 66-
68. 
 Le Monde Copte (Dossier: La Femme), N. 16 (dir. by Ashraf Iskander Sadek), 
Limoges, 1980 in Hathor - Estudos de Egiptologia (dir. by Maria Helena Trindade 
Lopes), Vol. N. 2, Lisbon, Cosmos, 1990, pp. 114-116. 
 Lacau, Pierre, Une stèle Juridique de Karnak in “Supplément aux Annales du 
Service des Antiquités de l’Egypte”, cahier Nº. 13, IFAO, Cairo, 1984 in Hathor - 
Estudos de Egiptologia (dir. by Maria Helena Trindade Lopes), N. 1, Lisbon, 1989, pp. 
109-111. 
 
- Translations 
(From English into Portuguese, from Portuguese into English, from French into 
Portuguese, from Spanish into Portuguese and from Catalan into Portuguese) 
 
 Technical translations (History of Art) for the Museum of Évora, 1999. 
 Several technical translations (History of Art) for the Portuguese Institute of 
Architectonic and Archaeological Patrimony (IPPAR) in 1995, 1996 and 1997. 
 Cadernos do MNAA, N. 1, Relíquias e Relicários, Lisbon, Museu Nacional de 
Arte Antiga, 1996. 
 Several occasional translations for the activities program of Lisbon 94- 
European Capital of Culture, namely biographies and critical essays, in 1993 and 1994.  
 Gschwend, Annemarie Jordan, “Imagens de majestade: O Retrato de Corte em 
Portugal (1552-1571)” in Portugal e Flandres - Visões da Europa (1550-1680), Lisbon, 
Mosteiro dos Jerónimos, 1992, pp.113-117. 
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7. COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFERENCES GIVEN  
 
 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – the Portuguese Case, 
Wilton Park Conferences, El Escorial, 2
nd
 March 2003. 
 Portuguese Foreign Policy, Aerial War General Course, Instituto de Altos 
Estudos da Força Aérea, Sintra, 6th June 2002. 
 
8. DIVERSE 
 
 Member of the European Law Institute since 4 October  2011 
 Member of the Company of Good Cheer, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, since 
August 2002 
 Member of the International Forum on Globalization since October 2000. 
 Member of the European Movement since July 1997. 
 Member of Culturelink, UNESCO/Council of Europe since January 1997. 
 
 
 
Viena,  December 2012 
 
 
 
